Here is the most pertinent portion of R 1343 that I have
transcribed so far. It appears on pages 11-17 of the
manuscript.
Classification
is one of the subjects of which Logic
has to treat. We must here confine
ourselves to such considerations as are almost axiomatic and
are indispensible
for framing a natural classification of the sciences. Every
class is constituted and held together
by a concept or idea expressed in its definition. Every
arrangement of ideas is itself an
idea. Consequently, every classification
whatever is governed by an idea, however loose and
incongruous it may
be. A natural classification, that is to
say, a birth-al classification, is a classification whose
governing idea
coincides with the idea which determines the things
classified to exist. An idea, so far as it has any relation
to
life, is a possible purpose. Therefore
the spirit of this work requires us here to regard a natural
classification as
a classification that conforms to the purpose, or
quasi-purpose, of the
existence of the objects classified. In
case we know what that purpose is, as we should, for
example, if we were
drawing up a classification of vehicles, it will be a
comparatively easy
thing,—though none too easy even in that case,—to ascertain
approximately the
natural classification. Should there be
no human purpose, there may, nevertheless, be an
evolutionary agency that acts
like a purpose, or there may [be] a principle similar to
such agency except
that it is related, not to a temporal, but to a logical
sequence of
results. If a natural
classification is to be possible, something of that
description there must
be. Our comprehension of such a
principle will be imperfect. It will
suffice to enable us to begin a sketch of a natural
classification, but not to
carry it out. Where such comprehension
of the origins of the species to be classified abandons us,
we can often derive
important aid from the doctrine of probabilities, which
teaches us how
fortuitous, that is, unintended, characters distribute
themselves. It will be demonstrated in the chapter on
classification that two closely related natural classes are
not, in general,
separated by sharp lines of demarcation, so that there will
be forms any one of
which might, as far as the essential characters of those
classes serve to
discriminate them, belong either to the one or to the other
of the two natural
classes. But in such cases it will often
be found upon investigation that there are other characters,
more or less
accidental, which may aid us in referring the forms to their
true
classes. For example, Prof. Petrie found
in the town of Naucratis some hundred and eighty standard
weights. The calculus of probabilities applied to
their weight-values proves that they were intended to
conform to five different
quasi-prototypes; but many of the weights, owing to the
imperfection of their
manufacture, have intermediate values, so that, as far as
this governing
intended character goes, it would be impossible to say to
which standard any
one such intermediate weight was intended to conform. But
if we take into consideration their
shapes, their material, and the perfection of their
execution, characters in
regard to which there was no distinctive intention, much may
be done toward
assigning the individual weights to their intended classes.
Every
purpose, although it relates to action upon an
individual subject is in itself general.
In the inception of its first fulfillment, whether in
reality or in
imagination, it is broadly general and simple. But in the
process of working itself out, it
necessarily becomes successively more and more definite and
complex, and each
of these determinations may usually take one or other of
several forms. Thus, when primitive man first found that he
needed clothing in winter, his original and principal
purpose may have been to
keep warm. But when he came to cut his
garment, it may have occurred to him that its appearance
would make some
impression on those who saw him; and then he might adopt as
a secondary purpose that of attracting his
friends or that of scaring his enemies.
Moreover, the attainment of a purpose usually involves the
solution of a
problem. There are conditions that have
to be fulfilled; and the fulfillment of these becomes a subordinate
purpose. When we
come to study the matter more closely, we shall find that
there are several
different categories of secondary and subordinate purpose.
These
categories of purpose must be categories of
every system of natural classification, so far as that
classification expresses
the development of a purpose working upon a unvarying
condition of matter, or
working upon conditions whose gradual changes and
revolutions are sufficiently
slow to allow of the purpose taking its full development.
In some form they must appear in every
natural classification,—be it of dances or be it of battles;
or at least, so
one may presume. But that form can
hardly fail to be very different in case nothing interferes
with the
prosecution of a purpose and in case plans are liable to be
deranged or
frustrated at every step by unexpected emergencies. These
categories must be expected to show
themselves not only in true natural classification, but also
in mistaken
attempts at natural classification,—sometimes even more
clearly. For they have their origin in the
necessary relations between thoughts and their objects; and
these affect
the operations of the human mind, even when it is most
illogical, quite as
clearly as the do those of nature.
All
this, however, as here stated, is vague in the extreme; and
even granting that it is true, leaves us quite in the dark
as to helpfulness of a further knowledge of the categories
in drawing up a scheme of natural classification. Moreover,
while enough has been said to excite a presumption that
there are some such categories, yet even this is not made
out with certainty. It will be the part of good sense to
leave such matters entirely out of account until the
frame-work of our classification is nearly or quite
complete, and to avoid the "high priori" method.
