That's exactly what I wrote in my earlier post - ...that Thirdness is bringing
two entities into relation with each other' (not two OTHER entities, but two
entities). I wrote:
"So Thirdness as this generalizing mode, can link two ordinal objects...the
First one and the Second one..because these particular objects might have
something GENERAL in common with each other..."
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'PEIRCE-L'
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 1:25 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8920] Re: Peirce's categories
I am tempted to quote Howard Pattee here: “any analytical approach to
understanding simplicity always turns out to be very complex” (Pattee 1973,
73). If you want to diagram all the implications of Peirce’s definition, you
will need the entire system of Existential Graphs.
Peirce says, “Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.” To me this is
equivalent to saying “Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as
it is, in bringing two other entities into relation to each other.”
I think the perceived problem may arise from trying to assign some kind of
metaphysical substantiality to the terms “second” and “third” in Peirce’s
sentence. The reference is simply to the other two ‘entities’ (“ideas” or
“things”, to use Peirce’s words) in a triadic relation. (The reason for the
scare-quotes there should be obvious enough.)
Gary f.
} What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
[Wittgenstein, Tractatus 4.121] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 28-Oct-15 11:41
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [biosemiotics:8918] Re: Peirce's categories
Hi Gary F., Kobus, Lists,
For my part, I don't think the point Peirce is making in this sentence itself
is all that simple: "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as
it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." (CP 8.328)
There are a number of ways of trying to diagram such a relation. Does one of
the possible ways capture something that Peirce is trying to say is really
basic? Pick any of the ways that this combination of a second and a third
might be diagrammed and see if it is adequate for articulating what Peirce is
doing in the richer discussions of the ways theses relations are brought
together, such as in the essay on "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to
develop my categories from within" or in the two essays on the nomenclature and
division of dyadic and triadic relations. These essays raise hard questions
about what Peirce is saying about the ways that dyads and triads can be
combined. Or, I find it hard to tease it all out. If there is some simple way
to explain what he is doing in these essays, I'm all ears.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 6:23 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:8917] Re: Peirce's categories
I have to confess that I don't see the problem here, or the need for an
elaborate explanation. Peirce's sentence seems to me perfectly clear in its
context (CP 8.328):
[[ The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough.
Giving to being the broadest possible sense, to include ideas as well as
things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas we do have, I
should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus:
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and
without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect
to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a
second and third into relation to each other.
I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. ]]
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