Supplement: So, degeneracy is not a de-evolution or reverse (de-) generation, but an incomplete or wrong comprehension of how something has been generated (and so the reason why it has), based on the fact, that the generation process is not easily observable, not observable at all, or not observable due to a lack of observation-competence by the observer. All in all it is a matter of reason and meaning not conveyed. This way one can say, that the immediate (internal) object is degenerate (because no sign can be able to represent each and every aspect of a dynamical object outside of the sign). This goes along with your internal-external-distinction. And also the two modes of the interpretant, which are not the final one, are. Now the question for me remains: What about the sign classes? In case this consideration is correct so far, can it be transferred to sign classes in a way, that one can say: firstness of secondness or secondness of thirdness is degenerate, that would be eg. a rhematic indexical legisign (eg. by Peirce: Demonstrative pronoun)? Demonstrative pronouns are eg "this", "that", "these", "those". Is there a loss of meaning or reason too? I have the impression that it is so, but cannot fix the thougt now.
Best,
Helmut
Clark, list,
you wrote: " If you have the form but not the matter then it’s degenerate.". Thank you: This way eventually, after a long time, I think I understand why it is called degenerate. Maybe it is like this: "matter" may be understood for "reason", like in the question "Whats the matter?", in which someone is asking for the reason for somebody elses behaviour. The reason (matter) has generated the behaviour (form). In the same way, the reason for two parallel lines might have been an elliptical function, but with the focal points very far apart. At this border case of the function, that has generated the lines (the form), one cannot see or reverse-engineer the elliptical function (the matter). The reason has gotten lost (also in the other border case of the ellipse, in which the two focal points are very close, then the form is a circle). In a sign, the reason for sending the sign has been to transport a meaning. If someone does not see the meaning, but only the sign-vehicle, then for him the meaning, the reason for the sign, the matter of the sign, has gotten lost. If an alien visiting the earth first meets some penguins and dolphins, he/she/it probably does not see, that their fins have evolved from wings and legs, because the wing- and leg- aspects of the fins are degenerate, i.e. the generation of wings and legs is not present in the fins anymore.
Best,
Helmut
17. Dezember 2015 um 18:42 Uhr
"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>
"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>
On Dec 16, 2015, at 10:32 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:In the passage from Peirce that you quote below, by way of Clark, I think the distinction is that the degenerate seconds consider them in terms of their form alone, which degenerates our understanding of them to firsts associated with them, making our understanding of something that is internal.
If I recall (don’t have time to look it up) but in at least a few places Peirce treats degeneracy as a form/matter distinction. If you have the form but not the matter then it’s degenerate. That is while he’s making the geometric analogy his distinctions are just the classic medieval distinctions among types of relations (especially as found in Scotus)
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A quick quote from my Peirce-L note. This is a post from 7/15/03 by Jean-Marc Orliaguet.
Peirce distinguished between the logical / formal categories and "metaphysical" (ontological?) categories, i.e. the categories of pure forms and categories of the "matter of phenomena". Considered as a form, a dyad is a dyad no matter if it is created by the mind by connecting two qualities or if it is the material dyad of a real fact. But ontologically, a dyad of pure imagination is not a material dyad, it is simply a dyad composed of two monads. Two qualities do not make matter. Peirce uses the terms genuine / degenerate categories to distinguish between them. A degenerate category has the same form but not the same "matter" as a genuine category.
example with secondness:
* genuine secondness : o_____o
(no mind intervention, pure secondness, no mediation. Here you see the difference between Peirce and Hegel as well as between Peirce and some peirce-l extreme idealists )
* degenerate secondness : o.........o
using here : '........' to represent the intervention of a mind (through a mediating third, a scaffolding, which is "forgotten", erased)
Peirce: CP 1.452 452. The metaphysical categories of quality, fact, and law, being categories of the matter of phenomena, do not precisely correspond with the logical categories of the monad, the dyad, and the polyad or higher set, since these are categories of the forms of experience. The dyads of monads, being dyads, belong to the category of the dyad. But since they are composed of monads as their sole matter, they belong materially to the category of quality, or the monad in its material mode of being. It cannot be regarded as a fact that scarlet is red. It is a truth; but it is only an essential truth. It is that in being which corresponds in thought to Kant's analytical judgment. It is a dyadism latent in monads.
JM
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