Charles, List, Let's consider Peirce's logical graphs at the alpha level, the abstract forms of which can be interpreted for propositional logic. I say “can be interpreted” advisedly because the system of graphs themselves form an uninterpreted syntax, the formulas of which have no fixed meaning until interpreted. As it happens, the forms themselves do not determine their interpretations uniquely. There is at minimum a degree of freedom that allows them to be interpreted in two different ways, corresponding to what Peirce called his entitative graphs and existential graphs.
Bringing this to bear on the empty sheet of assertion we have the following facts: The blank SA is a symbol and wants interpretation to give it a meaning. Under the entitative reading (En) it means “false”. Under the existential reading (Ex) it means “true”. What these mean demands a further, denotative interpretation relative to the universe of discourse at hand, “true” denoting the whole universe and “false” denoting the empty set. Regards, Jon > On Mar 2, 2017, at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle <charlesp...@comcast.net> wrote: > > I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion of > truth. > > > > In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the > fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in > caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in > which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an assertion. > > > > Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while > truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable? > > > > I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth > cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot be > known.
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