Hi everyone,

Here is something more of which to say about consciousness and mind:



"The absolute beginning, accordingly, is the *Idea*..

The procedure made from this beginning is the systematic exposition of the
world of Nature and Spirit, as manifestation, realization, and
actualization of God, or absolute self-conscious Reason.



Some words shall herein be capitalised when used, not as vernacular, but as
terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought
or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato>'s
idea of *ἰδέα*, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity
for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or
impotence to represent it.



The presupposition made by this beginning is manifestly the establishment
of the Idea as the highest and true form of Being- the result of the
Logic.



Logic had for presupposition the already existent power, on the part of the
thinker, to comprehend, i.e. to think speculatively or exhaustively- *sub
specie aeternitatis percipere*- the power to supply the test of
Universality (self-relation) to any category.



It is clear that the third beginning-the absolute first principle- must be
present as the moving soul in all philosophical procedure.


But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care
should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is
called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this
point of view does indeed appear to be awful."

~ Hegel, Peirce, Plato on neglected arguments...




One two three…mind, body, soul…sophist, statesman,
philosopher…consciousness, consciousness,
consciousness…consciousness…commens…*sub specie aeternitatis*…

On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 11:31 AM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On Aug 4, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> "That is to be conscious would seem to have a connection so we experience
> a flow. But if we tie it just to the swerve it’d seem like each conscious
> moment is unconnected."
> I guess, the states of the primisense are not directly connected with each
> other, but the primisense contents encounter the altersense, then both are
> combined in the medisense, and then the result goes back into the
> primisense. So the images in the primisense are rather like a slide show
> than like a video. But we experience a flow, because each picture is
> connected with upcoming memories and thoughts, and creates a new picture,
> or a new state of consciousness. That reminds of Edelman and Tononi, who
> say, that a brain can change its state very quickly.
>
>
> Early on he says this. Swerve proper is just chance but he allows
> something semi-chance that is instead a kind of mental spontaneity.
>
>
> I attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form
> of a spontaneity which is to some degree regular. It seems to me clear at
> any rate that one of these two positions must be taken, or else
> specification must be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself
> in a certain and not in a chance way, by an objective logic like that of
> Hegel. This last way I leave as an open possibility, for the present; for
> it is as much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own
> theory is. (CP 6.28)
>
>
> Later he makes this more explicit.
>
>
> One opinion frequently met with is that the law of energy does not
> prescribe the direction of velocity, but only its amountl so that the mind
> may cause atoms to “swerve,” in regular Lucretian fashion. (CP 6.83)
>
> The key issue distinguishing mind from “consciousness” is over the
> category of Firstness. (As I mentioned when Peirce speaks of mind
> technically rather than loosely he almost always means Thirdness)
>
> …whativer i First is *ipso facto sentient*. If I make atoms swerve - as I
> do - I make them server but very very little because I conceive they are
> not absolutely dead. And by that I do not mean exactly that I hold them to
> be physically such as the materialists hold them to be, only with a small
> does of sentiency superadded. For that, I grant, would be feeble enoguh.
> But what I mean is, that all that there is, is First, Feelings; Second,
> Efforts; Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their
> psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter would
> merely the finally result of the complete induration of habit reducing the
> free play of feeling and hte brute irrationality of effort to complete
> death (CP 6.201)
>
>
> The quasi-flow that connects these is basic to Peirce’s somewhat
> neoPlatonic ontology. (Again Kelly Parker has written on this a fair bit)
>
> Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come
> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then
> by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time
> would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the
> first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other
> successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the
> tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would
> have been bound together into something like a continuous flow. (CP 1.412)
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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>
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