Thanks Gary! Your comments are noted and appreciated.
Good luck with your work! Best, Jerry R On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 3:12 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Helmut, > > > > Yes, by all means write it down step by step, and think it through before > you share it with us, whether it’s a “new theory” or not. That’s what I did > with both of my recent long posts. Also, since they were about *Peirce’s* > concept of “determination,” I was careful to include *his* definition of > the term near the beginning. You should probably do the same with yours, as > it seems to be quite different from Peirce’s, if you’re going to post it > here. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] > *Sent:* 11-Apr-16 14:46 > > > > Gary, list, > > I think, that there is continuous determination only in inanimate nature, > efficient causation. Organisms act due to their needs, final causation, and > nervous animals, or at least animals with a brain, also act due to their > wishes. Needs and wishes rather occur than are determined. Especially > wishes may be quite nonrational, capricious, whatever. Peirce believed in > the phaneron, I dont. I rather believe in some sort of autonomy of the mind > of a nervous animal. Free will, volition. Ok, it has to be synchronized > with the environment, with society, to turn out to having a viable effect. > So there is feedback and learning. But one certain wish is not a determined > result of the past, I guess. So maybe I am not in accord with Peirce in > this respect, but am so in the other respect, that I think there are three > kinds of causation in accord with the three categories: force, need, and > wish, or to say it in latin: Causa efficiens, Causa finalis, Causa > exemplaris. Applying to the causal closedness of the three kinds of > systems: Inanimate universe, organism, brain. Determination only is there > within causa efficiens. This is a new theory ok, i will have to write it > down step by step... > > Best, > > Helmut > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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