List,
I guess, what is meant by "average", can be explained with what Jeffrey wrote three or four posts before:
"
What role, if any, does the conception of a mean, or an average, or a normal, play in the account of being when he says: "We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon signs -- words or thoughts; we observe that different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a subject has something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it -- and that we call Being."
"
I understand it like "mean", "average" and "normal" are necessary traits of any predicate, and there is no predicate but within communication, and "mean" is the common aspect of the communicated subject, "average" is the agreed-about aspect of it, and "normal" is the standardising aspect. Communication is what a sign is part of, the immediate object is within the sign, so within communication, so within the predicate, so within that what turns a subject into a being. This is what I think is the connection between "average" and "immediate object", though at first glance it seems odd, because "average" makes one think of a higher instance, but it is only the averageness of the subject between two communicating partners, same like it is with "mean", "normal", "truth", and "being": Terms that seem like meant universally, but really are just meant in the sense, that something (a predicate) is shared by two partners in communication. Is that so?
Helmut
Freitag, 24. Juni 2016 um 22:14 Uhr
"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Jun 24, 2016, at 1:42 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
I should add it’s really hard to quantify this notion into something more technically accurate. I don’t think this is just a problem with the immediate object but besets a lot of Peirce’s thought relative to common sensism. He makes use of the idea of “true in the main” quite regularly but honestly I can’t quite figure out what that actually means when I think about it more. I’m not sure brushing aside this issue by coenoscopic and idioscopic distinctions solves the problem. So I definitely tend to agree with you.
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