I assume Peirce is distinguishing from Cartesian doubt. Genuine doubt has a reason (or at least prima facie reason) for the doubt. Doubt based on mere possibilities of something being false is not genuine doubt.
John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, 29 September 2016 5:52 AM To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>>; Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Hi everyone: "We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, in fact, this is the case." Where is genuine doubt? Thanks, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Clark, List: As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that the PM itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting hypotheses to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced and justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by abduction. CSP: For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. Now it is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be admitted by any philosopher which should prohibit on any formalistic grounds any inquiry as to how we ought in consistency to shape our practical conduct. Therefore, a maxim which looks only to possibly practical considerations will not need any supplement in order to exclude any hypotheses as inadmissible. What hypotheses it admits all philosophers would agree ought to be admitted. On the other hand, if it be true that nothing but such considerations has any logical effect or import whatever, it is plain that the maxim of pragmatism cannot cut off any kind of hypothesis which ought to be admitted. Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully covers the entire logic of abduction. (CP 5.196) My earlier point was that identifying how a conception "might conceivably modify our practical conduct" seems like (deductive) explication to me--the hypothesis that a diamond is hard means, for one thing, "that it will not be scratched by many other substances" (CP 5.403). We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, in fact, this is the case. In Peirce's words that I quoted previously, the PM also "cut[s] down the premisses of deduction" by rejecting hypotheses that have no bearing on "possibly practical considerations," and thus do not warrant any further attention. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote: On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic. Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of the pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning practical differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive consideration although the actual measurement would be a combination of deductive and inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical scaffolding. But any particular detection that something is hard is different from the meaning of say a diamond being hard. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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