Dear peirce-list:
Body of Grandfather(?) of Netlogo (an embodied learning platform) passes… http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/08/05/488669276/remembering-a-thinker-who-thought-about-thinking “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world…” ~Peirce http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/Honeycomb Best, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 4:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Aug 5, 2016, at 2:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > I have not yet understood this, because if consciousness was mere > firstness, then it could not adopt a secondness mode (altersense), and a > thirdness (medisense), I am guessing. About mind, I thought, that for > Peirce it is not only thirdness, but everything, even matter is mind, > though effete, like frozen in secondness (or is it thirdness, because it is > a habit?). I imagine it like mind being the meaning process, or the sign > process in general, and a material object, eg. a stone in the soil, is like > in a sleeping mode concerning its parttaking at the sign process, or taking > part at it only in a very large time scale. > > > There seems a bit of handwaving on Peirce’s part here. (IMO) I’m not sure > I quite get it myself. > > As I’ve said many times I think one can embrace most of Peirce’s thought > without necessarily buying his ontology. Although I do find it interesting. > But arguments for foundational ontology are always by their nature so weak > that it’s hard to take musings on them too seriously. > > The best explanation I’ve seen of all this is still Kelly Parker’s. As > I’ve mentioned a few times there are a few places I recall having some > problems with his presentations. However that analysis was a sufficient > number of years ago that I now can’t quite remember the details of my > objections beyond some issues over mixing early and late Peirce in a few > places. They were minor quibbles though. > > http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html > > On the other hand you have written, that consciousness is a first-person > affair, and mind is seen from outside, in the third person. But this is not > totally different from saying that consciousness is in the brain, if one > says, that a first person (an I) has a brain, and organisms without one, > like plants, donot have a consciousness (though they have a mind). > > > I think it’s more one is looking at it in terms of computation and the > other in terms of raw experience. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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