> On Mar 1, 2016, at 11:46 AM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I consider Inference to the Best Explanation as the concluding part of the > First Stage of Inquiry, not the beginning. Selecting the best explanation > has to operate in context of relieving a genuine doubt, preceded by problem > framing (abduction) and deduction of different possibilities. There is > always the possibility that you might be choosing from a bad lot, so one > should be clear about the relevance relation. Importantly, IBE mitigates > importance of the thumotic component, the spiritedeness that seeks to rein in > the multiplicity into simplicity in an earnest way. That is, that of First > is so tender you cannot touch it without spoiling it. > >
Could you expand upon this a little? I confess I see Peirce typically treating abduction as functional. Although he doesn’t always do so. My problem with “inference to best explanation” is that if abduction is wrapped up with guessing as hypothesis formulation then typically in science there are multiple guesses and often it’s not clear which is the best explanation. Perhaps with an individual there is one most persuasive in terms of having the effect of belief. But I’m not sure Peirce wants to limit abduction in that way. That is I can engage in adductive reasoning without being committed to the conclusions too strongly. Now as I said I’m not convinced Peirce is always consistent in all this. So in CP 5.145 he says, that “abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that if we are ever to understand things it must be in that way.” That is he moves it towards a kind of transcendental argument. It seems to me that not only is there this Kantian element to abduction but also a sense of the Hegelian sense of speculation (as opposed to the contemporary meaning of that term). I think this notion of abduction as moving beyond a given system is what is key. That said, certainly doubt is involved in all this. It’s doubt that requires us to expand such that knowledge becomes possible. The reason I’m less comfortable with the places he seems to push towards a kind of “best explanation” is that it seems difficult to ground that. What constitutes best? Rather I think he’s after the more loose sense he gives in CP 7.202 (1901) where he says it is “likely in itself and renders the facts likely.” This seems much more defensible even if perhaps it’s far less satisfying. That said Peirce seems to also include many other notions at various times that seem in accordance with theory formulation in science. That is things like parsimony, explaining not just a given set of facts but deviations, unexpected new facts, and so forth. I can’t recall without looking if he ever invoked beauty or the good, but given his views on such matters I’d be far from shocked if they were not also wrapped up in his notion of abduction. I’d add that I think a lot of the things Continental Philosophy brought up in the mid 20th century regarding the problem of systems ends up being caught up in the Peircean notion of abduction. That is the entire post-structuralist drive is this creative aspect of abduction.
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