On Oct 14, 2015, at 2:57 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > Conclusion? Nothing is innate.
innate |iˈnāt| adjective inborn; natural: her innate capacity for organization. ORIGIN late Middle English: from Latin innatus, past participle of innasci, fromin- ‘into’ + nasci ‘be born.’ Cheers jerry > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM > Cc: 'Peirce-L' > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > List, > > Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to > differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the > term. The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically > inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the > Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject. As such, it appears to be a > prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter. > > Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas: > > CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the > operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain > rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that > may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with > extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took > this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from > experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not exhaust > all possibilities. > > So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature has > been aware of the idea since birth. Two examples he gives of innate ideas > are the conceptions of time and space: > > 6.416 That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of > time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the > idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations > without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted. The > idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so > early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence, > that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of > degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to > the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do so present themselves > irresistibly at the very dawn of intelligence, and take possession of the > mind on small provocation, while of other conceptions we are prepossessed, > indeed, but not so strongly, down a scale which is greatly extended. > > So, it appears the Peirce thinks of innate ideas as those that consist in a > natural tendency for the idea to present itself to the mind and to grow. > The idea need not be present at the birth of the organism in order for the > idea to be innate. The larger question is one of where the natural tendency > finds its source or perhaps its authority for us. Those ideas that are > innate in the power of reason, such as the ideas involved in logical self > control, may take some time and effort on our parts in order for the natural > growth to come to fruition. Calling such ideas innate is a way of saying > that they are necessary for the realization of ends that are entirely > natural for us--such as the end of seeking truth--and that the seeds of > these ideas are already present in us. They may be present in us regardless > of the temptations that some might feel at times to call those ideas "social > conventions" or even to try to stamp those ideas out when they appear to run > contrary to other interests we might have--such as the interests of > cultivating social status, political power, or what have you. > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au] > Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 2:52 PM > To: 'Edwina Taborsky'; 'Ozzie' > Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do not > believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this > specific point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate > knowledge is that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework as > readily as can the empty bucket theory. > > Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all > inheritance of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN take > place without the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. You can > do away entirely with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a > reasonable explanation for inheritance of behaviour across the generations > (I posted on this a couple of times to this forum, most recently on Thu > 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a scientific Buddhism"). > > And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of > behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and > debunked as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of > corruption in the peer-review process, colour me sceptic: > http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retract > ions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 > http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf > > So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate > knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic framework > that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty > bucket interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics. > Without an axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what > Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences), we have no life science... > hence my rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation. > > sj > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM > To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' > Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my > comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that > was the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point > was that a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, > insects, animals and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our > species has an innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for > imagination which enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, etc. > > Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience. This has nothing to do > with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with 'naive > cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues: > > 1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I suggested, > I think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is > genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual > (i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many > cases to be genetic rather than learned).. > vs > 2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT > subjective but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective reality) > and how does the collective knowledge base adapt and change? > > Edwina > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au> > To: 'Edwina Taborsky'<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; > 'Ozzie'<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com> > Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com> ; > 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. > However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive > idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive > idealism (naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning and > announce "today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then proceed to > become a different person from that point forwards, simply by the force of > will. > > As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and > how they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context of > a compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the > sense of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can > only ever be subjective. > > Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says "it's > all in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I can be > whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of simplistic > linear thinking. > > sj > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM > To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' > Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > To my understanding, Stephen J., you subscribe to what is known as the > 'Empty Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where the > human species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from almost > passive experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind of > knowledge - that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to > nominalism and relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't exist > in such an epistemology. > > See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective > Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the real', > the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs; and > human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a > Peircean 'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be > rational, to imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the > disposition to learn a language. > > Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and > only on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common > will to knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective > world. I don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places > all causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of > culture - BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how > to be' and the human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and > this is genetic. What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity > for logic, order, organization and symbolic communication. These permit its > knowledge base of 'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge > base of, let's say a frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to > adapt, while the human species changes its technology - a far easier and > faster method of adaptation. Language - and the rational analysis of the > world - which are both genetic within our species - enables man to critique, > describe, the objective reality and change his methods of interaction with > it. > > Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to speak, > are merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist > beliefs that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining > another set of beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the > objective world such that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis can > view it objectively. > > Edwina > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au> > To: 'Ozzie'<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com> > Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com> ; > 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Hi Tom, list, > >> ”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make > predictions about behavior? “ > > Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and > none of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA > blueprint. Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that > pragmaticism... establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. > The simplest and most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. > Richard Dawkins based his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other > ways of defining the things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a > subset of “knowing how to be.” > > Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we > recognize their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being > raised among humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour, incorporating > it within the terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token, > there are records (of varying credibility) of children raised by wild > animals (e.g., the “Wild Boy of Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine, > variously affirmed or debunked by “experts” who know nothing of neural > plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic principles). There is nothing > necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains of feral children... their > brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning how to be. Thomas Szasz > has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... it’s about experience, > choices and wiring. > > Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most people, > when they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of > their home culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives that > they must contend with are entirely different to the narratives back home. > Often, radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of > “knowing how to be” by realizing the extent to which one’s personal > narratives are alien to those of the new culture. You make the same > transactions as everyone else does, in your new culture, so you assume that > they are connecting with the same narratives... nothing could be farther > from the truth. > > So what sort of prediction would you like to make? I can predict that an > animal in the wild, beyond the sphere of human knowing, will become feral. I > can predict that a child raised in a knowing of abuse and violence, is going > to grow up knowing the narratives of abuse and violence. And whether or not > they rise above it will be contingent on the experiences to which they are > exposed and the choices that they make. If they are lucky, they might chance > upon a role model who might show them an alternative way of “knowing how to > be.” In Christianity, Jesus provides a role model, an example of “knowing > how to be.” How practical is that? Religious conflicts arise from different > ways of “knowing how to be.” > > But of course this is where the entrenched objectivist, genocentric > narrative kicks in... “it’s all in the genes, silly.” No, it’s not in the > genes. It’s about knowing how to be. It’s about plasticity, especially > neural plasticity, and how the brain wires itself to incorporate experience > into its narratives and its identity. Genes and DNA are important, of > course, but nothing as described in the spirit of the genocentric narrative. > >> ”Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA > (you suggest that I probably do) “ > > Might I suggest that, while you have an appreciation for the semiotic theory > of Peirce, your narratives continue to be influenced by the established > genocentric narrative. The scaffolding* for your semiotic theory is not > complete, it is a work in progress. And therefore you do not have an > intuitive feel for the reach of semiotic theory. This is why you have > trouble with “knowing how to be” and still see it is vague. > > As an engineering/business graduate ignorant of Peirce, I first formulated > my own theoretical outline, independently of Peirce, a couple of decades > ago. And prior to that, I devoted much effort to trying to understand what > motivates people in a cultural context... why are they so trapped in their > cultural bs? So my scaffolding has been a work in progress for a very long > time... and yet to this day, I continue to be surprised that I am still > learning new things... the adventure continues. Putting the scaffolding in > place takes a long time and requires considerable effort. And each stage > yields more insights, more layers to work on. When I talk about the > domestication of animals, for example, some less experienced Peirceans might > think to themselves “how nice, I buy that” and then fail to grasp the reach > of what I am trying to say because, continuing to whisper into their ears, > is the genocentric narrative, along the lines of “yes, what sj is saying > sounds pretty cool, but instinct because genes.” You can entertain a theory > on the surface, but remain mired in a scaffolding that continues to inform > the rest of your thinking. > > The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was > starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that > cliché, “like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL about > “knowing how to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise, laser > sharp. It is the core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it because > you continue to interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream > and the scaffolding that has established your “knowing how to be.” You need > to address your scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist koan: > > A Cup of Tea > Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), > received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen. > Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then > kept on pouring. > The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could > restrain himself. > “It is overfull. No more will go in!” > “Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own opinions > and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?” > > *I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the > structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having access to > the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using the > word in the right context. > > sj > > From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM > To: Stephen Jarosek > Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Stephen, List ~ > In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the young > ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was > eaten by crocs or made it safely across the river. > > If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't > endanger his survival. Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being > pushed into the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of > his species. Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to > volunteer for hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not > let their eyes bulge? > > If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, > drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is > premature. > > What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age. Did he know > how to be a buffalo when he was younger? What caused the transformation? > Did he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo? > > I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't mean > anything specific to me. (Yet, perhaps it does to others.) Can we use it > to animate our logic and make predictions about behavior? > > Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you > suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in conflict, > either. For example, social institutions do not have DNA. Neither do water > molecules. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > > > On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek > <sjaro...@iinet.net.au<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote: >> ” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more > complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can > survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest > motive.“ > > But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines the > things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to “knowing > how to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as > motivation (firstness?), is established within the context of that knowing. > This vaguely defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic > narrative... it seems to imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA > blueprint, which I for one do not buy into. > > sj > > From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM > To: Stephen Jarosek > Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > Stephen, Matt ~ > Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated > than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can survive (long > term) without individual members having a self-interest motive. Perhaps the > old buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs. Maybe > that's how he got to be old. And perhaps the young bulls behind him are > impatient and less afraid. Both may be self-interested, though not endowed > with equal wisdom. (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars? The > young soldier charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced > soldier keeps his head down. It's a matter of knowing how to be alive > tomorrow.) > > I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that > describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a > definitive account of nature's logic. For example, consider the example of > beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators. I'm > not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she can be > said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring. Maybe she can do > so despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious. ("Internal > fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use > external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are released > separately and are fertilized outside of the body.") > > In some species, sex is pleasurable. In those cases an "ugly" male or > female may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time. That > allows the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward > nonfunctional adaptations (that don't promote survival). > > Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern > humans would describe as rape. Then, selection is more a case of the > relative strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared toward > individual survival or that of the species. That institution (rape) mixes > up the gene pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling sex > to stay close to home for protection. (This process may describe early > human evolution.) > > Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of, > and those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently > attributed to kinship genes. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > > > On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek > <sjaro...@iinet.net.au<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote: > Matt, > > Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses > cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the > group only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every > organism has to “learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to > be”, you factor in the motivation for an organism to work for the good of > the group... not directly, of course, but by default... natural selection > meets semiotics. Easy peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial > insight. His reference to an elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river > by the herd can also be understood within the context of “knowing how to > be.” Regarding the passing of the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural > selection is SECONDARY to its demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up > with the “knowing how to be” of the herd. When it loses its ability to keep > up with the herd and its behaviour, that is when natural selection kicks in. > Natural selection is better understood in the context of failing to keep up > with the group, whereas “knowing how to be” is of greater importance, first > cause, and the source of complexity. Indeed, factoring in “knowing how to > be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, much more compelling than > reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. “Knowing how to be”... > humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do it, men and women do > it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. Natural selection is > the filter of variety, the penalty/reward for improper/successful conduct. > “Knowing how to be” is semiotics. > > sj > > > From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com] > Sent: Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Matt - I have some logical questions: > > 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable > perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable > perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the > species." > > I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because > it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work > toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert' > (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy). > > Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it: > https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s > > > Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a > reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both > privileging the gene and harming the species? > > Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, > but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving a > gene type. > > He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful despite > this trait making them more likely to be preyed on. > > A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its > competitor's but harms the species: > http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html > > Matt > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ________________________________ > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
