Dear Kirsti,

you are always welcome. He also wrote a two volume phenomenology of law. 

Best,
Stefan


Am 23. November 2016 14:02:38 MEZ, schrieb kirst...@saunalahti.fi:
>Hi Stefan,
>
>Very interesting! Especially because the author is a lawyer. Still, I 
>doubt I'll have time to read these.
>
>Anyway, Husserlian phenomenology is thoroughly different from Peircean 
>phenomenology. They started from a very, very different conception of 
>mind. For starters.
>
>Quite often, people take the same term to refer to the same concept, or
>
>at least the same idea. - Not so with CSP and Husserl.
>
>Dilthey is a classic within hermeneutics. But there is not an inkling 
>towards experimental philosophy by CSP.
>
>The European tradition of interpreting ancient (or old) texts is of 
>course worth knowing about. But CSP has written on the topic himself. 
>Plenty.
>
>Thanks for the information, anyway. Perhaps I'll look something up on 
>the basis of your incentive.
>
>Best,
>
>Kirsti
>
>sb kirjoitti 15.11.2016 23:33:
>> John, Kirsti, List, for those interested in the philosophy of stories
>> and able to read german i recommend:
>> 
>>      * Wilhelm Schapp (2012) In Geschichten verstrickt. Zu Sein von
>> Mensch und Ding. 5. ed. Klostermann.
>>      * Wilhelm Schapp (1981) Philosophie der Geschichten. 2. ed.
>> Klostermann.
>> 
>> His academic teachers were Rickert, Simmel and Dilthey. He got his
>PhD
>> in 1910 in Göttingen from Husserl. His Doktorarbeit "Beiträge zur
>> Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung" is one of the classic texts of german
>> phenomenology. He didn't pursue a career as an academic and worked
>his
>> life long as a lawyer. His phenomenology of stories is strongly
>> influenced by his work as a lawyer.
>> 
>> Schapps style is lucent and clear. He is fun to read and the absolute
>> opposite of Husserls dry turkey books.
>> 
>> Best,
>>  Stefan
>> 
>>  P.S: http://www.wilhelm-schapp-forschung.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/
>> [1]
>> 
>> Am 10.11.16 um 14:51 schrieb kirst...@saunalahti.fi:
>> 
>>> John, list,
>>> 
>>> Most important points you take up, John. Time-sequences between
>>> stories do not apply. - The big-bang is just a story,one on many
>>> just as possible stories.
>>> 
>>> Time-scales are just as crucial with the between - issue as are
>>> storywise arising issues. There are no easy ways out ot the
>>> time-scale issues.
>>> 
>>> Best, Kirsti
>>> 
>>> John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.11.2016 21:25:
>>> Edwina, Kirsti, list,
>>> 
>>> ET
>>> I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.
>>> 
>>> I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
>>> 
>>> issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from
>>> p. 2
>>> of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical
>>> point:
>>> 
>>> GB
>>> thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
>>> whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
>>> A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
>>> connectedness which we call relevance.
>>> 
>>> This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
>>> 'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:
>>> 
>>> CP 4.551
>>> Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may
>>> further
>>> be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
>>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
>>> interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
>>> 
>>> in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the
>>> Sign
>>> they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
>>> of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
>>> evolution of thought should be dialogic.
>>> 
>>> Re time: We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
>>> (whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
>>> formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
>>> thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected
>>> signs.
>>> 
>>> ET
>>> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the
>>> so-called
>>> Big Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S]
>>> 
>>> read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was
>>> Nothing, not even Platonic worlds.
>>> 
>>> This question is about time sequences in different kinds of
>>> stories:
>>> the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
>>> about ideal, mathematical forms.
>>> 
>>> The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the
>>> time
>>> sequence of a physical story. We may apply the math (for example,
>>> the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the
>>> construction of a physical story.
>>> 
>>> But that application is a mapping between two stories. The term
>>> 'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between
>>> stories.
>>> 
>>> In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from
>>> the stories we tell about our experience. The time sequences in
>>> two
>>> different stories may have some similarities, but we must
>>> distinguish
>>> three distinct sequences: the time sequences of each story, and
>>> the
>>> time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story.
>>> 
>>> JFS
>>> Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding
>>> our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?
>> 
>>  KM
>> 
>>> I am most interested in knowing more on this.
>> 
>>  David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below:
>> 
>>> Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least
>>> 
>>> in principle... [He] seems not to have responded to the
>>> continuously-
>>> evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to
>>> Einstein's
>>> conceptual unification of space and time.
>> 
>>  In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from
>>  stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of
>>  relating different views.  It also allows for metalevel reasoning
>>  that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that
>>  have independent time scales and sequences.
>> 
>>  John
>>  ____________________________________________________________________
>> 
>>  From Google books:
>> 
>>  _A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor
>>  to Biosemiotics_ edited by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Springer, 2008:
>> 
>>
>https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement&source=bl&ots=DQUnZlvOYu&sig=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement&f=false
>> [2]
>> 
>>  David R. Finkelstein, _Quantum Relativity:  A Synthesis of the Ideas
>>  of Heisenberg and Einstein_, Springer, 1996.
>> 
>>
>https://books.google.com/books?id=OvjsCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277&lpg=PA277&dq=peirce+relativity&source=bl&ots=0rc7kjxqIJ&sig=Hsgtu9_LwZAoDxH7kbVgvWmAfiI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihk4SzpZzQAhWF3YMKHR1kA5wQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage&q=peirce%20relativity&f=false
>> [3]
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Links:
>> ------
>> [1] http://www.wilhelm-schapp-forschung.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/
>> [2]
>>
>https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement&source=bl&ots=DQUnZlvOYu&sig=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement&f=false
>> [3]
>>
>https://books.google.com/books?id=OvjsCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277&lpg=PA277&dq=peirce+relativity&source=bl&ots=0rc7kjxqIJ&sig=Hsgtu9_LwZAoDxH7kbVgvWmAfiI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihk4SzpZzQAhWF3YMKHR1kA5wQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage&q=peirce%20relativity&f=false

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