Jerry,
O-R-I in my table is the objective sequence with deduction. Maybe this is the same as Sub Specie Aeternitatis? Like deduction might be sort of the natural or basic form of inquiry, to which the other forms are compared? R-O-I is what I had called the subjective sequence as it happens in the interpreters mind: Something happens, and this is the reason for the sign, temporally. This event then is the representamen, which fits to an object. The object is a knowledge of the mind. It has (objectively) existed before the event has showed up, but was unconscious, in sort of a sleeping mode, so, subjectively, it is the second thing perceived, after the event.
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Dienstag, 03. Mai 2016 um 00:12 Uhr
Von: "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>, "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>, Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?
Von: "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>, "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>, Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?
Helmut:
Thank you for that but a genuine problem is that I am a Second (Yes and No, Agent and Patient), and I say it’s not representamen, object, interpretant.
Rather, I say “object, representamen, interpretant”.
This is akin to my claiming that my view is the “sub specie aeternitatis”.
So, why ROI and not ORI?
Because the inquiry begins with the phenomenon, not the representamen.
And “The surprising fact, C, is observed. But if representamen A were true…”
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
List,Going back to what Jon Alan Schmidt wrote about rule, case and result, I would like to make a detour concerning representamen, object, interpretant. That is, because I first want to avoid the question (Edwina), whether rule, case, and result are essences, or relations, and postpone it or transfer it to the question, whether representamen, object, and interpretant are relations that may be assigned to the categories. There is a hint, that they can, as the representamen has one mode, the object two, and the interpretant three, so this would fit into the categorial scheme. Now, what i want to propose is, that rule, case, result can be assigned to representamen, object, interpretant. A rule is a permanent knowledge, so an object, I would say. As a knowledge of one mind, it is an immediate object, and as a general knowledge, eg. shared by a scientific community, it is a dynamical object. A case is an occurence in the mind, an event, so it is a representamen, I think. Or perhaps not the case itself is the representamen, but the cases appearance in the observers mind. And the result is an interpretant, or at least a mode of it- perhaps the immediate? So, now to put it into categorial terms, with deduction the sequence is rule- case- result, the categorial sequence would be 2-1-3. This would go along with Peirce saying that the object determines the representamen. this sequence "2-1-3", I would say, is the objective sequence of the environment of a deductive sign, while "1-2-3" is the subjective sequence of any signs environment, as experienced by the interpreter. This subjective sequence goes along with Peirce saying "a sign is a first...". In this subjective sequence, with deduction, the rule is the representamen (1), and the case the object (2). But in the objective sequence (as observed and analysed from outside), rule is object (2), and case representamen (1). That is complicated, so I write a table:Subjective sequence: Representamen (1) - Object (2)- Interpretant (3) (always like this)Objective sequences ofDeduction: Rule, Object (2)- Case, Representamen (1)- Result, Interpretant (3)Induction: Case, Representamen(1)- Result, Interpretant (3)- Rule, Object (2)Abduction: Result, Interpretant (3)- Rule, Object (2)- Case, Representamen (1)This is a proposal, and I wonder whether it goes along with Garys vectors. I wrote "environment of a sign", because I think, that within a sign there is no sequence at all, as all three sign parts occur at the same time due to irreducibility. So, to be very correct, I should not have written "Representamen", "Object", "Interpretant" in the sequences-table, but eg.: "That, what occurs as a.... (Representamen, object or interpretant) in the sign". The sign in question concerning the objective sequences is a would-be-sign in the mind of an outside interpreter, who eg. would say:" He has made an abduction: He took a mere representamen for a conclusion (for interpretant)".Best,HelmutGesendet: Montag, 02. Mai 2016 um 15:43 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
An: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
Cc: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>, Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?Very well said. The categories are modes of Relations, not modes of
Essences.
Edwina Taborsky
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
To: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; "Jerry Rhee"
<jerryr...@gmail.com>
Cc: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>; "Peirce-L"
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2016 9:24 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be
Worthwhile?
> Jon S.,
>
> Most of the old timers on this List have already heard
> and ignored this advice more times than I could care to
> enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers
> may not have heard it before, I will give it another try.
>
> Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations.
> To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are
> simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively,
> have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the
> issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity,
> but it is critical to take the first approximation first before
> attempting to deal with the second.)
>
> In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic
> relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness
> to any local domain or any given element that participates in that
> relation.
>
> As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of
> its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of
> tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of
> that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself
> to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to
> take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is
> a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice.
>
> Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error
> that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA).
> As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion,
> arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in
> sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain
> levels of structure.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 5/1/2016 11:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Jerry R., List:
>>
>> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
>>
>> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course [because B];
>>
>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
>>
>> This is propositional logic, so as you anticipated, we have to convert it
>> into predicate logic--a syllogism in the strict, deductive sense--in
>> order
>> to assign the various terms as you have requested. By doing so, we
>> construct the very syllogism that Peirce invoked in "A Neglected Argument
>> for the Reality of God" (EP 2.441). With S=subject (these beans),
>> P=predicate (white), and M=middle (beans from this bag) ...
>>
>> A = credible conjecture = Case = minor premiss = S is M.
>> B = circumstances of occurrence = Rule = major premiss = M is P.
>> C = surprising fact = Result = conclusion = S is P.
>>
>> I do not believe that any of this is controversial, nor (it seems)
>> is assigning B to Thirdness; someone will no doubt correct me if I am
>> wrong
>> about this. :-) What is still on the table is whether A is Firstness
>> (Jon
>> S.) or Secondness (Gary R.), and thus whether C is Secondness (Jon S.) or
>> Firstness (Gary R.).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
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