Ben, Gary F, I like Gary's suggestion about "throwing everything" into the predicate or into the subject. However, not quite everything gets thrown in, right? There still needs to be some bare minimum subject if everything gets thrown into the predicate, and some bare minimum predicate if everything gets thrown into the subject. I'm not sure this works.
Ben, I thought to myself of that possibility, namely of erasing the subject and letting the rhema or term remain. But I don't see how propositions and arguments can really be like terms in this sense, since propositions certainly require subjects and arguments do because they require premisses in the form of propositions. But, I was looking through Natural Propositions to make sure I understood the "throwing everything in" idea, and I found a quote from Peirce that Frederik included in his text that seems pertinent. NP, p.84, quoted from "Pragmatism", 1907, 5.473: The interpretant of a proposition is its predicate; its object is the > things denoted by its subject or subjects (including its grammatical > objects, direct and indirect, etc.). So this says that the subject-term represents the object of the proposition, while the predicate-term represents the interpretant of the proposition. We should probably imagine that interpretants don't all come down to being cases of predicate-terms. But if we consider that the conclusion of an argument is the argument's interpretant, and comes in the form of a proposition, and that such proposition itself can be interpreted by way of its predicate, then propositions and arguments can ultimately be interpreted as predicate terms. A term, in this way, as an interpretant, signifies all the characters of the propositions and arguments leading to it, while denoting, by way of its determination from such determining signs, the object(s) of the determining signs. What do you think? Franklin On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Gary F., Franklin, > > Gary, you wrote, > > I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition > and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician > would gain by regarding them that way. > [End quote] > > In "Kaina Stoicheia" III. 4. (EP 2:308), 1904, > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm > Peirce says: > > [....] If we erase from an argument every monstration of its special > purpose, it becomes a proposition; usually a copulate proposition, composed > of several members whose mode of conjunction is of the kind expressed by > "and," which the grammarians call a "copulative conjunction." If from a > propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately > denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a *rhema*; but I > shall take the liberty of calling it a *term*. Thus, from the proposition > "Every man is mortal," we erase "Every man," which is shown to be > denotative of an object by the circumstance that if it be replaced by an > indexical symbol, such as "That" or "Socrates," the symbol is reconverted > into a proposition, we get the *rhema* or *term* "_____ is mortal." [....] > [End quote] > > Somewhere Peirce also notes that a proposition is a medadic term. > > Best, Ben > > On 11/8/2015 1:48 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Franklin, > > I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition > and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician > would gain by regarding them that way. But to me it sounds like a precursor > of his (much later) observation that one can analyze a proposition by > “throwing everything” into the predicate *or* by throwing everything into > the subject. Maybe his comment in the Regenerated Logic also works in both > directions. > > In the Kaina Stoicheia passage, when Peirce says that the “totality of the > predicates of a sign” is “called its logical *depth*,” and that the > “totality of the subjects … of a sign is called the logical *breadth,*” > the sign he is referring to has to be a proposition, because only > propositions include subjects and predicates. Each subject and each > predicate can be called a “term,” but it’s the breadth and depth of the > whole sign, the proposition, that Peirce is defining here, not the breadth > or depth of the terms (which is what he defined in ULCE). And, as you say, > propositions and arguments also have information (which for Peirce is the > logical product of breadth and depth). > > Gary f. > > } The birth and death of the leaves are the rapid whirls of the eddy whose > wider circles move slowly among the stars. [Tagore] { > > <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/>http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* > gateway > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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