Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes.
Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Søren Brier <sb....@cbs.dk> wrote: > Dear Gary, Jon and list > > > > I suggest that the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his > semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the > phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and > the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between > inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy > his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument > as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. > Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy I think it is fair to say that > the categories do form three distinct different universes. > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 00:09 > *To:* Gary Richmond > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Gary R., List: > > GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the > categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement > here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from > phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began > my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; > they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. > > GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in > this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. > > Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over > time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I > think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as > calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those > words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several > years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never > again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." > > GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you > quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes > from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in > Universes, Predicates in Categories). > > Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that > passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this > context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than > Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? > > > > In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that > encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? > Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they > pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the > three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates > (possibility/actuality/habituality). > > > > Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds > of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants > (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, > while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the > ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a > 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four > relations divided by Category? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jon, List, > > > > I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least > when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes > represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the > Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at > all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > > > One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on > Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce > thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them > with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical > of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review > of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought > as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's > analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and > Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. > > > > Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, > Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from > Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, > Predicates in Categories). > > > > But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > List: > > > > I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary > literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint > presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes > various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. > > - Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. > - Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. > - Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. > - Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. > - Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually > is, must be. > - Valencies: monad, dyad, triad. > > I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found > to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and > Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving > Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of > which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia. > edu/TonyJappy/Papers. His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs > and the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December ( > http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes- > of-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/); > unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list). > Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical > framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to > ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three > trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66 > sign classes). From the conclusion of the second paper ... > > TJ: The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had > accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest > period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad > ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to > which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the > classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later > typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s > conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his > conception of sign-action experienced in those years between 1904 and 1906, > are, therefore, radically different from those of the earlier approach, and > it is doubtful that the two will ever be combined in a satisfactory manner > in the quest for the sixty-six classes that Peirce hoped to identify. > > In the body of the same paper, Jappy twice quotes from "Prolegomena to an > Apology for Pragmaticism" to explain the difference between Universes and > Categories in this context. > > TJ: 1906 was the year, finally, in which Peirce explicitly introduced a > fundamental distinction between categories and universes ... making > explicit the universes to which the subjects mentioned in the extract > (RL463 26–28) quoted earlier belonged: > > CSP: Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a > Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or > class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of > Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe > the two correctly is a question for careful study. (CP 4.545, 1906) > > TJ: In short, the passage suggests that Peirce is turning his back on the > logico-phenomenological framework within which he had established his > theory of signs since the mid-1860s, and that he is evolving towards an > ontological approach to classification, anticipating in this field, too, > the definitions advanced in the 23 December 1908 letter ... > > TJ: ... The theoretical framework within which Peirce is now working is > ontological in the widest sense, involving the three universes defined > above, three universes which are entirely different from the > phenomenological categories of 1903-1904. A universe, says Peirce, is not > the same as a category: "Let us begin with the question of Universes. It is > rather a question of an advisable point of view than of the truth of a > doctrine. A logical universe is, no doubt, a collection of logical > subjects, but not necessarily of metaphysical Subjects, or ‘substances’; > for it may be composed of characters, of elementary facts, etc." (CP 4.546, > 1906). In this way, the correlates involved in semiosis figure ... as > subjects susceptible of belonging to one or other of these universes ... > the correlates thus described are not subdivided in any way by Firstness, > Secondness or Thirdness but are subjects or members of a given universe: > the dynamic object is one subject, the sign is another, etc. > > Unfortunately, Jappy confines his analysis to the six semeiotic > correlates--Dynamic/Immediate Object, Sign, Immediate/Dynamic/Final > Interpretants--and does not address the four semeiotic relations, except to > note how Peirce described them in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (CP > 8.327-341), when he was still employing Categories rather than Universes. > So I guess the questions that I posed earlier today must be preceded by > this one--are relations in general, and semeiotic relations in particular, > more properly treated as Subjects in Universes or as Predicates in > Categories? If the latter, then that may explain why Peirce never managed > to arrange all ten trichotomies into a definitive order of determination to > establish the 66 sign classes, and why Jappy is skeptical that this can > even be done. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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