Gary R., List: GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates (possibility/actuality/habituality). Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least > when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes > represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the > Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at > all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on > Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce > thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them > with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical > of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review > of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought > as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's > analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and > Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. > > Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, > Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from > Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, > Predicates in Categories). > > But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary >> literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint >> presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ >> menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes >> various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. >> >> - Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. >> - Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. >> - Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. >> - Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. >> - Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually >> is, must be. >> - Valencies: monad, dyad, triad. >> >> I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found >> to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and >> Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving >> Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of >> which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu >> /TonyJappy/Papers. His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs >> and the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December ( >> http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-o >> f-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/); >> unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list). >> Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical >> framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to >> ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three >> trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66 >> sign classes). From the conclusion of the second paper ... >> >> TJ: The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had >> accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest >> period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad >> ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to >> which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the >> classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later >> typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s >> conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his >> conception of sign-action experienced in those years between 1904 and 1906, >> are, therefore, radically different from those of the earlier approach, and >> it is doubtful that the two will ever be combined in a satisfactory manner >> in the quest for the sixty-six classes that Peirce hoped to identify. >> >> >> In the body of the same paper, Jappy twice quotes from "Prolegomena to >> an Apology for Pragmaticism" to explain the difference between Universes >> and Categories in this context. >> >> TJ: 1906 was the year, finally, in which Peirce explicitly introduced a >> fundamental distinction between categories and universes ... making >> explicit the universes to which the subjects mentioned in the extract >> (RL463 26–28) quoted earlier belonged: >> >> CSP: Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a >> Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or >> class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of >> Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe >> the two correctly is a question for careful study. (CP 4.545, 1906) >> >> >> TJ: In short, the passage suggests that Peirce is turning his back on >> the logico-phenomenological framework within which he had established his >> theory of signs since the mid-1860s, and that he is evolving towards an >> ontological approach to classification, anticipating in this field, too, >> the definitions advanced in the 23 December 1908 letter ... >> >> >> TJ: ... The theoretical framework within which Peirce is now working is >> ontological in the widest sense, involving the three universes defined >> above, three universes which are entirely different from the >> phenomenological categories of 1903-1904. A universe, says Peirce, is not >> the same as a category: "Let us begin with the question of Universes. It is >> rather a question of an advisable point of view than of the truth of a >> doctrine. A logical universe is, no doubt, a collection of logical >> subjects, but not necessarily of metaphysical Subjects, or ‘substances’; >> for it may be composed of characters, of elementary facts, etc." (CP 4.546, >> 1906). In this way, the correlates involved in semiosis figure ... as >> subjects susceptible of belonging to one or other of these universes ... >> the correlates thus described are not subdivided in any way by Firstness, >> Secondness or Thirdness but are subjects or members of a given universe: >> the dynamic object is one subject, the sign is another, etc. >> >> >> Unfortunately, Jappy confines his analysis to the six semeiotic >> correlates--Dynamic/Immediate Object, Sign, Immediate/Dynamic/Final >> Interpretants--and does not address the four semeiotic relations, except to >> note how Peirce described them in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (CP >> 8.327-341), when he was still employing Categories rather than Universes. >> So I guess the questions that I posed earlier today must be preceded by >> this one--are relations in general, and semeiotic relations in particular, >> more properly treated as Subjects in Universes or as Predicates in >> Categories? If the latter, then that may explain why Peirce never managed >> to arrange all ten trichotomies into a definitive order of determination to >> establish the 66 sign classes, and why Jappy is skeptical that this can >> even be done. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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