Dear list: Plato: The Soul is older than the body, *Laws* Aristotle: Substance/non-being is first in every sense, *Metaphysics* Peirce: Substance and being are the beginning and end of all conception, *On a New List of Categories*
Best, Jerry R On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > ET: I don't agree that the 'blackboard' exists, and as a homogeneity - it > is not the same as Thirdness, which is habit. > > > Of course the blackboard does not *exist*, since its reality--or rather, > the reality of what it represents in Peirce's diagram--precedes the > emergence of *any* actuality. Thirdness is not confined to habit alone; > homogeneity is an aspect of *continuity*, which is also Thirdness. So is > *generality*. > > ET: The blackboard, is BEFORE the three categories. Peirce even says it > is 'utter vagueness' - and that's nothing to do with the three categories. > > > If the three categories together constitute *all* of reality, as Peirce > held, then how could *anything *be before them? Vagueness is another > word for *indeterminacy*, which is characteristic of both Firstness and > Thirdness; only that which falls under Secondness is *determinate*, and > thus subject to both the law of contradiction (not vague) and the law of > excluded middle (not general). > > ET: i certainly don't accept 'other-generated' for then, we have to go to > 'what generated this other power'? > > > Only if we presuppose that there is no *Ens necessarium*, Being whose > reality is eternal and uncreated. I suppose we could say that the choice > is between a self-generating universe and a self-sufficient Creator; again, > it is then a matter of which one each of us finds more plausible. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, list >> >> 1) I disagree that pure energy is 'something'. I consider it as aspatial >> and atemporal to be nothing. >> >> 2) I don't agree that the 'blackboard' *exists*, and as a homogeneity - >> it is not the same as Thirdness, which is habit. The blackboard has no >> habits. >> >> 3) I don't think the pure chance is inexplicable. Peirce considers it >> [1.410] a fundamental component [along with 2ndness and 3rdness] of the >> universe. >> >> 4) I agree - with Peirce and Aristotle - that randomness and spontaneity >> are not the same. Again, Firstness, which is spontaneity is a fundamental >> principle of the universe. >> >> 5) The blackboard, is BEFORE the three categories. Peirce even says it is >> 'utter vagueness' - and that's nothing to do with the three categories. >> >> 6) I don't think that self-generated means 'inexplicable'. It means what >> it says: self-generated. The 'utter vagueness' suddenly 'compressed' in >> spontaneity into a 'particle'..as outlined in 1.412. >> >> i certainly don't accept 'other-generated' for then, we have to go to >> 'what generated this other power'? >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Gary Richmond >> <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2016 1:35 PM >> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: Pure undifferentiated energy so to speak. >> >> >> That sounds like *something*, rather than *nothing*. >> >> ET: Peirce assumes all three categories as 'fundamental elements' - >> acting upon each other from the beginning. >> >> >> Except that the clean blackboard is there *before* any chalk mark >> appears on it. >> >> ET: That blackboard has no categorical mode in its makeup. No Firstness, >> no Secondness, No Thirdness. >> >> >> According to Peirce, it represents a *continuum*, which is a >> paradigmatic example of *Thirdness*. >> >> ET: When I draw a line - well - where in the world did I and my action >> come from????Outer space? >> >> >> You know (and disagree with) my answer to that question. How does a >> chalk line come about, if no one is there to draw it? I assume that your >> answer is pure chance, which makes it inexplicable, and thus unacceptable >> to Peirce. >> >> CSP: To undertake to account for anything by saying baldly that it is >> due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not do. I make use >> of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or >> tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities ... I >> attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of >> a spontaneity which is to some degree regular. (CP 6.63; 1892) >> >> >> For Peirce, chance in this context is not *randomness*, it is >> *spontaneity*--a characteristic that we routinely attribute to *persons*, >> not merely *events*, as something that "is to some degree regular." >> >> ET: The white chalk line is a Firstness. Not the blackboard. >> >> >> We agree on this. If the blackboard is not Firstness, and--despite >> representing a continuum--is not Thirdness, then what else could it be? >> Surely not Secondness, since in the beginning there is nothing else with >> which it could react. There are only these three categories, so we have no >> other options. >> >> ET: The universe then self-generated and self-organized using the basic >> fundamental three categories. >> >> >> Self-*organized* is one thing, since we can observe that kind of >> behavior in the universe now. Self-*generated* is another thing >> altogether; again, it effectively renders the origin of the universe >> inexplicable. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 11:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list: I guess we'll just continue to disagree but I don't think the >>> outline is really that clear in Peirce's writings. I consider from his >>> work, that the universe began with 'nothing', in the sense that there was >>> no determination, no agenda, ..never mind no actualization. Pure >>> undifferentiated energy so to speak. >>> >>> 1) Peirce's origin seems to be 'in the utter vagueness of completely >>> undetermined and dimensionless potentiality" 6.193. Now a good question - >>> is this akin to Firstness? My answer to this is: No. >>> My problem with this is that I don't consider the categories as >>> realities -in-themselves but only as modes of organization of matter/mind. >>> That is - they don't, in my readings, seem to even function until AFTER >>> the appearance of matter/mind. So- I don't see this as Firstness. >>> >>> 2) Peirce writes; 'the evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has >>> for an early stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is >>> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great >>> for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contraction >>> of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general but of >>> nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about" 6.196. >>> >>> I read the above 'continuum of forms' as an outline of the operation of >>> Thirdness in a mode of Secondness. Does this mean that this original 'utter >>> vagueness' is Thirdness-as-Secondness? I don't see this either, since my >>> view of Thirdness is that it is a *post hoc* process, acting as >>> habit-formations. And as such, it is not 'utter vagueness'. >>> >>> 3) So- I don't see that any of the categories have a 'pre-existence' so >>> to speak. He does suggest, in 6.197 that our current sense-qualities >>> [Firstness] are 'but the relics of an ancient ruined continuum of >>> qualities'...and that this 'cosmos of sense-qualities...had in an >>> antecedent state of development a vaguer being, before the relations of its >>> dimensions became definite and contracted" 6.197. >>> >>> So- my reading of this is that 'the relations of its dimensions' refers >>> to the three categories, which are quite specific in their nature and >>> function. These appeared AFTER that 'vaguer being' .....The 'general >>> indefinite potentiality' 6.199 doesn't seem to describe either Firstness or >>> Thirdness. >>> >>> And Peirce is specific that the emergence of existence didn't come about >>> by 'their own inherent firstness. 'They spring up in reaction upon one >>> another, and thus into a kind of existence" 6199. >>> >>> Peirce assumes all three categories as 'fundamental elements' - acting >>> upon each other from the beginning. But - again, the pre-categorical world >>> doesn't seem to me to be either Firstness or, as you claim, Thirdness. >>> >>> 4) That blackboard has no categorical mode in its makeup. No Firstness, >>> no Secondness, No Thirdness. When I draw a line - well - where in the world >>> did I and my action come from????Outer space? The white chalk line is a >>> Firstness. Not the blackboard. >>> >>> Again- my reading of the emergence of the universe is that the three >>> categories are *post hoc* fundamental elements. And what was 'there' >>> before was obviously 'not there' [there was no time or >>> space]...just...vagueness. The universe then self-generated and >>> self-organized using the basic fundamental three categories. >>> >>> That's as far as i can go! >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2016 12:16 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> ET: So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via >>> the actions of self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier >>> sections... 1.412. >>> >>> >>> Indeed, Nathan Houser's introduction to Volume 1 of *The Essential >>> Peirce* (http://www.peirce.iupui.edu/edition.html#introduction) >>> provides a similar summary of Peirce's cosmology, as follows. >>> >>> NH: In the beginning there was *nothing*. But this primordial nothing >>> was not the nothingness of a void or empty space, it was a >>> *no-thing-ness*, the nothingness characteristic of the absence of any >>> determination. Peirce described this state as "completely undetermined and >>> dimensionless potentiality," which may be characterized by freedom, chance, >>> and spontaneity (CP 6.193, 200). >>> >>> NH: The first step in the evolution of the world is the transition from >>> undetermined and dimensionless potentiality to *determined *potentiality. >>> The agency in this transition is chance or pure spontaneity. This new state >>> is a Platonic world, a world of pure firsts, a world of qualities that are >>> mere eternal possibilities. We have moved, Peirce says, from a state of >>> absolute nothingness to a state of *chaos*. >>> >>> NH: Up to this point in the evolution of the world, all we have is real >>> possibility, firstness; nothing is actual yet--there is no secondness. >>> Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing, >>> and the second great step in the evolution of the world is that in which >>> the world of actuality emerges from the Platonic world of qualities. The >>> world of secondness is a world of events, or facts, whose being consists in >>> the mutual interaction of actualized qualities. But this world does not yet >>> involve thirdness, or law. >>> >>> NH: The transition to a world of thirdness, the third great step in >>> cosmic evolution, is the result of a habit-taking tendency inherent in the >>> world of events ... A habit-taking tendency is a generalizing tendency, and >>> the emergence of all uniformities, from time and space to physical matter >>> and even the laws of nature, can be explained as the result of the >>> universe's tendency to take habits. >>> >>> >>> Again, this account hinges on the plausibility of attributing "agency" >>> to "chance or pure spontaneity," and "self-actualizing" power to "chaos." >>> It requires that "the three universes [of experience] must actually be >>> absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" (CP 6.490), >>> which I find to be absurd. Houser's use of the word "Somehow" is telling, >>> in my opinion; these presuppositions are supposed to contribute to an >>> *explanation* of the origin of everything from nothing, and yet they >>> are themselves *inexplicable*! As I have said before, Peirce would >>> never countenance this, because it effectively blocks the way of inquiry. >>> >>> CSP: Now, my argument is that, according to the principles of logic, we >>> never have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable or >>> unaccountable. For such a conclusion goes beyond what can be directly >>> observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we >>> observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe. But >>> it is no explanation or account of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable or >>> unaccountable, or to pronounce any other fact so. (CP 6.613; 1893) >>> >>> CSP: The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists >>> in maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, >>> ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable--not so much >>> from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to >>> know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could possibly >>> be reached is *retroduction*. Now nothing justifies a retroductive >>> inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, >>> however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it *inexplicable*. >>> That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or >>> excuse. (CP 1.139, EP 2.49; 1898) >>> >>> CSP: ... the postulate from which all this would follow must not state >>> any matter of fact, since such fact would thereby be left unexplained. (CP >>> 6.490) >>> >>> >>> Although Houser cites CP 6.193 and 6.200, he does not incorporate the >>> blackboard discussion that comes just a few paragraphs later, which Peirce >>> explicitly intended to clarify his "wildly confused" preceding comments (CP >>> 6.203). The "original vague potentiality" is not *nothing*; it is, >>> rather, "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions," which >>> "the clean blackboard" represents diagrammatically with only two >>> dimensions. The appearance of the first chalk mark then represents "the >>> transition from undetermined and dimensionless potentiality to >>> *determined* potentiality." There is not even "a Platonic world," let >>> alone "a world of events, or facts," until multiple chalk marks acquire the >>> habit of persistence, as well as additional habits that merge them into >>> "reacting systems" and aggregates thereof. It is only when "a >>> discontinuous mark" appears on the resulting whiteboard (as I am calling >>> it) that "this Universe of Actual Existence" comes about (NEM 4.345). >>> >>> I think that my alternative account is much more consistent with >>> Peirce's stated desire "to secure to [T]hirdness its really commanding >>> function" (CP 6.202). Although "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or >>> Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which >>> Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate," >>> nevertheless Thirdness is in some sense primordial--continuity (Thirdness) >>> is prior to spontaneity (Firstness), and habituality (Thirdness) is prior >>> to actuality (Secondness). >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 4:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon - the difference between us is not merely theism/atheism - where >>>> the former accepts an a priori agency - but, where the latter [might] >>>> include not an a priori agency but instead, argues for self-organization. >>>> >>>> So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via the >>>> actions of self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier >>>> sections... 1.412. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >>>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Monday, October 17, 2016 5:16 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal >>>> aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE >>>> 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only if you *presuppose *that only that which is spatial and temporal >>>> can be "something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his >>>> terminology, the Platonic worlds are *real*, even though they do not >>>> *exist*. >>>> >>>> ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order >>>> and super-habit'. >>>> >>>> >>>> According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three >>>> universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter >>>> nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no >>>> super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is >>>> absolutely necessary; in fact, there cannot be *any *Being whatsoever, >>>> since "all Being involves some kind of super-order ... Any such >>>> super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever >>>> would be a super-order and a super-habit." >>>> >>>> ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are >>>> theists vs non-theists! >>>> >>>> >>>> Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible >>>> that *everything *could have come from *nothing*. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary R, list >>>>> That's a nice outline. >>>>> >>>>> With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE >>>>> has been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even >>>>> if >>>>> one defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as *nothing* >>>>> for in a very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and >>>>> atemporal. >>>>> >>>>> With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality >>>>> of *any *kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and >>>>> super-habit; i.e., the Reality of God. [see ** below]... >>>>> >>>>> I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a >>>>> 'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require >>>>> self-organization of order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. >>>>> That is, order and habit emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. >>>>> They don't pre-exist. I think this is a basic disagreement among those of >>>>> us who are theists vs non-theists! >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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