Mike, List: I am afraid that you should not get your hopes up about that other chapter appearing later in R 1343. I am pretty sure that it only contains a single intended chapter, but I will let you know if I discover otherwise. I am mainly interested in seeing what (if anything) Peirce had to say about engineering among the practical sciences.
It is not clear when Peirce wrote R 1343 relative to CP 1.203-231. The latter is reproduced as EP 2.115-132, which the accompanying headnote dates to February 1902; it also states that he "must have written" R 1343 "around the [same] time." Therefore, one would not expect the two to express significantly different views about classification. In CP 1.211, Peirce wrote, "A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience"; so the distinction seems to be merely that the one is a subset of the other. Thus purposes are insufficient to define *all *natural classes, only because some of them have final causes that are *not *purposes. I wonder if Peirce used the term "quasi-purpose" in R 1343 precisely because he had those in mind. Finally, note that Peirce also included artificial objects in the scope of natural classification in CP 1.204, offering lamps as a specific example. In fact, he said there that it is easier to arrange "human productions" into natural classes than "natural objects," because we know for sure the final causes of the former, but not those of the latter. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 7:58 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Jon, Ben, List, > > This is fantastic! Thanks for checking your notes so quickly. Two things > come immediately to mind: > > 1) Peirce states, "It will be demonstrated in the chapter on > classification . . ." I hope in your continued transcription that such a > chapter so arises. Since these passages reflect many of the same points as > in CP 1.203-231, especially viz Petrie's kets example and the discussion of > class boundaries, perhaps Peirce was heading toward providing a more > complete and updated discussion, because, also: > > 2) In these passages Peirce wholly embraces the idea of "purpose". But in > CP 1.203-231 (esp. 1.211), he is at great pains to distinguish "final > cause" from "purpose", seemingly making the point that "purpose" alone is > insufficient to help define the distribution of a natural class. > > Besides these two points, I'm glad to see that Peirce also includes > inanimate or artificial objects -- vehicles in this case -- in the scope of > his interests in natural classification. These new passages pretty well > confirm his view that natural classification could apply to ideas, > human-made objects, and social considerations (not noted here). > > If, in your continuing transcription you find more reference to these > matters, please try to remember and post to the list. Guidance on creating > natural classifications is a very timely topic for me (in relation to > knowledge representation). > > Thanks to all who posted references! (I will keep monitoring to see if > more may arise.) > > Best, Mike > On 9/29/2016 7:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Mike, List: > > Here is the most pertinent portion of R 1343 that I have transcribed so > far. It appears on pages 11-17 of the manuscript. > > Classification is one of the subjects of which Logic has to treat. We > must here confine ourselves to such considerations as are almost axiomatic > and are indispensible for framing a natural classification of the > sciences. Every class is constituted and held together by a concept or > idea expressed in its definition. Every arrangement of ideas is itself an > idea. Consequently, every classification whatever is governed by an idea, > however loose and incongruous it may be. A natural classification, that is > to say, a birth-al classification, is a classification whose governing idea > coincides with the idea which determines the things classified to exist. > An idea, so far as it has any relation to life, is a possible purpose. > Therefore the spirit of this work requires us here to regard a natural > classification as a classification that conforms to the purpose, or > quasi-purpose, of the existence of the objects classified. In case we know > what that purpose is, as we should, for example, if we were drawing up a > classification of vehicles, it will be a comparatively easy thing,—though > none too easy even in that case,—to ascertain approximately the natural > classification. Should there be no human purpose, there may, nevertheless, > be an evolutionary agency that acts like a purpose, or there may [be] a > principle similar to such agency except that it is related, not to a > temporal, but to a logical sequence of results. If a natural > classification is to be possible, something of that description there must > be. Our comprehension of such a principle will be imperfect. It will > suffice to enable us to begin a sketch of a natural classification, but not > to carry it out. Where such comprehension of the origins of the species to > be classified abandons us, we can often derive important aid from the > doctrine of probabilities, which teaches us how fortuitous, that is, > unintended, characters distribute themselves. It will be demonstrated in > the chapter on classification that two closely related natural classes are > not, in general, separated by sharp lines of demarcation, so that there > will be forms any one of which might, as far as the essential characters of > those classes serve to discriminate them, belong either to the one or to > the other of the two natural classes. But in such cases it will often be > found upon investigation that there are other characters, more or less > accidental, which may aid us in referring the forms to their true classes. > For example, Prof. Petrie found in the town of Naucratis some hundred and > eighty standard weights. The calculus of probabilities applied to their > weight-values proves that they were intended to conform to five different > quasi-prototypes; but many of the weights, owing to the imperfection of > their manufacture, have intermediate values, so that, as far as this > governing intended character goes, it would be impossible to say to which > standard any one such intermediate weight was intended to conform. But if > we take into consideration their shapes, their material, and the perfection > of their execution, characters in regard to which there was no distinctive > intention, much may be done toward assigning the individual weights to > their intended classes. > > Every purpose, although it relates to action upon an individual subject is > in itself general. In the inception of its first fulfillment, whether in > reality or in imagination, it is broadly general and simple. But in the > process of working itself out, it necessarily becomes successively more and > more definite and complex, and each of these determinations may usually > take one or other of several forms. Thus, when primitive man first found > that he needed clothing in winter, his original and principal purpose may > have been to keep warm. But when he came to cut his garment, it may have > occurred to him that its appearance would make some impression on those who > saw him; and then he might adopt as a *secondary* purpose that of > attracting his friends or that of scaring his enemies. Moreover, the > attainment of a purpose usually involves the solution of a problem. There > are conditions that have to be fulfilled; and the fulfillment of these > becomes a *subordinate* purpose. When we come to study the matter more > closely, we shall find that there are several different categories of > secondary and subordinate purpose. > > These categories of purpose must be categories of every system of natural > classification, so far as that classification expresses the development of > a purpose working upon a unvarying condition of matter, or working upon > conditions whose gradual changes and revolutions are sufficiently slow to > allow of the purpose taking its full development. In some form they must > appear in every natural classification,—be it of dances or be it of > battles; or at least, so one may presume. But that form can hardly fail to > be very different in case nothing interferes with the prosecution of a > purpose and in case plans are liable to be deranged or frustrated at every > step by unexpected emergencies. These categories must be expected to show > themselves not only in true natural classification, but also in mistaken > attempts at natural classification,—sometimes even more clearly. For they > have their origin in the necessary relations between thoughts and their > objects; and these affect the operations of the human mind, even when it is > most illogical, quite as clearly as the do those of nature. > > All this, however, as here stated, is vague in the extreme; and even > granting that it is true, leaves us quite in the dark as to helpfulness of > a further knowledge of the categories in drawing up a scheme of natural > classification. Moreover, while enough has been said to excite a > presumption that there are some such categories, yet even this is not made > out with certainty. It will be the part of good sense to leave such > matters entirely out of account until the frame-work of our classification > is nearly or quite complete, and to avoid the "high priori" method. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Also see Peirce discussing the difference between logical classification >> and natural classification in "Triadomany", CP 1.568-572 >> http://www.textlog.de/4336.html >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 9/29/2016 2:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >> Mike, List: >> >> Glad to be of service! In the meantime, you might review Peirce's >> extensive discussion of "natural classes" and "natural classification" at >> CP 1.203-231. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Fantastic, Jon. That would be most helpful, especially since that is >>> "new" information. >>> Mike >>> >>> On 9/29/2016 11:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >>> >>> Mike, List: >>> >>> As it happens, I am currently in the process of reading and transcribing >>> R 1343, "Of the Classification of the Sciences, Second Paper, Of the >>> Practical Sciences," once again thanks to the SPIN project ( >>> http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16). So far, >>> about 40 pages into it, it presents instead a classification of instincts; >>> but if I remember right, it also includes some discussion about principles >>> of classification. I do not have my in-progress transcription with me at >>> the office, but if I get a chance this evening, I will review it and post >>> anything relevant that I find. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:22 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi List, >>>> >>>> Ben Udell recently quoted from this Peirce memoir: >>>> >>>> MEMOIR 27: OF METHODEUTIC >>>> >>>> [....] >>>> >>>> From Draft B - MS L75.279-280 >>>> >>>> [....] Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually >>>> made almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and >>>> of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification. >>>> [End quote] >>>> >>>> I have only found spotty references by Peirce to the "principles of >>>> classification" in my own online resources. Would anyone on the list care >>>> (Edwina ? :) ) to provide any of their own known citations? >>>> >>>> Thanks in advance, >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>
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