Hi Gary F., Kobus, Lists,
For my part, I don't think the point Peirce is making in this sentence itself
is all that simple: "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as
it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." (CP 8.328)
There are a number of ways of trying to diagram such a relation. Does one of
the possible ways capture something that Peirce is trying to say is really
basic? Pick any of the ways that this combination of a second and a third
might be diagrammed and see if it is adequate for articulating what Peirce is
doing in the richer discussions of the ways theses relations are brought
together, such as in the essay on "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to
develop my categories from within" or in the two essays on the nomenclature and
division of dyadic and triadic relations. These essays raise hard questions
about what Peirce is saying about the ways that dyads and triads can be
combined. Or, I find it hard to tease it all out. If there is some simple way
to explain what he is doing in these essays, I'm all ears.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 6:23 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8917] Re: Peirce's categories
I have to confess that I don't see the problem here, or the need for an
elaborate explanation. Peirce's sentence seems to me perfectly clear in its
context (CP 8.328):
[[ The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough. Giving
to being the broadest possible sense, to include ideas as well as things, and
ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas we do have, I should define
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus:
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and
without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to
a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a
second and third into relation to each other.
I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. ]]
Each of these "ideas" is the mode of being of a thing or idea ("that which
is"). I think Edwina also confuses the issue by saying that Thirdness is a
"mode of organization of matter". Peirce never says that about any of his
"categories."
Gary f.
} Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can
be counted. [William Bruce Cameron] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 28-Oct-15 08:02
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [biosemiotics:8914] RE: Peirce's categories
Hello Kobus,
I happen to think that is a very good question, and one that is not adequately
explained in the secondary literature. Having spent some time digging through
Peirce's works for clearer answers, I think the answers can be found in the
texts--but I sure wish Peirce had made things clearer himself. One thing we
need, I think, is a clear explanation of how the key ideas that are being
worked out in the phenomenological account of the formal categories are being
developed and refined in a diagrammatical manner in the graphical systems of
logic. That isn't much of a response, but I look forward to seeing what others
have to say.
If you are interested in seeing a bit more of an answer, I have a short paper
that was presented at the Congress last summer and would be happy to share it
with you. Bill McCurdy has also worked on this problem, and he has come to
similar kinds of conclusions about how we should picture the connections that
are being formed between un-bonded monadic, dyadic and triadic relations.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Kobus Marais [jmar...@ufs.ac.za]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:15 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>
Subject: [biosemiotics:8913] Peirce's categories
Dear List
I hope that you will have patience with what may be a very ignorant question.
In CP8.328, Perice defines thirdness as follows:
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a
second and third into relation to each other.
Now, I would have thought that thirdness brings a first and a second into
relation to each other. Why would Peirce say that thirdness brings a second and
a third into relation to each other? In which sense could thirdness bring a
second into relation with itself? Or what am I missing here?
Thanks.
K
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