Jerry, i believe we are talking about different things. Obviously there stands the word 'democracy', but it is mentioned within a list of different uses of the word 'hypotheses'. Therefore it is possible, that it is just an example and does not necessarily express his personal views on democracy. Why do you think it is more than an example? I am not sure about it and open to another reading.
Best, Stefan Am 24. November 2016 03:29:39 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>: >Hi Stefan, list: > >Well, the quote I selected is immediately followed by, >"Freedom is the hypothesis or condition of democracy." > >So, what's that about, then, if not about democracy? > >Also, the original quote has a very definite likeness to Plato's ideas, >in >particular, those in the *Republic* and even that in the *Laws*. > >So, then, what does Peirce and Plato say is useful about *likeness*? > >Best, >Jerry R > >On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 7:45 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: > >> Jerry, >> >> i am not sureb whether your quote from "Four Consequences" is useful >or >> not. In my opinion it is just an example and does not necessarily >express >> Peirce opinion about democracy. Do you think different about this >quote? >> >> Best, >> Stefan >> >> The whole context is: >> >> ----------- >> 1. Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here >quite >> misapplied the term hypothesis, and that what I so designate is an >argument >> from analogy. It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the >> cipher has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by >Descartes >> (Rule 10, Oeuvres choisies: Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz >(Nouveaux >> Essais, lib. 4, ch. 12, §13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 b), and (as I learn >from >> D. Stewart; Works, vol. 3, pp. 305 et seqq.) by Gravesande, >Boscovich, >> Hartley, and G.L. Le Sage. The term Hypothesis has been used in the >> following senses: 1. For the theme or proposition forming the subject >of >> discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides theses or >propositions >> adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses. The >latter are >> propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer >says, >> "Let there be a triangle." 3. For a condition in a general sense. We >are >> said to seek other things than happiness ex hypotheseos, >conditionally. The >> best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth, >the >> third the best ex hypotheseos, under the circumstances. Freedom is >the >> hypothesis or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a >> hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes >> facts. 6. In the Synopsis of Psellus, for the reference of a subject >to the >> things it denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the >conclusion of >> an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my >use >> of the term. 8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory >accepted >> into the body of a science. >> >> I give a few authorities to support the seventh use: >> >> Chauvin. -- Lexicon Rationale, 1st Ed. -- "Hypothesis est propositio, >quæ >> assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi, >ut hæc >> hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex >ea >> deduci possint. Verum aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis >pro >> vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, quæ respondent >> phænomenis, et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quæ hac parte in >re, >> et in iis quæ de ea apparent, occurrebant." >> ---------------- >> >> >> >> >> Am 24. November 2016 02:11:57 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee ><jerryr...@gmail.com >> >: >>> >>> Dear list: >>> >>> >>> >>> Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of democracy: >>> >>> >>> >>> “The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on >earth, >>> the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.” >>> >>> ~Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities* >>> >>> >>> >>> “It has come about through the agencies of development that man is >>> endowed with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal >experiments >>> ascertain that in a certain universe of logical possibility certain >>> combinations occur while others do not occur. Of those which occur >in the >>> ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all >that >>> occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world. >>> >>> For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a >part >>> of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the >world of >>> ideas.” >>> >>> ~ Peirce, Logic of Relatives >>> >>> >>> >>> “It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high >than >>> the high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one >necessarily >>> distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive >the low >>> of the freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” ~ Leo >Strauss >>> >>> >>> "It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates." >>> >>> ~Peirce >>> >>> >>> >>> “Liberal education supplies us with experience in things beautiful.” >>> >>> ~Strauss, *What is Liberal Education?* >>> >>> *___________* >>> >>> >>> >>> Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of Aristotle: >>> >>> >>> >>> “Whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a >physical >>> object is not yet clear. But that the principles are three, and in >what >>> sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear.” >>> >>> ~Aristotle, *Physics* >>> >>> >>> >>> “We naturally choose three as the smallest number which will answer >the >>> purpose.” >>> >>> ~Peirce, *Logic of Relatives* >>> >>> >>> >>> Hth… >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> *CP 5.189* >>> >>> On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 6:50 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary, List, >>>> >>>> long speak, short forgotten conclusions: I believe that two >directions >>>> could be fruitful to understand Peirce idea of democracy better. >First, >>>> thinking with Habermas that (ideal) scientific communities can be a >>>> blueprint for (ideal) democracies. Second, diving deeper into >Peirce ethics >>>> in comparison to Socrates idea of Ethics. Peirce makes a few short >comments >>>> about Socrates as one of the forefathers of pragmatism (it's a wild >guess, >>>> but there could be something interesting) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Stefan >>>> >>>> >>>> Am 23. November 2016 23:29:37 MEZ, schrieb Gary Richmond < >>>> gary.richm...@gmail.com>: >>>>> >>>>> Stefan, List, >>>>> >>>>> Stefan, thanks for bringing together these several relevant Peirce >>>>> quotations. You concluded your post: >>>>> >>>>> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political >economy >>>>> are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this >context are >>>>> love and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly >Aristoteles >>>>> classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> government of... altruistic >>>>> good >>>>> egoistic >>>>> bad >>>>> one >>>>> monarchy >>>>> tyranny >>>>> few aristocracy >>>>> oligarchy >>>>> many politeía >>>>> democracy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and >>>>> democracy... >>>>> >>>>> I'm not so sure that reflecting on Aristotle's views in this >matter >>>>> will help us much in getting at Peirce's. I would , however, tend >to >>>>> strongly agree with you that "The context for Peirce thinking >about >>>>> democracy and political economy are obviously his religious ideas. >Central >>>>> concepts in this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism." >>>>> I'm not sure why this brought Aristotle's classification >"immediately" >>>>> to your mind given that Aristotle's views would seem to have >little to do >>>>> with religion, love, and greed. As for Peirce's view (if not >exactly of >>>>> democracy, at least of what underpins political economy), it seems >to me to >>>>> be admirably represented by this quotation which you offered which >>>>> contrasts the Gospel of Christ (i.e., of Love) with the Gospel of >Greed. >>>>> >>>>> 6.294. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that >>>>> progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in >sympathy >>>>> with his neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the >nineteenth >>>>> century is that progress takes place by virtue of every >individual’s >>>>> striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor >under >>>>> foot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be >called the >>>>> Gospel of Greed. >>>>> >>>>> Peirce most surely did not have anything good to say about social >>>>> Darwinism. >>>>> >>>>> While for Aristotle democracy is not a good form of government, >one >>>>> ought recall that for him the concept of democracy is rule by the >indigent >>>>> or needy (I'm not sure why this gets democracy placed among the >'egoistic' >>>>> forms of government). The better form for him is, as in your >diagram above, >>>>> that of the *politeía* composed, I take it, of those with enough >time >>>>> and resources to pursue virtue (one might assume, in the interest >of the >>>>> general good), so certainly not the common people. *Politeía* is, >>>>> however, a problematic term in Aristotle's work and is to this day >much >>>>> debated as he does not use it in a consistent sense in *Politics*. >>>>> But, in any event, even a benevolent monarchy is preferable to a >democracy >>>>> in Aristotle's sense of that concept. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>> >>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>> *C 745* >>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 3:06 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> >wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Gary, Clark, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> You may recall that I concluded my message which began this >thread >>>>>> with this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce >>>>>> quotations which might help quickly clarify his views on >democracy? >>>>>> >>>>>> when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. >Just >>>>>> because of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and >"Tocqueville"but >>>>>> there were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are: >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional >>>>>> experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is >more than >>>>>> the head, and is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus >agreeing >>>>>> with my unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think >that >>>>>> sentiment has no part in common sense forget that the dicta of >common sense >>>>>> are objective facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but >what the >>>>>> healthy, natural, normal *democracy* thinks. And yet when you >open >>>>>> the next new book on the philosophy of religion that comes out, >the chances >>>>>> are that it will be written by an intellectualist who in his >preface offers >>>>>> you his metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if >philosophy were >>>>>> one of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive >himself? >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy >recognizes >>>>>> that it is the Christian church which has made him a man among >men. To it >>>>>> he owes consolations, enjoyments, escapes from great perils, and >whatever >>>>>> rectitude of heart and purpose may be his. To the monks of the >medieval >>>>>> church he owes the preservation of ancient literature; and >without the >>>>>> revival of learning he can hardly see how the revival of science >would have >>>>>> been possible. To them he owes the framework of his intellectual >system, >>>>>> and if he speaks English, a most important part of his daily >speech. The >>>>>> law of love which, however little it be obeyed, he holds to be >the soul of >>>>>> civilization, came to Europe through Christianity. Besides, >religion is a >>>>>> great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social life which >extends >>>>>> beyond one’s own circle of personal friends. That life is >everything for >>>>>> elevated, and humane, and *democratic* civilization; and if one >>>>>> renounces the Church, in what other way can one as satisfactorily >exercise >>>>>> the faculty of fraternizing with all one‘s neighbours? >>>>>> >>>>>> In CP VIII: >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce: CP 8 Bibliography General 1875 [G-1875-1]1875 >>>>>> 3. “A Plan and an Illustration” (on proportional representation), >The >>>>>> *Democratic* Party; A Political Study, by a Political Zero >(Melusina >>>>>> Fay Peirce), John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, 1875, pp. 36-37. >Both the >>>>>> whole work and Peirce’s contribution are anonymous, but these are >>>>>> identified in [Fisch-Haskell]. >>>>>> >>>>>> The publication by Melusina can be found here: >>>>>> http://www.unav.es/gep/TheDemocraticPartyMichigan.pdf >>>>>> >>>>>> Using the keyword "republic" i find: >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 2.654 To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point >of >>>>>> fact, they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful >prosecution >>>>>> of one’s desires is a different thing from selfishness. The miser >is not >>>>>> selfish; his money does him no good, and he cares for what shall >become of >>>>>> it after his death. We are constantly speaking of *our* >possessions >>>>>> on the Pacific, and of *our* destiny as a *republic*, where no >>>>>> personal interests are involved, in a way which shows that we >have wider >>>>>> ones. We discuss with anxiety the possible exhaustion of coal in >some >>>>>> hundreds of years, or the cooling-off of the sun in some >millions, and show >>>>>> in the most popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive >the >>>>>> possibility of a man‘s descending into hell for the salvation of >his >>>>>> fellows. >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 2.654 Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man >should >>>>>> himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is >sufficient that >>>>>> he should recognize the possibility of it, should perceive that >only that >>>>>> man’s inferences who has it are really logical, and should >consequently >>>>>> regard his own as being only so far valid as they would be >accepted by the >>>>>> hero. So far as he thus refers his inferences to that standard, >he becomes >>>>>> identified with such a mind. >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 5.355. That being the case, it becomes interesting to inquire >how >>>>>> it is with men as a matter of fact. There is a psychological >theory that >>>>>> man cannot act without a view to his own pleasure. This theory is >based on >>>>>> a falsely assumed subjectivism. Upon our principles of the >objectivity of >>>>>> knowledge, it could not be based; and if they are correct, it is >reduced to >>>>>> an absurdity. It seems to me that the usual opinion of the >selfishness of >>>>>> man is based in large measure upon this false theory. I do not >think that >>>>>> the facts bear out the usual opinion. The immense self-sacrifices >which the >>>>>> most wilful men often make, show that wilfulness is a very >different thing >>>>>> from selfishness. The care that men have for what is to happen >after they >>>>>> are dead, cannot be selfish. And finally and chiefly, the >constant use of >>>>>> the word ”*we*“ -- as when we speak of our possessions on the >Pacific >>>>>> -- our destiny as a *republic* -- in cases in which no personal >>>>>> interests at all are involved, show conclusively that men do not >make their >>>>>> personal interests their only ones, and therefore may, at least, >>>>>> subordinate them to the interests of the community. >>>>>> >>>>>> In CP 8.41 and CP 4.231 P just refers to Platos Republic. And CP >>>>>> 7.601 is from my point of view also of lesser interest: >>>>>> >>>>>> He will not even name him (perhaps to spare the family), but >refers to >>>>>> him by various satirical nick-names, especially as >”*Thrasymachus,*“†4 >>>>>> -- a foolish character introduced into the *Republic* and another >>>>>> dialogue of Plato for the purpose of showing how vastly such an >ignorant >>>>>> pretender to philosophy is inferior to Socrates (that is, to >Plato himself) >>>>>> in every quality of mind and heart, and especially in good >manners. >>>>>> >>>>>> The search terms "vote" and "voting" don't produce any hits >related >>>>>> to a discussion of democracy. >>>>>> >>>>>> Since Peirce mentions democracy within the context of his >religious >>>>>> ideas i also included a search for "political economy", because >his >>>>>> views on political economy are also influenced by religion: >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 1.75 The old-fashioned *political economist* adored, as alone >>>>>> capable of redeeming the human race, the glorious principle of >individual >>>>>> greed, although, as this principle requires for its action >hypocrisy and >>>>>> fraud, he generally threw in some dash of inconsistent >concessions to >>>>>> virtue, as a sop to the vulgar Cerberus. But it is easy to see >that the >>>>>> only kind of science this principle would favor would be such as >is >>>>>> immediately remunerative with a great preference for such as can >be kept >>>>>> secret, like the modern sciences of dyeing and perfumery. >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> >>>>>> 6.290. The nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, >and >>>>>> we all begin to review its doings and to think what character it >is >>>>>> destined to bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of >future >>>>>> historians. It will be called, I guess, the Economical Century; >for >>>>>> political economy has more direct relations with all the branches >of its >>>>>> activity than has any other science. Well, *political economy* >has >>>>>> its formula of redemption, too. It is this: Intelligence in the >service of >>>>>> greed ensures the justest prices, the fairest contracts, the most >>>>>> enlightened conduct of all the dealings between men, and leads to >the >>>>>> summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort. Food for whom? >Why, for >>>>>> the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to say that this >is one of >>>>>> the legitimate conclusions of political economy, the scientific >character >>>>>> of which I fully acknowledge. But the study of doctrines, >themselves true, >>>>>> will often temporarily encourage generalizations extremely false, >as the >>>>>> study of physics has encouraged necessitarianism. What I say, >then, is that >>>>>> the great attention paid to economical questions during our >century has >>>>>> induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of >the >>>>>> unfortunate results of sentiment, until there has resulted a >philosophy >>>>>> which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent in >the >>>>>> elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe. >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 6.291 I open a handbook of *political economy* †1 -- the most >>>>>> typical and middling one I have at hand -- and there find some >remarks of >>>>>> which I will here make a brief analysis. I omit qualifications, >sops thrown >>>>>> to Cerberus, phrases to placate Christian prejudice, trappings >which serve >>>>>> to hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the >greed-god. >>>>>> But I have surveyed my position. The author enumerates “three >motives to >>>>>> human action:†2 >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 6.291The love of self; >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 6.291The love of a limited class having common interests and >>>>>> feelings with one‘s self; >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 6.291The love of mankind at large.” >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> >>>>>> 6.294. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that >>>>>> progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in >sympathy >>>>>> with his neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the >nineteenth >>>>>> century is that progress takes place by virtue of every >individual’s >>>>>> striving for himself with all his might and trampling his >neighbor under >>>>>> foot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be >called the >>>>>> Gospel of *Greed*. >>>>>> ---- >>>>>> >>>>>> 7.96. In all the explanatory sciences theories far more simple >than >>>>>> the real facts are of the utmost service in enabling us to >analyse the >>>>>> phenomena, and it may truly be said that physics could not >possibly deal >>>>>> even with its relatively simple facts without such analytic >procedure. >>>>>> Thus, the kinetical theory of gases, when first propounded, was >obliged to >>>>>> assume that all the molecules were elastic spheres, which nobody >could >>>>>> believe to be true. If this is necessary even in physics, it is >far more >>>>>> indispensable in every other science, and most of all in the >moral >>>>>> sciences, such as *political economy*. Here the sane method is to >>>>>> begin by considering persons placed in situations of extreme >simplicity, in >>>>>> the utmost contrast to those of all human society, and animated >by motives >>>>>> and by reasoning powers equally unlike those of real men. >Nevertheless, in >>>>>> this way alone can a base be obtained from which to proceed to >the >>>>>> consideration of the effects of different complications. Owing to >the >>>>>> necessity of making theories far more simple than the real facts, >we are >>>>>> obliged to be cautious in accepting any extreme consequences of >them, and >>>>>> to be also upon our guard against apparent refutations of them >based upon >>>>>> such extreme consequences. >>>>>> >>>>>> Other hits for political economy can be found in: >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 2.4, CP 3.405, CP 4.210, CP 4.114, 5.377, CP 6.517, CP 6.612, >CP >>>>>> 7.64, CP 7.66, CP 8.6, CP 8 Bibliography General c.1893 >[G-c.1893-5] >>>>>> >>>>>> For "greed" in: >>>>>> >>>>>> CP 6.292, CP 6.293, CP 6.294, CP 6.297, CP 6.311, CP 7.265, CP 8 >>>>>> Bibliography General c.1893 [G-c.1893-5] >>>>>> >>>>>> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political >economy >>>>>> are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this >context are >>>>>> love and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly >Aristoteles >>>>>> classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 >f.). >>>>>> >>>>>> government of... altruistic >>>>>> good >>>>>> egoistic >>>>>> bad >>>>>> one >>>>>> monarchy >>>>>> tyranny >>>>>> few aristocracy >>>>>> oligarchy >>>>>> many politeía >>>>>> democracy >>>>>> >>>>>> Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and >>>>>> democracy... >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Stefan >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail >>>> gesendet. >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail >> gesendet. >> -- Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail gesendet.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
