Gary F - I'll say the same to you - you get full marks for tenacity. Equally, your 'GaryF-isms' are not, in my view, correct analyses of Peirce. You are locked into the semantics (the trees) and don't see the broader picture (the semiosis).
1) The genuine or degenerate 'signs' (again, you refer only to the Representamen) is operative in a 'genuine' or 'degenerate' way due to and only to the categorical mode of the Relation between the Representamen and the Object. You wrote: GF: So you also reject Peirce’s “view” that “Of signs there are two different degenerate forms. … The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. … The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an index. … We now come to the genuine sign, for which I propose the technical designation symbol” (EP2:306-7)? or that “Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus” (EP2:163)? If so, your rejections are irrelevant to Peircean semiotic. EDWINA: What function do you see in these degenerate/genuine modes? WHY does Peirce define the Iconic Relation as 'degenerate'? Well? It's because it is operating in a mode of 3-1, with the Representamen in itself in a mode of Thirdness, and the Relation between the R-and-Object, in a mode of Firstness, ie. Thirdness-as-Firstness. The indexical Relation between the R-and-Object is 3-2. The symbol relation is in a mode of Thirdness. 2) You seem to privilege only the full or 'genuine' categorical modes, ie. Thirdness as Thirdness, Firstness as Firstness, Secondness as Secondness. You seem to denigrate the 'mixed' modes, eg, Thirdness as Secondness. But - these mixed categorical modes are what enables interaction and diversity. 3) And again, I also reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". Why should a Representamen in the categorical mode of Firstness be 'degenerate'? Or is it that the Legisign 'ought' to be, as the site of laws, in the mode of Thirdness, and any weakening of it (by its being in a mode of Firstness or Secondness) thereby weakens its rule-making powers. Now - THAT I can accept. But you don't explain this. 4) Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of this statement. I think I've asked this three times already. 5) Finally - you maintain that YOUR outline is The Only Correct View of Peirce. I, however, disagree with you - but - I don't declare that MY outline is the Correct View of Peirce. I am providing my view and my analysis, and consider that you are only and merely providing your view and your analysis - not The Only Correct View - but simply, your analysis. It ends there. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: g...@gnusystems.ca To: 'Peirce-L' Sent: Friday, December 04, 2015 8:46 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations Edwina, you certainly get full marks for tenacity! What we need in this thread, though, is closer attention to what Peirce actually said. In the responses interleaved below, that will be my focus. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 3-Dec-15 16:13 ET: Gary F- I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on this. GF: In this thread I am quoting from NDTR, where Peirce says that “A Sign is a representamen” (CP 2.242). Can you provide a quote from NDTR where Peirce says that a Sign is a full triadic semiosic process (or a “triad of relations”)? ET: I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined as 'degenerate'. GF: Neither do I. I’m guessing at what Peirce means by “peculiar” in this context, and how this “peculiarity” might be related to degeneracy, precisely because Peirce does not mention degeneracy in NDTR, as he does elsewhere. ET: That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'. I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245. He might be saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the mode of 2-1, or Secondness-as-Firstness. GF: OK, that makes sense in the Taborskian idiom. But how that relates to the Peircean idiom is considerably less clear than what Peirce means by “peculiar.” What follows is yet another elaboration of the Taborskian idiom, with no reference to the Peircean text: ET: Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". It's the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs. GF: So you also reject Peirce’s “view” that “Of signs there are two different degenerate forms. … The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. … The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an index. … We now come to the genuine sign, for which I propose the technical designation symbol” (EP2:306-7)? or that “Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus” (EP2:163)? If so, your rejections are irrelevant to Peircean semiotic. ET: Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws. Qualisigns are connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive rather than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but functions within a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode of Firstness) then, it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as related to a Sinsign (which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical mode of 2-1, or, Secondness as Firstness. Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen, the Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant could be in a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness. GF: Another translation of Peircean idiom into Taborskian, with no basis in Peirce’s text. In your previous post, you wrote that “I consider the Peircean Sign to be an integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. [See 8.344--]” Well, I did read, carefully and in its entirety, the December 1908 letter from Peirce to Welby which includes CP 8.344, which is also EP2:481-91; and in that letter, Peirce says nothing of the kind that you express here. What he says, in 8.343, is that “A sign has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant”; and he conducts an inquiry into “the triadic relation of Sign-Object-Interpretant (8.361), in terms of ten trichotomies, (rather than limiting his analysis to the three trichotomies which define the ten sign types in NDTR). But nowhere in that text does he say that the “Sign” is a triad of three Relations, and anyone who reads it with care can see that such Taborskian language is incompatible with Peirce’s actual usage of the word “sign.” Now, I know that you will continue to insist that your reading of Peirce is the only correct one, and how futile it is for me (or anyone) to demonstrate its inaccuracy. So all I hope to accomplish in a post like this is to urge its readers to read Peirce’s actual text closely, rather than your loose translation of it into Taborskian idiom. That’s the only hope we have of understanding Peircean semiotics. So, I give up trying to answer nonsensical questions which do nothing to advance that understanding. Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of this statement? Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: g...@gnusystems.ca To: 'Peirce-L' Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with Peirce, not with me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes of “Saussurean sign”, “Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I can see. Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested an explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that there is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is prompted by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion, which is fine, but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns involved in sinsigns “of a peculiar kind”? Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41 Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't think this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' but rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign. You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for 'Representamen. This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as really a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the Signified=Interpretant. Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I consider the Peircean Sign to be an integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. [See 8.344--] So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate. It isn't that the Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of Peirce's terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" 2.244. I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of Firstness is degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness as a categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy. The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where, as we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both a genuine and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1). When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves are genuine or degenerate not the Relation. I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not 3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign. How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce as a 'free-floating Representamen'. That's Platonism. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: g...@gnusystems.ca To: 'Peirce-L' Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”: CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. [As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904). On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:] 245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. [Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a “normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps this will be clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll leave for the next post.] Gary f. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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