Gary, Jeffrey and list:
I had no intention of upsetting anyone but I wanted to raise some issues.
Gary, you said:
(Thirdness, Firstness, Secondness… three, one, two…)
|> (3ns), *Rule*, These beans are white,
(1ns), Result, *All the beans from this bag are white*;
(2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;
but the HYPOTHESIS states:
*Rule*.–
*All the beans from this bag are white. **Result*.–These beans are white.
.·.*Case*.–These beans are from this bag.
These two are not synonymous. You attributed the Result from HYPOTHESIS
(These beans are white) to the Rule in your translation (in bold). This is
what I alluded to as inconsequential. It didn’t even affect your
interpretation, “Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the
complete discussion, i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be
expressed as "All the beans I find *lying near this bag* are white."
Moreover, , from Jeffrey’s post, “Peirce states, “Hypothesis proceeds from
Rule and Result to Case”.
>From this Peirce statement, there is no distinction between (Rule + Result)
=> Case or (Result + Rule) => Case
Moreover, I contend that Result is 1ns, Rule is 2ns and Case is 3ns….one,
two, three…
Again, others have argued that Result comes before Rule but you simply
ignored those claims. There is no counterargument for why that should not
be the case.
_____________
As for sign/object/interpretant, it isn’t a trivial issue. For example,
from Brent:
“The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every
subject [for example: *one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant*;
chance, law, habit-taking or continuity].
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM
My query is really related to whether the sequence matters. Note also how
he distinguishes law (2ns) from habit-taking (3ns). That is, law and
lawfulness is NOT habit but can be construed that way.
The possibility of confusing terminology is recognized in the following
discussion regarding the multiple meanings for “sign”. Note the sequence:
“*It is difficult to define a sign in general*. It is something which is in
such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this
much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and
its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, *Sign, Object, Interpretant*,
the sign as being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object
is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic.”
Later, he clarifies:
“I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something,
called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be
borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object
and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or
communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a
Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there
should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in
consequence of the communication. The Form, (and the Form is the Object of
the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent
of the sign…”
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
Should not all these definitions and labels be in unity? If we were to
relate to the bean example, which is the Form/Object?
I say the sequence in a complete inquiry is:
the Form/Object is Result (1ns),
the Sign is Rule (2ns) and
the Interpretant is the Case (3ns),
i.e., (o => s => i), as you say with which I agree.
I don’t have to be correct (e.g., I may have mislabeled Case and Result but
the sequence holds 1ns, 2ns, 3ns). To me, being clear on this matter is an
important issue. But again, where is consensus opinion to be sought? In
beans and bags? It only leads to people walking away.
___________
To further elaborate on why beans and bags are such a bad example:
Jeffrey,
Thank you for your detailed response.
Relating it to the current query, where is feeling and sensation in beans
and bags? There is no genuine doubt there.
Best,
J
On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
> Gary R., Jerry, List,
>
> Let us apply the claim that hypothesis "is the formula of the acquirement
> of secondary sensation--a process by which a confused concatenation of
> predicates is brought into order under a synthetizing predicate" to the
> analysis of hypothesis. (CP 2.712)
>
> Notice what he says about the nature of a deductive argument: 'The
> so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All men are
> mortal. The other or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, Enoch
> was a man. The conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the
> result: Enoch is mortal."
>
> So, let's apply this explanation to the example of deduction that we have
> been considering:
> 1. The so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All
> the beans in the bag are white.
> 2. The other or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, These
> beans are from the bag
> 3. The conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result:
> These beans are white.
>
> Now, let's apply the same formula to hypothesis, and insert the
> explanation given above:
> 1. The minor premiss states the result; as, The pile of beans on the floor
> are white
> 2. The so-called major premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All
> the beans in the bag are white.
> 3. The conclusion takes the confused concatenation of predicates that are
> expressed when we colligate the rule and the result. It then brings them
> into order under a synthetizing predicate and arrives at a case that would
> be sufficient to explain the surprising phenomena, if it were true: These
> beans are from the bag.
>
> One reason for retaining the language of "rule, case, result" when
> analyzing examples of induction and hypothesis is that we thereby retain a
> nice clear language that enables us to see how the three propositions have
> been rearranged in the transformations of the deductive case. Setting that
> minor point to the side, does the application of the explanation given in
> (CP 2.712) to the conclusion of the synthetic inference shed any light on
> the character of this type of inference to a hypothesis? I think it
> does--largely because it focuses our attention on what is necessary for a
> synthetizing predicate to bring the confused concatenation of predicates
> into unity.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 9:32 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial
> mirrors, was, The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and
> 'representation'.
>
> Jerry, List,
>
> You concluded your first response (before the second brief message as
> addendum) by writing:
>
> JR: My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not theirs.
> This is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be malicious. A
> novice doesn’t see a difference between one and the other because there’s
> no consequential difference in whether you notice one before the other to
> make an inference about the case. Am I missing something here?
> .
> We may be speaking past each other. Perhaps others on the list can figure
> out what one or the other of us is "missing" in this exchange. Meanwhile,
> and whether one sees the bean example as 'bad' or 'malicious' or not (I
> certainly don't see it as such), let's take a look at how Peirce originally
> puts the bean example and see to whehter "my explanation" follows or
> misconstrues his. Peirce writes:
>
>
> DEDUCTION.
>
> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
> Case.–These beans are from this bag.
> .·.Result.–These beans are white.
>
> INDUCTION.
>
> Case.–These beans are from this bag.
> Result.–These beans are white.
> .·.Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white
>
> HYPOTHESIS.
>
> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
> Result.–These beans are white.
> .·.Case.–These beans are from this bag. (CP2.623)
>
> OK, let's see what happens when I translate these formations into my
> notation following this schema.
>
> 1ns, Result
> |> 3ns. Rule
> 2ns, Case
>
> But, before doing that, let me address the additional remarks you made in
> you message immediately following since we are clearly in disagreement here
> and I apparently haven't made my categorial associations clear to you. You
> wrote:
>
> JR: btw, in your response, would you mind commenting on whether
> 1ns, 2ns, 3ns follows Result (1ns), Rule (2ns), Case (3ns), please?
>
> I think the above is correct and that the following is wrong:
> Rule (1ns), Result (2ns), Case (3ns).
>
> GR: As I see it, both of these are incorrect. Rather, Rule (3ns), Case
> (2ns), Result (1ns)
>
> 1ns, Result, is, as already mentioned, can be associated with a character
> or quality
> |> 3ns. Rule, represents a law, or at least 'lawfulness'--habit
> 2ns, Case, is an existential occurence
>
> So:
>
>
> DEDUCTION.
>
> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
> Case.–These beans are from this bag.
> .·.Result.–These beans are white.
>
>
> 3rd (1ns), Result, These beans are white.
> |> 1st (3ns). Rule, All the beans from this bag are white,
> 2nd, 2ns, Case, These beans are from this bag;
>
>
> INDUCTION.
>
> Case.–These beans are from this bag.
> Result.–These beans are white.
> .·.Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white
>
>
> 2nd, (1ns), Result, These beans are white.
> |> 3rd (3ns), Rule, All the beans from this bag are white.
> 1st (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;
>
>
> HYPOTHESIS.
>
> Rule.–All the beans from this bag are white.
> Result.–These beans are white.
> .·.Case.–These beans are from this bag.
>
> 2nd, (1ns), Result, All the beans from this bag are white;
> |> 1st, (3ns), Rule, These beans are white,
> 3rd, (2ns), Case, These beans are from this bag;
>
> Peirce's "Result" here (as he makes quite clear in the complete
> discussion, i.e. CP 2.619-624. and elsewhere) might better be expressed as
> "All the beans I find lying near this bag are white." However, at this
> point in the analysis he only means to demonstrate the results of
> "inverting a deductive syllogism."
>
> As for your final comment:
>
> JR: I also want to be clear about avoiding semantic conflations.
> I suspect this problem extends to preference about (object, sign,
> interpretant) over (sign, object, interpretant).
>
> I don't at all undertstand what you may be suggesting here; that is, I
> have no idea what you mean when you speak of a "preference" in this
> regard.since all Peircean semioticians see o-> s -> i as the order of
> semiosis; s -> o -> i, on the other hand, if it means anything at all (and
> I don't quite see that it does) points, perhaps, to the Hegelian order in
> some way which I personally can't fathom.
>
> Finally, your second message makes me rather certain that we are talking
> past each other. I certainly will have nothing more to say on the topic and
> will let others sound in if they're interested.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 10:03 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:
> jerryr...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Hi Gary,
>
> I'm not sure what you're saying exactly but in Anderson’s Evolution of
> Peirce’s Concept of Abduction (p.148), he states:
>
> Rule - All the beans from this bag are white.
> Result - These beans are white.
> .'. Case – These beans are from this bag. (2.623)
>
> This is also repeated in Aliseda and many others.
> _________
>
> Yet, others have it Result, Rule, Case;
>
> e.g., Reichertz:
> “Abduction "proceeds," therefore, from a known quantity (= result) to two
> unknowns (= rule and case).”
>
> and
> figure 1.3 of Eco’s Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language goes Result,
> Rule, Case…
>
> But a quick internet search for Result, Rule, Case will bring up other
> examples.
> ____________
>
> My main query is why I should accept your explanation and not theirs.
> This is why I think the bean example is so bad as to be malicious. A
> novice doesn’t see a difference between one and the other because there’s
> no consequential difference in whether you notice one before the other to
> make an inference about the case. Am I missing something here?
>
> Best,
> J
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com
> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Jerry, list,
>
> One approach which might help in understanding the bean example as I
> believe Peirce imagined it is to think 'character' or 'quality' rather than
> 'result' since, as I've argued somewhere, 'result' literally really works
> only for deduction.
>
> Deduction:
> 3rd (1ns) result: all these beans will necessarily evidence the quality
> whiteness.
> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag are white,
> 2nd, (2ns), this large sample of beans is drawn from this bag;
>
> Induction:
> 2nd (1ns) all these sampled beans evidence the quality whiteness;
> |> 3rd (3ns) all the beans in this bag are probably white,
> 1st, (2ns), This large sample of beans is drawn from this bag,
>
> Abduction:
> 2nd (1ns) these beans I find on the table. say, nearest this bag, evidence
> the quality whiteness;
> |>1st (3ns) All the beans in this bag on this table are white,
> 3rd, (2ns), this sample of beans is possibly from this bag (but there may
> be some other piles of beans a bit further away from the bag which include
> some black beans, so it is in no way certain that these beans are actually
> from this bag).
>
> Just now I can't see how to 'flip' abduction in the order you suggested
> that "some authors" do, namely 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns. As I've remarked on
> several occasions, this seems to me to be the vectorial order, not of an
> inference pattern, but of a complete inquiry involving all 3 inference
> patterns:
>
> A complete inquiry:
> 1st (1ns) Abduction, in the sense of hypothesis formation; i.e., a
> possible explanation,
> |> 2nd (3ns) Deduction of what would necessarily follow from the
> hypothesis if valid that might be used to devise a test of it;
> 3rd (2ns) the Inductive test of the hypothesis which has been devised to
> suggest the probability of the hypothesis being valid.
>
> So, it would be helpful if you could offer an example of the categorial
> 'flip' of abduction you referred to. At the moment, I just can't envision
> it.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 8:20 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:
> jerryr...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Hi Gary, Ben and List,
>
> I appreciate the idea of trikonic and have read about the bean example,
> which I dislike. Some authors flip Rule/Result/Case and Result/Rule/Case
> for abduction. Are they isomorphic?
>
> If I said they’re asymmetric, that it ought to be Result/Rule/Case and not
> the other, where should we look to achieve consensus opinion?
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee :)
>
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 12:06 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com
> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> List,
>
> At the conclusion of my most recent post in this thread I offered trikonic
> vectorial analyses of the inference patterns as exemplified by the famous
> "bean" example of Peirce. Upon reflection, I find that I am not at all
> pleased with my diagram in that post for abductive inference and, in fact,
> think I did a somewhat better job of diagramming it a few years ago when
> presenting an invited paper, "Interoperability as Desideratum, Problem, and
> Process"
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/InteropArisbe.pdf
> at an ICCS workshop on "interoperability" in Aalborg, DK.
>
> Ben Udell created an excellent slide show in ppt to illustrate some of the
> principal ideas of my paper, including slide 18 (reproduced below) of the
> three inference patterns (the slide show itself uses some pretty
> sophisticated animation and is well worth taking a look at for a number of
> reasons (e.g., from the design standpoint}. See:
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/interoparisbe.ppt
>
> [cid:part1.03000607.04010207@nyc.rr.com]
> [https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif]
> For abduction, then, the handfull of beans that I find near the bag of
> white beans is indeed from that bag is a mere guess--it has possible
> validity only.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:30 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com
> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Jeff, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> JD: The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and
> representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea
> that I would like to explore.
>
> -I'm glad you're resuscitating this topic of 'determination' mirroring
> 'representation' in Peirce, as it seems to me both interesting and
> important in potentially illuminating the categoral vectors in relation to
> these essential ideas in semiotic, especially their connection to two of
> the three patterns of inrference which follow the same categorial paths:
> inductive inference (cf. semiotic determination) and abductive inference
> (cf. representation).
>
> JD: I'm finding it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the
> relationship by which one thing determines another. The basic suggestion
> you are making, I take it, is this: an object determines a sign; in turn
> the sign determines an interpretant; the interpretant is
> determined--mediately--to be in a relation to the same object that
> initially determined the sign. One can reverse the story replacing
> "determines" with "represents", which show that one is the mirror of the
> other.
>
> -I think this is correct, and a neat and succinct way of expressing the
> situation (see also my diagrams at the bottom of this message). I also
> think that you're quite right in suggesting that key to understanding this
> mirroring relationship is to correctly understand the term 'determination'
> (as Peirce intended it to be employed in semiotic). But, this is, as you've
> suggested, not an easy matter. Yet, in the course of discussions on this
> list and elsewhere, I have come to agree with Albert Atkins that:
>
>
> Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to
> interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood as the
> placing of constraints or conditions on succesful signification by the
> object, rather than the object causing or generating the sign. The idea is
> that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall within if
> it is to represent that object. However, only certain characteristics of an
> object are relevant to this process of determination.
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>
> --For our purposes, too, I think it is best to think of "determines" in
> semiotic as meaning something like "placing constraints on." As has
> repeatedly been made clear on this list, it is assuredly not determination
> in the physical sense. You continued, quoting Peirce on "determination."
>
> JD: "An operation increasing the depth of a term, whether with or without
> change of information, is known as a determination. The books generally
> give abstraction as the contrary of determination; but this is
> inadmissible. I would propose the word depletion." (CP 2.428)
>
> JD: This passage contains a number of interesting points. First, he is
> using the concept of determines to characterize an operation, where the
> result of that operation involves an increase in the depth of a term. Not a
> result, but an operation. Not the breadth, but the depth. Why does he
> restrict the term "determines" in this way?
>
> -If one sees this operation' as one of constraint, then there will be an
> increase in "the depth of a term," for we are necessarily focusing in on
> certain parameters, particular characteristics of the object, and this is
> so whatever information the sign provides (i.e., with or without "change of
> information"). And this I think also suggests an answer to your question as
> to why 'depletion' is for Peirce a better term than 'abstraction' for the
> contrary of 'determination': its contrary is an increase of breadth, that
> is, what concerns the whole object (thus it involves a loss of depth,
> constituting a depletion of the focus on certain parameters). Well, I'm not
> certain about this, but that's how I'm seeing it now.
>
> -Moving now to your suggestion that we should start our reflection on
> semiotic determination by looking at parallels in patterns of inference,
> you wrote:
>
> JD: In abductive inference [. . .] it is clear that we are amplifying
> something about the various qualities that are expressed in the premisses.
> As such, we are gaining depth with respect to the predicates that refer to
> the grounds of the respective assertions and inferences.
>
> -I don't agree. That is, I can't see how an abductive inference--a good
> guess--allows us to gain depth here as an entire inquiry process will be
> required for that. A representation of a possible answer to a question put
> before nature (i.e., a mere hypothesis) is hardly an answer to the quesiton
> per se. Indeed, it is a fact that many hypotheses have been shown to be
> quite invalid. An abduction in science, in my view, is merely a
> representation which, after a complete inquiry--which includes the actual
> testing of it--may prove to be valid; may even show itself to be as
> powerful as, say, Newton's, Darwin's, or Einstein's. Or it may amount to
> nothing much at all.
>
> --You then proceeded to the bean example of abduction.
>
> JD: Premisses: (1) there are a set of beans that are on the floor, a
> certain portion of those beans are white, and (2) we know that a bag
> contains a similar proportion of white beans. Conclusion: Perhaps, the
> beans on the floor are from the bag.
> How do the premisses determine the conclusion?
>
> -I'm afraid that I also can't say that I agree with your extended analysis
> of the bean example, especially as you conclude:
>
> JD: The fundamental point Peirce is making is that the premisses determine
> the reasonableness of the conclusion in this case because the pile on the
> floor and the portion in the bag both have the quality of both being
> "mostly white." The fact that both sets of beans have similar qualities is
> what makes the conclusion reasonable.
>
> -But in my view the abduction, as mere guess, can be 'reasonable' only
> because the person offering the hypothesis thinks it may be, albeit perhaps
> for some good reasons. But the proof is in the pudding, that is, in the
> experimental testing to see if the abduction gels with the facts of the
> matter. In science a mind well prepared through study of the facts and
> theories relating to the question at hand may very well come upon a valid
> hypothesis, as Peirce suggests, after even just a few attempts. But, the
> hypothesis in and of itself is but a broad stroke of the scientific
> imagination, and that is so even in the case of a very well prepared mind.
> In short, it may well be proved invalid (this is also famously the case for
> engineering. Take, for example, Edison's many attempts at creating an
> incandescent light bulb which could stay lit a while.
>
> -On the other hand, I completely agree with you that it behooves us to "to
> apply the analysis of the main forms of inference to the various kind of
> relations that hold between object, sign, and interpretant." As I see it,
> semiotic determination and induction follow the same vector, as do their
> mirror, representation. So, commencing at 2ns:
>
> Semiotic determination:
> 2nd (1ns) the Sign (representamen);
> |> 3rd (3ns) for the Interpretant sign
> 1st (2ns) The Object (Peirce says the dynamic object determines the
> immediate object, so here is meant the IO) determines,
>
> == (both following the vector of determination: 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns)
>
> Induction (bean example):
> 2nd (1ns) exactly, 1/2 are shown to be while;
> |> 3rd (3ns) it is probable that these beans are from this bag full which
> is 1/2 white.
> 1st (2ns) This large number of found beans is sampled,
>
> While its mirror is, as I see it, this, commencing at 3ns:
>
> Representation:
> 2nd (1ns) offers a theory (say, re: gravitation)
> |> 1st (3ns) A prepared scientific mind (say, Newton's)
> 3rd (2ns) and subsequent experimental tests show it to be valid.
>
> == (both following the vector of representation: 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns)
>
> Abduction (bean example):
> 2nd (1ns) exactly, 1/2 of my sample are shown to be white;
> |> 1st (3ns) I have some reason to believe that these beans may be from
> this bag which I know to be1/2 white
> 3rd (2ns) it is possible that these beans are from this bag (they may not
> be; I may have been tricked, or the sample wasn't large enough and further
> testing might show that, etc.)
>
> While I'm at it, I might as well add the vectorial path which deduction
> follows and offer one expression of it in semiotic grammar (not at all an
> exact parallel to the above 2 inference patterns), namely Peirce's naming
> each sign in his classification of 10 to show that the interpretant
> involves the sign's object which involves the sign itself. Here, only the
> first sign in the classification will be diagrammed, commencing at 3ns.
>
> Semiotic involution (in theoretical grammar: example, class 1 of 10):
> 3rd (1ns, as to the Sign itself) legisign.
> |> 1st (3ns, as to its Interpretant) Rhematic,
> 2nd (2ns, as to its Object) iconic;
>
> == (both following the vector of involution: 3ns -> 2ns -> 1ns))
>
> Deduction (bean example):
> 3rd (1ns) the beans in this sample are necessarily 1/2 white.
> |> 1st (3ns) All the beans from this bag are 1/2 white,
> 2nd (2ns) this very large sample is taken from this bag;
>
> Note also, and significantly in my opinion, that both deduciton and
> abduction start at 3ns.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 4:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
> List,
>
> The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and
> representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea
> that I would like to explore. Having spent some time digging, I'm finding
> it to be quite a challenge to get straight about the relationship by which
> one things determines another. The basic suggestion you are making, I take
> it, is this: an object determines a sign; in turn the sign determines an
> interpretant; the interpretant is determined--mediately--to be in a
> relation to the same object that initially determined the sign. One can
> reverse the story replacing "determines" with "represents", which show that
> one is the mirror of the other.
>
> Here is what Peirce says about the way he is using the term
> "determination" in his semiotic theory: "An operation increasing the depth
> of a term, whether with or without change of information, is known as a
> determination. The books generally give abstraction as the contrary of
> determination; but this is inadmissible. I would propose the word
> depletion." (CP 2.428)
>
> This passage contains a number of interesting points. First, he is using
> the concept of determines to characterize an operation, where the result of
> that operation involves an increase in the depth of a term. Not a result,
> but an operation. Not the breadth, but the depth. Why does he restrict the
> term "determines" in this way? Why does Peirce think that the standard use
> of the term, which takes "abstraction" to be its contrary, is mistaken? Why
> is "depletion" a better term for characterizing the contrary?
>
> My hunch is that the operation by which one correlate in a dyadic or
> triadic relation determines another correlate is a rather complicated kind
> of operation--having many varieties. Much depends upon whether we are
> talking about dyadic or triadic relations, or some larger complex involving
> a number of different relations coming together according to some pattern.
> My sense is that a good starting point for getting clear on these matters
> is to think of "determines" as a term that refers to an operation that
> takes place in a pattern of inference. Speaking in general terms, the
> premisses determine what follows as a conclusion. Getting clearer about how
> the premisses determine the conclusion will require that we look at
> different sorts of inferences. In abductive inference, for instance, it is
> clear that we are amplifying something about the various qualities that are
> expressed in the premisses. As such, we are gaining depth with respect to
> the predicates that refer to the grounds of the respective assertions and
> inferences.
>
> How might we make this out in more detail? An example might help. Let's
> take the case of the beans on the floor in the barn. The abductive pattern
> of inference takes the following form.
>
> Premisses: (1) there are a set of beans that are on the floor, a certain
> portion of those beans are white, and (2) we know that a bag contains a
> similar proportion of white beans. Conclusion: Perhaps, the beans on the
> floor are from the bag.
>
> How do the premisses determine the conclusion? The claim that the
> inference is valid implies that the conclusion is plausible given the
> information supplied in the premisses. In this case, it is clear that
> there is a growth in the information. Why say that the relation by which
> the premisses determine the conclusion is one in which the increase of
> information is a matter of an increase in the depth of the predicates
> contained in those premisses? Why isn't the relation by which the
> premisses determines the conclusion one of an increase in the breadth?
> After all, aren't we learning something about the objects to which the
> predicates "In a pile on the floor" "mostly white" and "from the bag" apply?
>
> The answers to these types of questions is as follows. In this type of
> inference, what we are learning is that it is reasonable to infer that the
> objects on the floor once came from the bag. Perhaps there is a hole in
> the bag, and the bag was once sitting in the part of the barn where the
> pile of beans are now. Or, perhaps the bag was opened so that the farmer
> could check the contents of the bag, and some were spilled when the bag was
> opened, etc. Regardless of the particularities of the explanation, the
> inference is valid if there is some causal explanation that links the
> presence of the pile of beans with the fact those particular beans were
> once in that particular bag. The fundamental point Peirce is making is
> that the premisses determine the reasonableness of the conclusion in this
> case because the pile on the floor and the portion in the bag both have the
> quality of both being "mostly white." The fact that both sets of beans
> have similar qualities is what makes the conclusion reasonable.
>
> In order to work this out in more detail, we would need to apply the
> analysis of the main forms of inference to the various kinds of relations
> that hold between object, sign and interpretant. That is, we would need to
> extend this analysis to various sorts of dicent signs that make up the
> premisses and conclusions, and the various rhemes that make up the dicent
> signs. Furthermore, we would need to clarify how the various qualisigns,
> sinsigns and legisigns function as icons, indices and symbols--and how the
> relations of determination work in each case. That is a tall order, but I
> believe that this is the method that Peirce is using as he works out the
> explanations of what it is for one thing to determine another in a
> absolutely genuine triadic relation.
>
> --Jeff
>
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