Gary F., List: GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”
This is very helpful. My mistake has been thinking of the Sign-Object relation as conventional for a Symbol, rather than more broadly habitual. CSP: Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. So, just as ideas or resolutions in a human mind result in actions by a human body, likewise the laws of nature have existential effects within the universe. GF: But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). I think that there is some equivocation on "consciousness" between the two passages. In the earlier one, it seems to me that Peirce may have chosen that word mainly to avoid repeating "mind." In the later one, he clearly associated consciousness with bodily sensation and therefore 2ns or existence, which (as I just mentioned in another post) he did not consider to be applicable to God. GF: I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens necessarium/Creator* God you believe in may not be the same as the *agency *God that Edwina disbelieves in. That is an interesting suggestion, although I have a hard time seeing how God could be the Creator *without *possessing agency. I am reminded of these remarks by Peirce. CSP: "God" is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than almost any, is *vague*. No words are so well understood as vernacular words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is true that, let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents in their places, still the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness, answer the principal purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very vague word "God," which is not made less vague by saying that it imports "infinity," etc., since those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494; c. 1906) Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 4:17 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon Alan, > > > > The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In > *Baldwin’s > Dictionary,* Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is > constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and > understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and > without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.” > > > > Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here > (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): > > “That thoughts act on the physical world and *conversely*, is one of the > most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories > are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible > for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very > promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be > made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of > ultimate solution. > > > > All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature > influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or > symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not > merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The > general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But > it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not > in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the > thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation* > which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible > analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. > Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the > mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a > Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and > Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the > advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that > beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific > service.” > > > > But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in > His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, > and since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is > either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at > all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no > consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet he had earlier referred to God as a “vast > consciousness.” I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think > it’s possible that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens > necessarium/Creator *God you believe in may not be the same as the > *agency* God that Edwina disbelieves in. > > > > Gary f. >
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