Hi list, I assert that you can simply translate all the difficult language above regarding causation/determination/etc., through consideration of a real example of an ideal inquiry that utilizes signs, objects and interpretants. That is, give good reasons for phi spiral abduction:
Promoting convergence: the phi spiral in abduction of mouse corneal behaviors. One advantage is that you don't have to look to Peirce for answers. You can discover them on your own. Gary: I just discovered your website. Very nice! Also, this is a very earnest question: Why did you choose pictures of fractal spirals on your webpage? Thanks! Jerry Rhee On Sat, Apr 9, 2016 at 8:25 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > > > Another long post, this time mostly relating the Peircean concepts of > determination and causation. The formatting and embedded links will work > better in the web version, > > http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#causdetrmn , but here it is anyway. > > > > Gary f. > > In the stream of consciousness, how does one idea *determine* another? > > Peirce by 1873 (W3:72-5, CP 7.351-3) had worked out a theory of mental > causality based on the concept of consciousness as ‘something which takes > up time.’ Since time is conceived as continuous (not as a series of > discrete *instants*), we likewise conceive of consciousness as a > continuous process. > > It will easily be seen that when this conception is once grasped the > process of the determination of one idea by another becomes explicable. > What is present to the mind during the whole of an interval of time is > something generally consisting of what there was in common in what was > present to the mind during the parts of that interval. And this may be the > same with what is present to the mind during any interval of time; or if > not the same, at least similar — that is, the two may be such that they > have much in common. These two thoughts which are similar may be followed > by others that are similar and according to a general law by which every > thought similar to either of these is followed by another similar to those > by which they are followed. … > > There is besides this a causation running through our consciousness by > which the thought of any one moment determines the thought of the next > moment no matter how minute these moments may be. And this causation is > necessarily of the nature of a reproduction; because if a thought of a > certain kind continues for a certain length of time as it must do to come > into consciousness the immediate effect produced by this causality must > also be present during the whole time, so that it is a part of that > thought. Therefore when this thought ceases, that which continues after it > by virtue of this action is a part of the thought itself. In addition to > this there must be an effect produced by the following of one idea after a > different idea; otherwise there would be no process of inference except > that of the reproduction of the premises. > > This anticipates Peirce's later statements > <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xtn.htm#ndtrm> to the effect that the > antecedent-consequent relation is the essential concept for explaining the > process of *determination*. But does this concept at the heart of > inference also explain causality in the physical realm? Peirce addressed > this question under the rubric of ‘the logic of events’ in his Cambridge > Conferences lecture series of 1898. > > In his sixth lecture, on ‘Causation and Force’ (RLT 197-217), Peirce took > pains to show that in physics as well as philosophy, different and > incompatible concepts of causation have prevailed as times have changed. He > also argued (RLT 198), in opposition to Mill, that causation must be > regarded as a relation between *facts*, not between *events*. As he put > it in 1904, > > That which is caused, the *causatum*, is, not the entire event, but such > abstracted element of an event as is expressible in a proposition, or what > we call a “fact.” The cause is another “fact.” —EP2:315 > > In the Cambridge lecture, Peirce outlined what we might call a > “common-sense” concept of causation, as follows: > > the grand principle of causation which is generally held to be the most > certain of all truths and literally beyond the possibility of doubt … > involves three propositions to which I beg your particular attention. The > first is, that the state of things at any one instant is completely and > exactly determined by the state of things at one other instant. The second > is that the cause, or determining state of things, precedes the effect or > determined state of things in time. The third is that no fact determines a > fact *preceding* it in time in the same sense in which it determines a > fact *following* it in time. — RLT 198-9 > > Peirce went on to show that this ‘principle of causation’ is ‘in flat > contradiction to the science of mechanics,’ i.e. to ‘the dominant > mechanical philosophy,’ which deals only with ‘particles of matter with > their *masses,* their relative *positions* in space at different instants > of *time,* and the immutable laws of the relations of those three > elements of space, time, and matter.’ According to the mathematical models > of Newtonian physics, ‘the positions of the masses at any one instant are > not determined by their positions at any other single instant, even with > the aid of the laws. On the contrary, that which is determined is an > acceleration. Now an acceleration is the relation of the position at one > instant *not* to the position at another instant, but to the positions at > a second and a third instant’ (RLT 199). This contradicts the first > proposition of the three given above by Peirce as ‘the grand principle of > causation’; and the ‘mechanical philosophy’ also contradicts the other two, > because it represents causation as reversible, so that ‘the future > determines the past in precisely the same way in which the past determines > the future’ (RLT 201). Thus the principle of causation in the physical > domain of the Law of Energy is ‘in flat contradiction’ to ‘the grand > principle of causation’ as stated above. > > But when from the world of physical force we turn to the psychical world > all is entirely different. Here we find no evident trace of any state of > mind depending in opposite ways upon two previous states of mind. Every > state of mind, acting under an overruling association, produces another > state of mind.… I come down in the morning; and the sight of the newspaper > makes me think of the *Maine,* the breakfast is brought in, and the sight > of something I like puts me into a state of cheerful appetite; and so it > goes all day long. Moreover, the effect is not simultaneous with the cause. > I do not think of the explosion of the *Maine* simultaneously with seeing > the newspaper, but after seeing it, though the interval be but a thirtieth > of a second. Furthermore, the relations of the present to the past and to > the future, instead of being the same, as in the domain of the Law of > Energy, are utterly unlike. I remember the past, but I have absolutely no > slightest approach to such knowledge of the future. On the other hand I > have considerable *power* over the future, but nobody except the Parisian > mob imagines that he can change the past by much or by little. Thus all > three propositions of the law of causation are here fully borne out. — RLT > 201-2, CP 6.69-70 > > This account of psychical or mental causation is similar to Peirce's 1873 > theory in its focus on the irreversibility of determination in time, and it > does bear out the proposition that the state of things (or state of mind) > at one time determined by the state of things at *one* other time (and > not two). We might question whether it ‘fully bears out’ the proposition > ‘that the state of things at any one instant is *completely and exactly* > determined by the state of things at one other instant,’ because in > semiosis, *determination* is never ‘complete’ or ‘exact.’ But this > oversimplification may result from the fact that ‘instants,’ ‘states of > things’ and ‘facts’ are abstractions from the flow of experience, which we > deploy as ideal entities in our mathematical models of causality – > including physical or ‘dynamic’ causality. > > A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a > nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one > *individual,* or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all > of reality. A *fact* is so highly a prescissively abstract state of > things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the > term “simple,” here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative > expression. — EP2:378, 1906 > > Besides, Peirce's ‘logic of events’ (or ‘objective logic’) regarded the > present state of the universe as evolving from an original state of things > in which there was ‘no compulsion and no law’ (CP 6.217), and thus the > rationale of its evolution was not limited to deductive logic, the only > kind of inference that can be *exact.* This, said Peirce, is > > the prime difference between my objective logic and that of Hegel. He > says, if there is any sense in philosophy at all, the whole universe and > every feature of it, however minute, is rational, and was constrained to be > as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of action in > the universe but reason. But I reply, this line of thought, though it > begins rightly, is not exact. A logical slip is committed; and the > conclusion reached is manifestly at variance with observation. It is true > that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded as > rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not > follow that it is *constrained* to be as it is by the logic of events; > for the logic of evolution and of life need not be supposed to be of that > wooden kind that absolutely constrains a given conclusion. The logic may be > that of the inductive or hypothetic inference. — CP 6.218 (1898) > > Even dynamic causation ‘must be regarded as rational’ in order to be > intelligible, and ‘exact logical analysis shows dynamic causation (if every > element of it be considered) is more than the mere brute force, the dyadic > action, that it appears to superficial thinkers to be. For it is governed > by law’ (CP 6.329, c.1909) – governed, but not completely determined in > every respect. > > All our knowledge, all our thought, is in signs – including our knowledge > of what happens ‘whenever one thing acts upon another.’ That action may be > essentially dyadic, but our *cognition* of it must be the triadic action > of semiosis; only semiotic determination can render physical causation > intelligible. > > Peirce argues (EP2:392) that the best way of ‘determining the precise > sense which we are to attach to the term *determination*’ is to realize > that a sign whose meaning was completely determinate would leave “no > latitude of interpretation” at all, ‘either for the interpreter or for the > utterer.’ This makes the definition of *determination* ‘turn upon the > interpretation’ (EP2:393). This way of defining determination applies to > ‘anything capable of indeterminacy’ (EP2:392) – but if ‘everything > indeterminate is of the nature of a sign’ (as Peirce argues, EP2:392 fn), > then the processes of determination and semiosis are inseparable from one > another. > > In 1906, Peirce went on to argue – based on the analysis represented by > his Existential Graphs – that semiosis at any level of complexity amounts > to a *mutual determination* of signs, paradigmatically of Antecedent and > Consequent: > > It thus appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and > the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so > much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to > perform. > > For that reason, the ways in which Terms and Arguments can be compounded > cannot differ greatly from the ways in which Propositions can be > compounded. A mystery, or paradox, has always overhung the question of the > Composition of Concepts. Namely, if two concepts, A and B, are to be > compounded, their composition would seem to be necessarily a third > ingredient, Concept C, and the same difficulty will arise as to the > Composition of A and C. But the Method of Existential Graphs solves this > riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions go, and it must > evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general > way in which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each > component must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their > composition each determines the other. On the recto this is obvious: “Some > man is rich” is composed of “Something is a man” and “something is rich,” > and the two somethings merely explain each other's vagueness in a measure. > Two simultaneous independent assertions are still connected in the same > manner; for each is in itself vague as to the Universe or the “Province” in > which its truth lies, and the two somewhat define each other in this > respect. The composition of a Conditional Proposition is to be explained in > the same way. The Antecedent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its > Interpretant; the Consequent is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its > Object. They supply each the other's lack. — CP 4.572 > > But of course the argument does not end here; this is only a set of > ‘Prolegomena > to an Apology for Pragmaticism <http://www.gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm> > .’ > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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