“…there is also present a nameless philosopher designated only as a stranger from Elea. Socrates asks the stranger whether his fellows regard the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher as one and the same or as two or as three. It could seem that the question regarding the identity or nonidentity of the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher takes the place of the question, or is a more articulate version of the question, What is knowledge?” ~Strauss
To articulate the problem of cosmology means to answer the question of what philosophy is or what a philosopher is…But even that stranger from Elea did not discuss explicitly what a philosopher is. He discussed explicitly two kinds of men which are easily mistaken for the philosopher, the sophist and the statesman. By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is. Philosophy strives for knowledge of the whole. The whole is the totality of the parts. The whole eludes us, but we know parts: we possess partial knowledge of parts. At one pole…At the opposite pole…it is necessarily accompanied, sustained and elevated by *eros*. It is graced by nature’s grace.” ~Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? One, two, three…icon, index, symbol…sophist, statesman, philosopher…object, sign, interpretant… Hth, Jerry Rhee On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 3:11 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Frances, list, > Did you say, that not all signs are inferences? This I would agree with. > Or did you also say, that inferences are not signs, but only interpretant- > relations? Hm, may be, though I like psychical drama. But in this case, i > think, that any inference can only be an argument, because an inference > consists of three parts, and a term/rheme is only one part, and a > proposition/dicent may consist of only two parts (eg.: "birds fly"). But: > Is an argument not necessarily a syllogism, that is deduction? An argument > being an abduction must first change or de-degenerate the abduction into a > deduction, eg. by putting a "possibly" before the conclusion. Eg.: If the > abduction ends with "the beans are from the bag", then this conclusion must > be replaced by: "So possibly the beans are from the bag", to have a proper > syllogism, a deduction. and in case of induction, the replacement eg. would > be: "So probably all swans are white", to de-degenerate it into a > deduction. or am I thinking too complicated? > Best, > Helmut > *Gesendet:* Dienstag, 03. Mai 2016 um 19:59 Uhr > *Von:* [email protected] > *An:* 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > *Betreff:* RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial > Analysis Be Worthwhile? > > Frances in the Wings to Helmut and Listers--- > > Would it not be more categorially consistent with the Peircean theory of > signs to hold that the inferred evaluated worth of a satisfactory and > meaningful sign in the broadest way is judged only by its informative > interpretant. This implies that informative representamens and referred > objects are not themselves alone part of inferences nor assigned and > aligned structurally with inferences, so that what is inferred or judged is > the evaluated interpreted effect of the signed information. In other words, > the interpretant as mainly a term or proposition or argument is transferred > by the signer to the inference and judgement as mainly an abduction or > induction or deduction. The informative "grammatic" division of signs is > therefore initially preparatory to the evaluative "critical" division of > signs and inferences, which in turn is eventually contributory to the > evocative "rhetorical" or "methodeutical" division of signs. (The > hierarchical sequencing of the phenomenally signed categories here in this > topical subject is merely a psychical drama used to illustrate the observed > issues as they might really occur in the relative situation of a sign and > in the selective mesh of evolving nature.) > > Note that if divisional information on the whole were forced broadly and > generally to fit divisional evaluation on the inference, which information > on the whole likely should not be, then across the board its representamens > would perhaps mainly be qualitative results and objects would be factual > cases and interpretants would be lawful rules. > > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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