List, At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered trikonic vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the famous "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at all pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in fact, think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago when presenting an invited paper, "Interoperability as Desideratum, Problem, and Process" http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/InteropArisbe.pdf at an ICCS workshop on "interoperability" in Aalborg, DK.
Ben Udell created an excellent slide show in ppt to illustrate some of the principal ideas of my paper, including slide 18 (reproduced below) of the three inference patterns (the slide show itself uses some pretty sophisticated animation and is well worth taking a look at for a number of reasons (e.g., from the design standpoint}. See: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/interoparisbe.ppt For abduction, then, the handfull of beans that I find near the bag of white beans is indeed from that bag is a mere guess--it has *possible* validity only. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:30 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, List, > > You wrote: > > JD: The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and > representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea > that I would like to explore. > > -I'm glad you're resuscitating this topic of 'determination' mirroring > 'representation' in Peirce, as it seems to me both interesting and > important in potentially illuminating the categoral vectors in relation to > these essential ideas in semiotic, especially their connection to two of > the three patterns of inrference which follow the same categorial paths: > inductive inference (cf. semiotic determination) and abductive inference > (cf. representation). > > JD: I'm finding it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the > relationship by which one thing determines another. The basic suggestion > you are making, I take it, is this: an object determines a sign; in turn > the sign determines an interpretant; the interpretant is > determined--mediately--to be in a relation to the same object that > initially determined the sign. One can reverse the story replacing > "determines" with "represents", which show that one is the mirror of the > other. > > -I think this is correct, and a neat and succinct way of expressing the > situation (see also my diagrams at the bottom of this message). I also > think that you're quite right in suggesting that key to understanding this > mirroring relationship is to correctly understand the term 'determination' > (as Peirce intended it to be employed in semiotic). But, this is, as you've > suggested, not an easy matter. Yet, in the course of discussions on this > list and elsewhere, I have come to agree with Albert Atkins that: > > Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to > interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood as the > *placing > of constraints* or conditions on succesful signification by the object, > rather than the object *causing* or *generating *the sign. The idea is > that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall within if > it is to represent that object. However, only certain characteristics of an > object are relevant to this process of determination. > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ > > > --For *our* purposes, too, I think it is best to think of "determines" in > semiotic as meaning something like "placing constraints on." As has > repeatedly been made clear on this list, it is assuredly *not* > determination in the physical sense. You continued, quoting Peirce on > "determination." > > JD: "An operation increasing the depth of a term, whether with or without > change of information, is known as a determination. The books generally > give abstraction as the contrary of determination; but this is > inadmissible. I would propose the word depletion." (CP 2.428) > > JD: This passage contains a number of interesting points. First, he is > using the concept of determines to characterize an operation, where the > result of that operation involves an increase in the depth of a term. Not a > result, but an operation. Not the breadth, but the depth. Why does he > restrict the term "determines" in this way? > > -If one sees this operation' as one of constraint, then there will be an > increase in "the depth of a term," for we are necessarily *focusing* in > on *certain* parameters, *particular *characteristics of the object, and > this is so whatever information the sign provides (i.e., with or without > "change of information"). And this I think also suggests an answer to your > question as to why 'depletion' is for Peirce a better term than > 'abstraction' for the contrary of 'determination': its contrary is an > increase of breadth, that is, what concerns the whole object (thus it > involves a loss of depth, constituting a depletion of the focus on > *certain* parameters). Well, I'm not certain about this, but that's how > I'm seeing it now. > > -Moving now to your suggestion that we should start our reflection on > semiotic determination by looking at parallels in patterns of inference, > you wrote: > > JD: In abductive inference [. . .] it is clear that we are amplifying > something about the various qualities that are expressed in the premisses. > As such, we are gaining depth with respect to the predicates that refer to > the grounds of the respective assertions and inferences. > > -I don't agree. That is, I can't see how an abductive inference--a good > guess--allows us to gain depth here as an entire inquiry process will be > required for that. A representation of a *possible* answer to a question > put before nature (i.e., a *mere* hypothesis) is hardly an answer to the > quesiton *per se*. Indeed, it is a fact that many hypotheses have been > shown to be quite *in*valid. An abduction in science, in my view, is > merely a representation which, after a complete inquiry--which includes the > actual testing of it--*may* prove to be valid; may even show itself to be > as powerful as, say, Newton's, Darwin's, or Einstein's. Or it may amount to > nothing much at all. > > --You then proceeded to the bean example of abduction. > > JD: Premisses: (1) there are a set of beans that are on the floor, a > certain portion of those beans are white, and (2) we know that a bag > contains a similar proportion of white beans. Conclusion: Perhaps, the > beans on the floor are from the bag. > How do the premisses determine the conclusion? > > -I'm afraid that I also can't say that I agree with your extended analysis > of the bean example, especially as you conclude: > > JD: The fundamental point Peirce is making is that the premisses determine > the reasonableness of the conclusion in this case because the pile on the > floor and the portion in the bag both have the quality of both being > "mostly white." The fact that both sets of beans have similar qualities is > what makes the conclusion reasonable. > > -But in my view the abduction, as mere guess, can be 'reasonable' *only* > because the person offering the hypothesis thinks it may be, albeit perhaps > for some good reasons. But the proof is in the pudding, that is, in the > experimental testing to see if the abduction gels with the facts of the > matter. In science a mind well prepared through study of the facts and > theories relating to the question at hand may very well come upon a valid > hypothesis, as Peirce suggests, after even just a few attempts. But, the > hypothesis in and of itself is but a broad stroke of the scientific > imagination, and that is so even in the case of a very well prepared mind. > In short, it may well be proved invalid (this is also famously the case for > engineering. Take, for example, Edison's many attempts at creating an > incandescent light bulb which could stay lit a while. > > -On the other hand, I completely agree with you that it behooves us to "to > apply the analysis of the main forms of inference to the various kind of > relations that hold between object, sign, and interpretant." As I see it, > semiotic determination and induction follow the same vector, as do their > mirror, representation. So, commencing at 2ns: > > > *Semiotic determination*: > 2nd (1ns) the Sign (representamen); > |> 3rd (3ns) for the Interpretant sign > 1st (2ns) The Object (Peirce says the dynamic object determines the > immediate object, so here is meant the IO) determines, > > == (both following the *vector of determination*: 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns) > > *Induction* (bean example): > 2nd (1ns) exactly, 1/2 are shown to be while; > |> 3rd (3ns) it is *probable* that these beans are from this bag full > which is 1/2 white. > 1st (2ns) This large number of found beans is sampled, > > > While its mirror is, as I see it, this, commencing at 3ns: > > > *Representation*: > 2nd (1ns) offers a theory (say, re: gravitation) > |> 1st (3ns) A prepared scientific mind (say, Newton's) > 3rd (2ns) and subsequent experimental tests show it to be valid. > > == (both following the *vector of representation*: 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns) > > *Abduction* (bean example): > 2nd (1ns) exactly, 1/2 of my sample are shown to be white; > |> 1st (3ns) I have some reason to believe that these beans may be from > this bag which I know to be1/2 white > 3rd (2ns) it is *possible* that these beans are from this bag (they may > not be; I may have been tricked, or the sample wasn't large enough and > further testing might show that, etc.) > > > While I'm at it, I might as well add the vectorial path which deduction > follows and offer one expression of it in semiotic grammar (not at all an > exact parallel to the above 2 inference patterns), namely Peirce's naming > each sign in his classification of 10 to show that the interpretant > involves the sign's object which involves the sign itself. Here, only the > first sign in the classification will be diagrammed, commencing at 3ns. > > *Semiotic involution* (in theoretical grammar: example, class 1 of 10): > 3rd (1ns, as to the Sign itself) legisign. > |> 1st (3ns, as to its Interpretant) Rhematic, > 2nd (2ns, as to its Object) iconic; > > == (both following the *vector of involution: 3ns -> 2ns -> 1ns)*) > > *Deduction* (bean example): > 3rd (1ns) the beans in this sample are *necessarily* 1/2 white. > |> 1st (3ns) All the beans from this bag are 1/2 white, > 2nd (2ns) this very large sample is taken from this bag; > > > Note also, and significantly in my opinion, that both deduciton and > abduction start at 3ns. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 4:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> List, >> >> The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and >> representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea >> that I would like to explore. Having spent some time digging, I'm finding >> it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the relationship by which >> one things determines another. The basic suggestion you are making, I take >> it, is this: an object determines a sign; in turn the sign determines an >> interpretant; the interpretant is determined--mediately--to be in a >> relation to the same object that initially determined the sign. One can >> reverse the story replacing "determines" with "represents", which show that >> one is the mirror of the other. >> >> Here is what Peirce says about the way he is using the term >> "determination" in his semiotic theory: "An operation increasing the depth >> of a term, whether with or without change of information, is known as a >> determination. The books generally give abstraction as the contrary of >> determination; but this is inadmissible. I would propose the word >> depletion." (CP 2.428) >> >> This passage contains a number of interesting points. First, he is using >> the concept of determines to characterize an operation, where the result of >> that operation involves an increase in the depth of a term. Not a result, >> but an operation. Not the breadth, but the depth. Why does he restrict the >> term "determines" in this way? Why does Peirce think that the standard use >> of the term, which takes "abstraction" to be its contrary, is mistaken? Why >> is "depletion" a better term for characterizing the contrary? >> >> My hunch is that the operation by which one correlate in a dyadic or >> triadic relation determines another correlate is a rather complicated kind >> of operation--having many varieties. Much depends upon whether we are >> talking about dyadic or triadic relations, or some larger complex involving >> a number of different relations coming together according to some pattern. >> My sense is that a good starting point for getting clear on these matters >> is to think of "determines" as a term that refers to an operation that >> takes place in a pattern of inference. Speaking in general terms, the >> premisses determine what follows as a conclusion. Getting clearer about how >> the premisses determine the conclusion will require that we look at >> different sorts of inferences. In abductive inference, for instance, it is >> clear that we are amplifying something about the various qualities that are >> expressed in the premisses. As such, we are gaining depth with respect to >> the predicates that refer to the grounds of the respective assertions and >> inferences. >> >> How might we make this out in more detail? An example might help. Let's >> take the case of the beans on the floor in the barn. The abductive pattern >> of inference takes the following form. >> >> Premisses: (1) there are a set of beans that are on the floor, a certain >> portion of those beans are white, and (2) we know that a bag contains a >> similar proportion of white beans. Conclusion: Perhaps, the beans on the >> floor are from the bag. >> >> How do the premisses determine the conclusion? The claim that the >> inference is valid implies that the conclusion is plausible given the >> information supplied in the premisses. In this case, it is clear that >> there is a growth in the information. Why say that the relation by which >> the premisses determine the conclusion is one in which the increase of >> information is a matter of an increase in the depth of the predicates >> contained in those premisses? Why isn't the relation by which the >> premisses determines the conclusion one of an increase in the breadth? >> After all, aren't we learning something about the objects to which the >> predicates "In a pile on the floor" "mostly white" and "from the bag" apply? >> >> The answers to these types of questions is as follows. In this type of >> inference, what we are learning is that it is reasonable to infer that the >> objects on the floor once came from the bag. Perhaps there is a hole in >> the bag, and the bag was once sitting in the part of the barn where the >> pile of beans are now. Or, perhaps the bag was opened so that the farmer >> could check the contents of the bag, and some were spilled when the bag was >> opened, etc. Regardless of the particularities of the explanation, the >> inference is valid if there is some causal explanation that links the >> presence of the pile of beans with the fact those particular beans were >> once in that particular bag. The fundamental point Peirce is making is >> that the premisses determine the reasonableness of the conclusion in this >> case because the pile on the floor and the portion in the bag both have the >> quality of both being "mostly white." The fact that both sets of beans >> have similar qualities is what makes the conclusion reasonable. >> >> In order to work this out in more detail, we would need to apply the >> analysis of the main forms of inference to the various kinds of relations >> that hold between object, sign and interpretant. That is, we would need to >> extend this analysis to various sorts of dicent signs that make up the >> premisses and conclusions, and the various rhemes that make up the dicent >> signs. Furthermore, we would need to clarify how the various qualisigns, >> sinsigns and legisigns function as icons, indices and symbols--and how the >> relations of determination work in each case. That is a tall order, but I >> believe that this is the method that Peirce is using as he works out the >> explanations of what it is for one thing to determine another in a >> absolutely genuine triadic relation. >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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