John: CSP’s interpretation of Boscovich’ian atoms was unique to CSP, at least that is my reading. I could find the CSP text if it is a substantial issue. It was in a short note on the classification of the elements. Note the dates of the two men.
Do you have a significant reason for introducing “Common Sense” philosophy into CSP’s view of “atoms”? Cheers Jerry > On Mar 8, 2017, at 9:41 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Interesting discussion, but one that bothers me a bit due to my reading of > Boscovic as an undergrad and my familiarity with the Scottish “Common Sense” > philosophers. > > My understanding of Boscovician atoms is that they are centres od force > fields that very in sign and intensity, being effective over varying > distances. The overall effect is a sinusoidal liker wave centred on the atom. > In this sense Boscovician atoms are not points, but have an extended scope, > which varies with distance. The point aspect stems from this filed being zero > at the centre, all the effects stemming from more distant fields centred on > the atom. > > The Scottish Common Sense Philosophers, Like Thomas Young (usually classed as > an empiricist) took the view that we should treat a phenomena as it appears, > irrespective of its real nature, until we know more. In the Boscovician case > this would mean treating atoms as very small, but with the Boscovician field > properties, without reference to their smaller nature or their real > structure. Young, the wave theorist, was a follower of this school, and so > was, to some extent Maxwell. > > So I think it is historically misleading to compare Boscovician atomism with > continuous views – I see no contradiction – much as the problem might be > interest in itself. I am more than a little reluctant to set up metaphysical > problems that aren’t supported by the science itself, and I think it requires > careful and unbiased historical study to ensure this is enforced. > > John Collier > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > http://web.ncf.ca/collier <http://web.ncf.ca/collier> > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com] > Sent: Wednesday, 08 March 2017 6:51 PM > To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>; Frederik Stjernfelt > <stj...@hum.ku.dk>; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>; Jeffrey > Goldstein <goldst...@adelphi.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen > <ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi>; John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich > points. > > List, John: > > I’m rather pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly > provocative post. > Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to > mine. But this is neither the time nor the place to develop these critical > differences. > > My post was aimed directly at the problem of the logical composition of > Boscovich points. This is inferred from CSP’s graphs and writings. > I would ask that you describe your views on how to compose Boscovich points > into the chemical table of elements. Please keep in mind that each chemical > element represents logically a set of functors in the Carnapian sense. see: > p. 14, The Logical Syntax of Language. > > > On Mar 7, 2017, at 8:56 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net > > <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: > > > > Jerry, > > > > We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called > > "Peirce's semiotic”. > > Semiotics is not, in my view, a foundation for logic which is grounded on > antecedent and consequences. > Neither antecedents nor conclusions are intrinsic to the experience of signs > yet both are necessary for logic. > Logic is grounded in artificial symbols. Applications of logic to the > natural world requires symbolic competencies appropriate to the > application(s). > > > > JLRC > >> the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the > >> mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the > >> discrete become the mathematics of the continuous. > > > > They are all subsets of what mathematicians say in natural languages. > > I reject this view of ‘subsets’ because of the mathematical physics of > electricity. > Many mathematics reject set theory as a foundations for mathematics, > including such notables as S. Mac Lane (I discussed this personally with him > some decades ago.) My belief is that numbers are the linguistic foundations > of mathematics and the physics of atomic numbers are the logical origin of > (macroscopic) matter and of the natural sciences. (Philosophical cosmology is > a different discourse.) > > > > > For that matter, chess, go, and bridge are just as mathematical as > > any other branch of mathematics. They have different language games, > > but nobody worries about unifying them with algebra or topology. > > > Board games are super-duper simple relative to the mathematics of either > chemistry and even more so wrt life itself. > > > I believe that Richard Montague was half right: > > > > RM, Universal Grammar (1970). > >> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between > >> natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians; indeed, > >> I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and semantics of > >> both kinds of languages within a single natural and mathematically > >> precise theory. > > The logic of chemistry necessarily requires illations within sentences that > logically connect both copula and predicates associated with electricity. > This logical necessity is remote from the logic of the putative “universal > grammars.” (I presume that a balanced chemical equation is analogous to the > concept of the term “sentence” in either normal language or mathematics.) > > > > But Peirce would say that NL semantics is a more general version > > of semiotic. Every version of formal logic is a disciplined subset > > of NL (ie, one of Wittgenstein's language games). > > > > JLRC > >> For a review of recent advances in logic, see > >> http://www.jyb-logic.org/Universallogic13-bsl-sept.pdf > >> <http://www.jyb-logic.org/Universallogic13-bsl-sept.pdf>, > >> 13 QUESTIONS ABOUT UNIVERSAL LOGIC. > > > > Thanks for the reference. On page 134, Béziau makes the following > > point, and Peirce would agree: > >> Universal logic is not a logic but a general theory of different > >> logics. > > Analyze this quote. Is he saying anything more beyond a contradiction of > terms? > > >> This general theory is no more a logic itself than is > >> meteorology a cloud. > > What the hell is this supposed to mean? Merely an ill-chosen metaphor? > > > > > JYB, p. 137 > >> we argue against any reduction of logic to algebra, since logical > >> structures are differing from algebraic ones and cannot be reduced > >> to them. Universal logic is not universal algebra. > > > > Peirce would agree. > > > > JYB, 138 > >> Universal logic takes the notion of structure as a starting > >> point; but what is a structure? > > > > Peirce's answer: a diagram. Mathematics is necessary reasoning, > > and all necessary reasoning involves (1) constructing a diagram > > (the creative part) and (2) examining the diagram (observation > > supplemented with some routine computation). > > > > What is a diagram? Answer: an icon that has some structural > > similarity (homomorphism) to the subject matter. > > Chemical isomers are not mathematical homomorphisms because of the intrinsic > nature of chemical identities. Thus, this reasoning is not relevant to the > composition of Boscovichian points. > The reasoning behind chemical equations is not “necessary” in this sense of > generality, but is always contingent on both the (iconic?) perplex numbers > and the functors. > See, for example, Roberts, p. 22, 3.421. > > > JYB, 145 > >> Some wanted to go further and out of the formal framework, namely > >> those working in informal logic or the theory of argumentation. > >> The trouble is that one runs the risk of being tied up again in > >> natural language. > > > > Universal logic (diagrammatic reasoning) is *independent of* any > > language or notation. The differences between the many variants > > are the result of drawing different kinds of diagrams for sets, > > continua, quantum mechanics, etc. (Note Feynman diagrams.) > > If this is the case, then find a mode of explanation that is relevant to > Boscovichian points and compositions of matter. > > To me, these sentences are a very slippery use of language. > Logic remains tied to its ancient roots, antecedents and consequences. > Diagrammatic reasoning is just a picture. > See the excellent book by Greaves on the Philosophy of Diagrams. > > > > I develop these points further in the following lecture on Peirce's > > natural logic: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/natlogP.pdf > > <http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/natlogP.pdf> > > > > See also "Five questions on epistemic logic" and the references > > cited there: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf > > <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf> > > I read these very nice papers. > > But, I do not find your arguments very useful for either chemistry or biology > which demand that the concept of identity is antecedent to all consequences > for the logic of the grammar and the “algebra” of the sentences. > > My general view is that if such broad assertions were valid pragmatically, > then we would have a mathematics of life itself. > > So, how do you relate your work (and your logical assertions) to the dynamic > of life grounded in the genetics and contextual relations to health and > disease? > > These are the issues of interest to me. I believe that both the logic of > Tarski (meta-languages) and mereology (part-whole illations over chemical > identities) are necessary and have published papers to that effect. > > Thus, by and large, we are talking past one another. It is my view that 21 st > Century scientific logic is dependent on symbolic competencies. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > > John > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > > <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > > BODY of the message. 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