Edwina, Jon, Gary, list,
I think I am an agnostic. "Everything could come from nothing" (Edwina) reminds me of having read (merely) the (very) beginning of Hegels, I think it was "Science of logic". Hegel showed how dialectics leads to the evolution from "nothing" to "something", and then on to all other things, like life. I have understood it like: "Nothing" is a thesis, which cannot exists of its own, because existence requires that it is something, i.e. "The nothing", which means that "nothing" is "something", and there is a something else, which is not nothing, as antithesis. Or something like that. I found this argumentation quite catchy. Nothing cannot exist, because something that exists is, well, something, and something is not nothing. But now I am not still so sure of this logic. Because who said, that a nothing has to exist to be nothing? Maybe it did not exist, but merely was real? A real but nonexistent nothing might remain in its sleeping mode forever, if no God shows up. I cannot pin it down, but have the feeling, that the difference between real and existing requires theism, and if you do not see the difference, one (eg.I) may be an agnostic. I am, because I thought I had understood the terms "existing", "real", "being" (this thing about the predicate), but somehow lost it again. Like faith: It is an on-off-relationship somehow. I feel I cannot pin down God. But I like this state better than to be somebody who claims to know God well. These folks are dangerous, you just have to switch on the TV. So I want to remain an agnostic.
Best,
Helmut
17. Oktober 2016 um 23:48 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Jon - the difference between us is not merely theism/atheism - where the former accepts an a priori agency - but, where the latter [might] include not an a priori agency but instead, argues for self-organization.
So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via the actions of self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier sections... 1.412.
Edwina
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .----- Original Message -----From: Jon Alan SchmidtTo: Edwina TaborskyCc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-LSent: Monday, October 17, 2016 5:16 PMSubject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's CosmologyEdwina, List:ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.Only if you presuppose that only that which is spatial and temporal can be "something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his terminology, the Platonic worlds are real, even though they do not exist.ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order and super-habit'.According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is absolutely necessary; in fact, there cannot be any Being whatsoever, since "all Being involves some kind of super-order ... Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit."ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists vs non-theists!Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible that everything could have come from nothing.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:Gary R, listThat's a nice outline.With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE has been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of any kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the Reality of God. [see ** below]...I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require self-organization of order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. That is, order and habit emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. They don't pre-exist. I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists vs non-theists!Edwina
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