OK, thanks Jon. That is clear enough. You are right on all counts, I think. I would think that Russell and Frege come out as rationalists (my version) on this account, but Peirce does not (on these grounds at least). That would put Peirce closer to my position than I could argue for previously, though I suspected it. I was strongly influenced by reading Peirce as an undergrad, though I did it without guidance and paid more attention to how it influenced my own thinking than to what the correct interpretation of Peirce was. My 1984 PhD thesis refers to Peirce as an influence, but I am a bit cagey on this, and remarked in a footnote that it depended on how Peirce was interpreted. People like Nicholas Rescher and Hilary Putnam were also influenced by Peirce, but drew some conclusions diametrically opposite to what I was arguing. Our 2007 book, Every Thing Must Go, opens with a Peircean positivism that is also present in my thesis (not to be confused with either that of Comte or the Logical Positivists like A.J. Ayer, which are considerably more strict in rejecting metaphysics). The only paper I have published from my thesis so far was titled “Pragmatic Incommensurability”, a take on Kuhn. Both Kuhn and Phillip Kitcher praised it, but a number of more radical idealists were more critical. My own approach lends itself to naturalism rather than the anti-psychologism you mention, which I tend to associate with rationalism. Another place I deviate from Russell, but perhaps not Peirce, if you are right.
John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > -----Original Message----- > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] > Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 5:27 PM > To: John Collier > Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > Subject: Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > John, all, > > This is just one of those points I've been pressing for the last quarter of a > century or so, for example, if I may append a self-quotation: > > <QUOTE> > > Peirce's claim that his definition of a sign involves no reference to human > thought means no necessary reference. > The adjective "nonpsychological" that he often attaches to this conception of > signs and logic is not intended to be exclusive of human thought but to > expand the scope of the concepts beyond it (Peirce, NE 4, 21). The prefix > "non" > is better read as an acronym for "not of necessity," and is commonly used in > mathematical discourse in just this way. > It extends the use of a concept into wider domains than the paradigm cases > upon which our original intuitions were formed. > > </QUOTE> > > Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : > The Risk of Inquiry”, _Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines_ > 15(1), > 40–52. > Archive: > https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/in<https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http:/chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html> > quiry/fall95/awbrey.html<https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http:/chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html> > Journal: > https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040<https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052> > _0052<https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052> > Online: > https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_o<https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry> > f_Inquiry<https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry> > > Peirce's non-psychological definition of logic as formal (= normative) > semiotics and his non-psychological definition of signs in terms of triadic > sign > relations yield very different fruit from Frege's anti-psychological harvest, > especially in the raw state picked by Russell. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 11/19/2015 9:09 AM, John Collier wrote: > > Jon, Lists, > > > > I agree that starting with Cartesian dualism will give a bad > > interpretation of Peirce, but I am not sure what you mean by your first > distinction. Could you expand? > > > > The Cartesian position is a consequence of what I called rationalism > > if it accepts material substance. Idealism is the result if it does > > not (what I take to be Russell’s position, though he also argued for > > what he called neutral monism, which is not technically idealistic in, > > e.g., the Berkeleyan sense). I am unclear if Peirce was a rationalist, > > but I suspect that his idealism stems from this. It would be a mistake > > to understand this more or less as Russell as a world of universals, which > Peirce would reject as a form of nominalism (though Russell would shudder > at this idea). Peirce’s metaphysics is definitely not a Cartesian world with > material substance sliced off, which is pretty much Berkeleyan idealism. The > latter effectively makes ideas particulars, and is nominalistic as a result. > > > > John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: Thursday, 19 November > 2015 2:46 PM To: John Collier Cc: > > biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; PEIRCE-L > > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, > > Propositions, Arguments > > > > John, all, > > > > It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and > independence from exclusion. > > > > It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by assuming > the Cartesian dualism that he rejected. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > > > On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:23 AM, John Collier > > <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za%3cmailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>> > > wrote: Lists, > > > > At the end of the 19th Century there was a reaction against the idea > > that logic was a human creation and depended on the mind. This view is > > called psychologism. The founders of modern logic, including in > > particular Frege and Peirce, were anti-psychologists who argued that > > logic is independent of human psychology. I won’t give the arguments > > here, since they are readily available (see, e.g., > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/). Whether logic is > > independent of thought depends on what you take thought to be. An > > idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by > Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that > thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view > requires > further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker > position is that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world > (early Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his > view that true propositions = facts). > > > > Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of > > humans requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that > > forms are meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I > > disagree with Jerry, I think). In this case logic can apply > > independently of thought, just as can mathematics, to the world. In > > other words, the world can be both logical and mathematical. I go a > > bit further and argue that logic and mathematics depend on the nature > > of the world, and that we must discover them through hypothetical > > reasoning rather than a priori (for example whether continuity exists, > > the infinite exists and similar). This allows a version of > > non-psychologistic naturalism that is somewhat similar to what I take > > to be Mill’s position, though he is often interpreted as a psychologist. So > > I > don’t see Jerry’s worry that there is a gap between the formal aspects of, > say, information theory and its manifestation as making sense. It seems to > me that this presupposes that the formal aspects can exist independently, > involving either a rationalism or an idealism or both that I cannot accept, > as I > find it ontological otiose. This is my argument against Jerry’s objection. I > also > deviate from Peirce here, I think, and certainly from my philosophical hero, > Bertrand Russell. > > > > However my views may be, there is a clear antipsychologist position on > > logic that is associated with the greatest logicians, and I think it very > > hasty > to adopt Stan’s classification of logic. > > > > John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: > http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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