Edwina, List: ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.
Only if you *presuppose *that only that which is spatial and temporal can be "something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his terminology, the Platonic worlds are *real*, even though they do not *exist* . ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order and super-habit'. According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is absolutely necessary; in fact, there cannot be *any *Being whatsoever, since "all Being involves some kind of super-order ... Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit." ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists vs non-theists! Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible that *everything *could have come from *nothing*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, list > That's a nice outline. > > With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE has > been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if one > defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as *nothing* for in a > very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal. > > With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of *any > *kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., > the Reality of God. [see ** below]... > > I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a > 'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require > self-organization of order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. > That is, order and habit emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. > They don't pre-exist. I think this is a basic disagreement among those of > us who are theists vs non-theists! > > Edwina >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
