Jon, list
1) Agree - the DO can be in any of the three categorical modes.
2) Ah- I see your point about the categories and universes. Yes, it makes sense.
I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects
(Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants
(Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while
the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological
Universes.
3) No - I don't see how the six categorical relations correspond to the six
correlates. I understand what you are setting up - and such
relations/correlates ARE possible. BUT -The Representamen can be in any mode,
eg, in 1-1 Pure Firstness. The Relation between the Representamen and DO can be
in any mode...and so on. That's what increases the complex adapatability of the
semiosic actions.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 4:00 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
ET: I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a
trichotomy.'
Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a
Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe.
JS: ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division,
while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division.
ET: I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined
within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean
here..
Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain to
predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545. I am hypothesizing that the
distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the
three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the
phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate
is based on the ontological Universes.
Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od,
2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)?
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon, list:
1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit
that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological
alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that
they are quite different but again, I haven't paid enough attention to them to
conclude what role the universes have.
2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or
active and passive. I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still
divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the Dynamic is divided in itself into
the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...]
3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final
division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought
division."
I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within
such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here..
Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see where
the three universes fits in...
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
ET: I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on,
and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-....as analyses
of the categories [not universes].
As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904,
before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative
to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does
include the word "category" several times.
CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind
actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the
Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and
the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts
between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive.
In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and
its passive aspect as a resistance.
The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action,"
and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I think
we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. It seems like
this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in Peirce's later
thought, the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division,
while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division.
ET: My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of
Relations, which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this
outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are
four semiotic relations.
Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes
of 1903. As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of Categories,
rather than switching to Universes. I think that it is an open question
whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change his
theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working out the
details of the second approach.
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jon, List
I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and
also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-....as analyses of
the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three
ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness.
My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations,
which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined
in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four
semiotic relations.
You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I.
But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and
Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the
number of Relations up to a basic Six.
Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with
restrictions of course.
The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode
of Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of
Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact
mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic
mode.
Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in
itself which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I...
But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are
SIX: We have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But
Secondness functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. And
Thirdness functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and 3-1. I
have written on all of this...
The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or
informational interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I
and F-I..... PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX
categorical modes....provides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological
semiosis.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
List:
While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I
noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of
the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the
Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He then implied that
they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate,
Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination
after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a
Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."
However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves
seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual
(Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought.
Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to
Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant,
and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to
me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on what
basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive
terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to
all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049.
This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must
belong to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a
relation to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In
particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations
with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I
relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and
presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of
assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the
literature that addresses these specific questions?
Thanks,
Jon
On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gary F., List:
I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2
that you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one
to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument."
CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in
itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even
to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability
of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an
Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential
vagueness if for no other reason. For that which is not subject to the
principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP 2.478-479)
CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all,
the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of
poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name
within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 1.455)
These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby
clarifies that "capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of
"Idea" in CP 1.452 called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not
imply capability of actualization." This is thus the universe of pure
possibility, rather than potentiality. Whatever belongs to this universe "is
not subject to the principle of contradiction" because it "is essentially
vague."
CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being
consists in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions,
events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the
last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more
unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. Every member
of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to the Principles of
Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a
proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479)
CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of
things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions
against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are
closely and fairly examined. (CP 6.455)
These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby
confirms that whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the
Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle."
CSP: The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is
in its Nature necessitant, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible
in a universal proposition. Especially, continua are of this nature. I call
objects of this universe Necessitants. It includes whatever we can know by
logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479)
CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being
consists in active power to establish connections between different objects,
especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially
such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of
serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living
consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a
living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement."
(CP 6.455)
These seem to have some important differences. In particular, the
letter to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, laws,
and (especially) continua, rather than Signs. It then goes on (EP 2.480) to
discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third universe, can be
a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a Necessitant (Type). The
letter to James confirm that "A Sign is anything of either of the three
Universes ..." (EP 2.497)
Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three
categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three universes,
if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and perhaps even
replace) the former. It thus leaves me wondering how to interpret CP 1.480,
where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality
nor in that of fact" and "a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from
those worlds and exists in the universe of representations." One plausible
explanation is that Peirce simply changed his mind about this between c.1896
and 1908; another is that what he meant by "world" or "universe" in c.1896 was
different from what he meant by "universe" in 1908. I will obviously need to
think about this some more.
As for the discussion of "Universes" and "Categories" in
"Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.547-549), it is not clear to
me that Peirce used either of those terms there in the same sense in which we
are using them here. I will quote the concluding paragraph--where he aligned
the "three Universes" with the "modes of reality," which are presumably the
"Modes of Being" that he had just identified as Actuality, Possibility, and
Destiny--in case anyone would like to comment further on it.
CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called
Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you
have explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of
hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are,
nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from
being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. We
thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another
thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction,
and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series
proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different
members? My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say
that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be
confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny
(or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of
Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be
proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the
division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality
into Realms for the different Predicaments. (CP 4.549)
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gary F., List:
Thank you for those references. I was thinking about conducting
a search myself, and you have saved me the trouble, although I may still do
some digging through CP. I will take a look as soon as I can, although I am
traveling tonight and tomorrow and do not have my hard copy of EP 2 with me.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:03 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
Jon, Gary R et al.,
I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up
with the discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late
texts to see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems to have
shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I found a
couple of extended discussions of the difference between “Categories” and
“Universes,” one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also found two other
places where Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the long letter to Welby
of Dec. 1908 (EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James (EP2:497). He doesn’t
refer to Categories in these letters, so that would seem to support your
suggestion. I found very little that uses either term from 1909 on.
I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the
‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch up
with the thread.
Gary f.
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