> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> > wrote: > > I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper philosophical > structures of mathematics and its origins and the pragmatism of applied > mathematics as it relates to the conceptualization of the exactness of > logical terms and propositions.
> On one hand, he adores the concept of chemical elements as a BOUNDED source > of the logic of terms and of his description of natural recursive logic (the > trichotomy). On the other hand, he adores probability and continuity. The is > a metaphysical tension, not merely a logical tension. What does one believe > about the distinction between collections as individuals and collections as > masses? Could you expand on this a little more? I confess I don’t see the tension here. Certainly if we applied these ideas universally there would be a tension. But it seems to me that Peirce solves this issue with his development of Entelechy. That is to the degree something becomes self-controlled and thus habit it comes to be more like a substance in the sense other philosophers think of it. The process from chaos to substance is itself a continuum though. > This inconsistency to which I refer is in his failure to denote the > relationships between the mathematical symbol system(s) for real numbers and > the chemical symbol system which is based on the identity of natural objects > and the order of arrangements of parts of the whole (mereology). If one is to > give serious weight to the extra-ordinary strict argument of continuity that > CSP offers, then the sciences of biology and chemistry CAN NOT exist. Again could you expand a little more on this? (Forgive me if it was discussed when I wasn’t able to read the list for a few weeks) It almost sounds like you’re trying to deal with the conflict between quanta (integers) and continuum (reals) in chemistry. But isn’t that just a part and parcel of the quantum mechanics we now typically consider chemistry to arise out of? Maybe it’s just the bias my physics gave me causing me to overlook the obvious and problematic as not a problem. To the degree this is fundamental (as say in interpretations of quantum mechanics involving the collapse of the wave function) it makes me tend to suspect we’re just looking at the problem wrong. That is I tend to see the conflict more as an error of interpretation. (This puts me in the camp that distrusts the very notion of a collapse of a wave function as basic ontology)
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