Degenerateness, I think, is a relation too. So, something may be (regarded for) degenerate, if you look at it as a mode. Because degeneracy is a trait of modes. But if you look at the same thing regarding it for a sign (a triadic sign), then degeneracy is not something you can assign to it. And anything can be interpreted for a triadic sign. It is the point of view that makes it. Anyway, I think, that "degenerate" is merely a Peircean technical term, and has nothing to do with the opposite of "to generate". Subsumption or classification has to do with generation and inheritance: This is a one-way-affair, in which there is only generation, but never a degeneration. In compositional hierarchy you may say, that something complex is made of less complex things, and ok, you may substitute "less complex" with "degenerate", but that also has nothing to do with the opposite of "to generate". All in all, I merely wanted to say, that I do not like the term "degenerate", because it leads to nothing but astray.
Best,
Helmut
16. Dezember 2015 um 20:48 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Jeff - please see my comments below:
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
To: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 2:19 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, List,
There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit
with what Peirce says. Let me start with this one about the character of
relatively degenerate signs. ET: "Therefore, I reject your view that the
"Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".
It's the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or
degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.
1) JEFF: It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations
between sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate. He says, for
instance, that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the
Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the
Symbol is the relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73
EDWINA: I view the above, as outlining that the Relations are degenerate or
genuine with regard to a Representamen in a mode of Thirdness. So, the
Relation with the Dynamic Object in a mode of Firstness would be 3-1
(Thirdness in a mode of Firstness) which produces an iconic relation. The
Relation with the DO in a mode of Secondness would be 3-2, an indexical
Relation. And the Relation with the DO in a mode of Thirdness is 3-3, or
'pure' [genuine] Thirdness.
Now - what if the Relation were instead, in a mode of Secondness? [2-2,
2-1].
2) JEFF: What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction
between signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e.,
qualisign, sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less
degenerate kinds? I think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP
2.265 where he applies the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the
three main classifications that he considers in NDTR.
EDWINA: Again, I think we must be careful in what we mean by 'sign'. By
Sign, I refer to the full triad. Peirce sometimes refers to the full triad
as a sign, and often only to the Representamen. Again, I don't consider that
the 'nodes' in themselves are genuine or degenerate for they don't exist 'in
themselves'; they exist only within the triadic relation; therefore, only
the Relations are genuine/degenerate.
And I don't see where in the 2.265 outline, there is any discussion of
genuine or degenerate relations. There is one outline of a triad in a full
mode of Secondness; the rest are mixed.
3) JEFF: In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.
Having looked at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic
idea is that a sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the
sign is a token (i.e., a sinsign). Peirce makes it clear that a sign does
not need to be embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign. A
qualisign, for instance, is an abstraction that represents possible
feelings.
EDWINA: Again, please clarify your terminology. When you use the term
'sign', do you mean a Representamen? Again, a Sign, to me, is a full triad.
The three 'nodes' of the triad do not exist per se in themselves. Therefore,
the Representamen, that site-of-mediation, cannot exist per se except within
the interaction of mediation. When it is in this interaction, it must be
embodied; it can't exist 'in thin air'! I reject Platonism.
When the Representamen is in a mode of Firstness [a qualisign] - it is NOT
an abstraction (which is an intellectual construct] but the pure unanalyzed
feeling - and that qualisign never exists, again, per se, but only within
the full triad of a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign.
________________________________________
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F- I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on
this.
I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined
as 'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and
'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations
between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are
operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the
'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate
relations'.
I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind
and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245. He might be
saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a
qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the
mode of 2-1, or Secondness-as-Firstness.
Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to
the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". It's the Relations in their categorical
modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are
genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.
Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a
Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a
transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws. Qualisigns
are connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive
rather than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but
functions within a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode
of Firstness) then, it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as
related to a Sinsign (which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical
mode of 2-1, or, Secondness as Firstness.
Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but
again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences
that are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen,
the Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant
could be in a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness.
Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of
this statement?
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign”
exactly as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are
responding to. If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with
Peirce, not with me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes
of “Saussurean sign”, “Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I
can see.
Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested
an explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that
there is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is
prompted by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has
nothing to do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion,
which is fine, but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns
involved in sinsigns “of a peculiar kind”?
Gary f.
} {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't
think this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and
'degenerate' but rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.
You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for
'Representamen. This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as
really a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the
Signified=Interpretant. Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I consider the
Peircean Sign to be an integral triad of three Relations: That between the
Representamen and Object; that of the Representamen in itself; and that
between the Representamen and the Interpretant. [See 8.344--]
So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see
how you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate. It isn't that
the Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied;
it isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving
into Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of
Peirce's terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied"
2.244.
I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of
Firstness is degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness
as a categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy.
The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where,
as we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness
has both a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both
a genuine and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1).
When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its
categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves
are genuine or degenerate not the Relation.
I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not
3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign.
How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce
as a 'free-floating Representamen'. That's Platonism.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and
Divisions of Triadic Relations”:
CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign,
a Sinsign, or a Legisign.
A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its
character as a sign.
[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with
its Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242).
Yet it cannot act as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes
involved in at least a dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of
existence. Yet its significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and
qualities being monadic, there is no real difference between Sign and Object
(or Interpretant either). So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate
kind of triadic relation, where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and
self-determining as its own Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient”
point on a map which Peirce offers as an example of doubly degenerate
Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy
is relative, we can say that the Qualisign is degenerate relative to the
Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is degenerate relative to the
Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in both the third Harvard
lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).
On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types
defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a
possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly
this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and
of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:]
245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only
once,” as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing
or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that
it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns
are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
[Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I
suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because
a “normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But
perhaps this will be clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll
leave for the next post.]
Gary f.
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----- Original Message -----
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
To: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 2:19 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, List,
There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit
with what Peirce says. Let me start with this one about the character of
relatively degenerate signs. ET: "Therefore, I reject your view that the
"Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".
It's the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or
degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.
1) JEFF: It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations
between sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate. He says, for
instance, that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the
Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the
Symbol is the relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73
EDWINA: I view the above, as outlining that the Relations are degenerate or
genuine with regard to a Representamen in a mode of Thirdness. So, the
Relation with the Dynamic Object in a mode of Firstness would be 3-1
(Thirdness in a mode of Firstness) which produces an iconic relation. The
Relation with the DO in a mode of Secondness would be 3-2, an indexical
Relation. And the Relation with the DO in a mode of Thirdness is 3-3, or
'pure' [genuine] Thirdness.
Now - what if the Relation were instead, in a mode of Secondness? [2-2,
2-1].
2) JEFF: What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction
between signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e.,
qualisign, sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less
degenerate kinds? I think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP
2.265 where he applies the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the
three main classifications that he considers in NDTR.
EDWINA: Again, I think we must be careful in what we mean by 'sign'. By
Sign, I refer to the full triad. Peirce sometimes refers to the full triad
as a sign, and often only to the Representamen. Again, I don't consider that
the 'nodes' in themselves are genuine or degenerate for they don't exist 'in
themselves'; they exist only within the triadic relation; therefore, only
the Relations are genuine/degenerate.
And I don't see where in the 2.265 outline, there is any discussion of
genuine or degenerate relations. There is one outline of a triad in a full
mode of Secondness; the rest are mixed.
3) JEFF: In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.
Having looked at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic
idea is that a sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the
sign is a token (i.e., a sinsign). Peirce makes it clear that a sign does
not need to be embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign. A
qualisign, for instance, is an abstraction that represents possible
feelings.
EDWINA: Again, please clarify your terminology. When you use the term
'sign', do you mean a Representamen? Again, a Sign, to me, is a full triad.
The three 'nodes' of the triad do not exist per se in themselves. Therefore,
the Representamen, that site-of-mediation, cannot exist per se except within
the interaction of mediation. When it is in this interaction, it must be
embodied; it can't exist 'in thin air'! I reject Platonism.
When the Representamen is in a mode of Firstness [a qualisign] - it is NOT
an abstraction (which is an intellectual construct] but the pure unanalyzed
feeling - and that qualisign never exists, again, per se, but only within
the full triad of a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign.
________________________________________
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F- I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on
this.
I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined
as 'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and
'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations
between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are
operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the
'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate
relations'.
I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind
and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245. He might be
saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a
qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the
mode of 2-1, or Secondness-as-Firstness.
Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to
the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". It's the Relations in their categorical
modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are
genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.
Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a
Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a
transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws. Qualisigns
are connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive
rather than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but
functions within a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode
of Firstness) then, it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as
related to a Sinsign (which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical
mode of 2-1, or, Secondness as Firstness.
Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but
again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences
that are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen,
the Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant
could be in a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness.
Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of
this statement?
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign”
exactly as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are
responding to. If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with
Peirce, not with me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes
of “Saussurean sign”, “Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I
can see.
Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested
an explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that
there is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is
prompted by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has
nothing to do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion,
which is fine, but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns
involved in sinsigns “of a peculiar kind”?
Gary f.
} {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't
think this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and
'degenerate' but rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.
You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for
'Representamen. This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as
really a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the
Signified=Interpretant. Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I consider the
Peircean Sign to be an integral triad of three Relations: That between the
Representamen and Object; that of the Representamen in itself; and that
between the Representamen and the Interpretant. [See 8.344--]
So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see
how you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate. It isn't that
the Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied;
it isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving
into Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of
Peirce's terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied"
2.244.
I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of
Firstness is degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness
as a categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy.
The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where,
as we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness
has both a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both
a genuine and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1).
When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its
categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves
are genuine or degenerate not the Relation.
I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not
3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign.
How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce
as a 'free-floating Representamen'. That's Platonism.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and
Divisions of Triadic Relations”:
CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign,
a Sinsign, or a Legisign.
A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its
character as a sign.
[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with
its Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242).
Yet it cannot act as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes
involved in at least a dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of
existence. Yet its significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and
qualities being monadic, there is no real difference between Sign and Object
(or Interpretant either). So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate
kind of triadic relation, where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and
self-determining as its own Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient”
point on a map which Peirce offers as an example of doubly degenerate
Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy
is relative, we can say that the Qualisign is degenerate relative to the
Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is degenerate relative to the
Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in both the third Harvard
lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).
On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types
defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a
possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly
this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and
of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:]
245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only
once,” as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing
or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that
it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns
are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
[Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I
suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because
a “normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But
perhaps this will be clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll
leave for the next post.]
Gary f.
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