Gary F., List: GF: That rules out pantheism, but not, I think, panentheism, which (as I understand it) holds that Nature is immanent in God, not the other way round.
Hmm, my admittedly limited understanding of panentheism is that it affirms God to be somehow both immanent and transcendant; so flatly denying immanence would seem to rule it out. Apparently there are lots of varieties, though. GF: Anyway, I think the fact that in revising his drafts for publication, Peirce reduced the ascription of “Infinite Benignity” (R 843) to a conditional clause in the NA, could signify a well-considered reluctance to assert it. Again, fair enough. GF: Maybe it’s unfair of me to comment on this “at one sitting,” but I find this reply unconvincing, because it appears to rest partly on the premiss that the “life to come” is an *individual *life. I see no logical reason to accept that premiss. Consequently I don’t think Peirce has met the objection that challenges the connection between *the Reality of God* and *logic as semeiotic*. I’m inclined to think that connection is just as vague as other features of the NA — and that your efforts here have done just about all that can be done to reduce that vagueness. Also fair enough; perhaps this is why Peirce did not end up including that objection and response in the published text--although, since it comes from the first additament, it may have been *The Hibbert Journal* that omitted it by printing the second additament instead--and/or why the CP editors chose to omit it. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Sep 17, 2016 at 11:32 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, thanks for this, and for your later post, which clears things up > considerably. Just a couple of responses: > > > > JS: In R 843, he states that the NA pertains to "the Being whose > Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, > Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being *not *'immanent in' the > Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content > of them, without exception." > > > > GF: If the former, this use of the term “God” would make Peirce a > pantheist or panentheist ... > > > > JS: Pantheism and panentheism both seem to be ruled out by Peirce's > explicit *denial *in at least two drafts, including the one quoted above, > that God--as he defines the term--is "immanent in Nature." > > > > GF: That rules out pantheism, but not, I think, panentheism, which (as I > understand it) holds that Nature is immanent in God, not the other way > round. Anyway, I think the fact that in revising his drafts for > publication, Peirce reduced the ascription of “Infinite Benignity” (R > 843) to a conditional clause in the NA, could signify a well-considered > reluctance to assert it. But enough theology … > > > > JS: CP 6.491 includes his description of the objection that "man's power > of guessing at the truth" could simply be--like the instincts of animals to > which he compared it--"entirely explained by the action of natural > selection," and thus inapplicable to metaphysical matters like the Reality > of God. However, for some reason the editors left out Peirce's response > that immediately follows in R 844. > > > > CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted > much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of > divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection > could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My > reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or > disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt > or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and > further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief > in the Ens necessarium would according as it were true or false, fit or > disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural > selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this > belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it > acts in respect to ordinary morality. > > > > GF: Maybe it’s unfair of me to comment on this “at one sitting,” but I > find this reply unconvincing, because it appears to rest partly on the > premiss that the “life to come” is an *individual* life. I see no logical > reason to accept that premiss. Consequently I don’t think Peirce has met > the objection that challenges the connection between *the Reality of God* > and *logic as semeiotic*. I’m inclined to think that connection is just > as vague as other features of the NA — and that your efforts here have done > just about all that can be done to reduce that vagueness. > > > > And as Jeff said, thanks for pointing to the SPIN project which gave you > access to the manuscripts. The more Peirceans start using it, the better! > > > > Gary f. >
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