> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:49 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >>> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com >>> <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>> wrote: >>> >>> I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper >>> philosophical structures of mathematics and its origins and the pragmatism >>> of applied mathematics as it relates to the conceptualization of the >>> exactness of logical terms and propositions. >> >>> On one hand, he adores the concept of chemical elements as a BOUNDED source >>> of the logic of terms and of his description of natural recursive logic >>> (the trichotomy). On the other hand, he adores probability and continuity. >>> The is a metaphysical tension, not merely a logical tension. What does one >>> believe about the distinction between collections as individuals and >>> collections as masses? >> >> Could you expand on this a little more? I confess I don’t see the tension >> here. > > Perhaps this is because of your philosophy of mathematics?
Perhaps, but that doesn’t help me determine if it is. I confess to not having terribly strong opinions on why physics is so mathematical. To the degree I have them it’s something akin to Peirce’s scholastic realism. > On Nov 19, 2015, at 9:33 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> > wrote: > >>> This inconsistency to which I refer is in his failure to denote the >>> relationships between the mathematical symbol system(s) for real numbers >>> and the chemical symbol system which is based on the identity of natural >>> objects and the order of arrangements of parts of the whole (mereology). If >>> one is to give serious weight to the extra-ordinary strict argument of >>> continuity that CSP offers, then the sciences of biology and chemistry CAN >>> NOT exist. >> >> Again could you expand a little more on this? (Forgive me if it was >> discussed when I wasn’t able to read the list for a few weeks) > > Again, I suggest that this is a consequence of a physical view of mathematics > and mereology. > > see, for example, "The Applicability of Mathematics in Science." Sorin > Bangu, 2012. > Or, the earlier book by Mark Stein. Sadly I won’t have time to pick up those books which aren’t in my local library. By the time I did interlibrary loan I’m sure the discussion would be long passed. >> It almost sounds like you’re trying to deal with the conflict between quanta >> (integers) and continuum (reals) in chemistry. But isn’t that just a part >> and parcel of the quantum mechanics we now typically consider chemistry to >> arise out of? > > This comment is a-historical! The chemical elements are the starting point > for quantum theory (Rutherford, Schrodinger and others). They provide the > initial conditions for the study of quantum systems in relation to energy / > motion. And the success or failure of quantum thinking in the sciences rests > on approximations consistent with physical measurements on the chemical > elements. How is this not conflating the genealogy of the development of an idea with the idea itself? Why does the starting point historically for quantum theory matter? Certainly the results must explain earlier measurements but it appears you’re demanding something more radical than that. >> Maybe it’s just the bias my physics gave me causing me to overlook the >> obvious and problematic as not a problem. >> > How would you develop this argument in terms of logical terms, propositions > and arguments? > > I would suggest that you may wish to start with the concepts of mass and > electricity and hybrid logic. > > If you follow this suggestion, will you develop an argument based on the > union of units? > What other alternatives do you have? > > Just some of my quick thoughts that may stimulate deeper explorations. Well that line was more a throw away joke, although there’s some truth to it. I think scientists, especially in the hard sciences, tend to downplay gaps or issues. I’m well aware of that instinct in myself due to my background. Although I like to think I keep an appreciation that all the models in physics have big gaps due to the lack of a true unifying theory (despite string theory’s pretenses). Further there are gaps between theory and empirics as we don’t yet have explanations for dark matter or dark energy that are satisfactory yet. Likewise certain aspect of gravity waves that are predicted have not yet been observed. These suggest our understanding is fragmentary and that thus realist interpretations leading to ontology should be viewed with a skeptical eye. I confess though I’m not quite sure what to make of your rejoinder. Again, could you flesh things out a bit more? I see gestures towards issues but so vague that I’m not quite sure what to make of them. For instance are you talking of mass in classical physics or in the standard model? I assume you’re talking of this integers:real issue, but again I’m still not sure what you mean. Are you speaking of issues in standard quantum field theory or something else? Are you talking about the theory about how mass arises in a quantum field theory approach? Or how that is hard to reconcile with gravity? I remain confused as to what it is you’re asserting.
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