Jon Alan,
The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.” Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): “That thoughts act on the physical world and conversely, is one of the most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of ultimate solution. All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.” But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet he had earlier referred to God as a “vast consciousness.” I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21 To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902). As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human reason is analogous." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
