Jon S, Gary F, List, Jon, this is most interesting and brings up several topics, some of which, for example, those relating to Jappy's diagram, I'll hold off discussing at least for now (although I have a number of questions regarding his approach and, indeed, with much of the literature surrounding the possible classification into 66 sign classes).
For now I'd like to take up just one facet of one of your points (there are others, which you allude to at the close of your post and which do not appear in this truncated excerpt), that of whether the signs of the third trichotomy can or cannot be analyzed dyadically. Your wrote: JS: However, you seem to be saying that the third trichotomy (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is *not *for the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation that we can likewise prescind. That would be contrary to not only most (maybe all) of the secondary literature that I have read on this topic, but also what Peirce himself wrote later in the same 1904 letter to Lady Welby that you quoted. CSP: In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337) Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is somehow *not *dyadic like the Sign-Object relation? I am still inclined to think that it *is *dyadic in much the same way- I think there are several ways of looking at this. First, from the standpoint of prescission, I see no reason why for the purposes of prescissive abstraction the Sign-Interpretant relation "in this context" cannot be dealt with dyadically. Indeed, I am of the opinion that even the first 1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) can be so analyzed as well, at least for the purposes of an abstract analysis (this, albeit, "in a manner of speaking"). We are, after all, working at a rather high level of abstraction in consideration of the diagram of the 10 classes. But--and I hope I'm not beating this horse of 'involution' to death--from the standpoint of involution it is the case that the argument will *involve*, and *necessarily*, it's dicents (propositions) and rhemes (terms). Now this is not shown in the 10-class diagram, but at another level of analysis it can be presupposed, and this relates to the complexity and mental quality of symbols. Further, in Peirce's gloss on each of the classes (including the examples he gives) we see that several of the classes may take into consideration (involve in another sense) classes 'lower' in the classification. And, at this level of analysis each of the10 signs of the 1903 classification can be seen as involving all-at-once-together a relation to the interpretant which involves a relation to the object which, in turn, involves a relation to the sign itself. One can, as I see it, prescind each of the 3 kinds of the 3 correlates from the each of the 10 classes of signs. But, again, only for the purposes of a rather abstract analysis. I'm not sure that I see exactly what Gary F is aiming at in writing that "Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is “mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations," but it may be related to the mental character and complexity of the genuine sign, the Symbol. Perhaps Gary F can clarify his meaning in this matter. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > This is very helpful, thank you for posting it. It is interesting that in > NDTR, Peirce treated the three monadic correlate divisions and three dyadic > relation divisions as each generating a different set of ten Sign classes. > Tony Jappy has suggested that we should perhaps maintain these two separate > approaches when expanding to two Objects and three Interpretants, rather > than trying to integrate them into a single series of ten trichotomies to > produce 66 Sign classes. This figure is from his 1989 paper, "Peirce's > Sixty-Six Signs Revisited," in Gerard Deledalle, Ed., *Semiotics and > Pragmatics: Proceedings of the Perpignan Symposium*. > > [image: Inline image 1] > > > GF: Peirce devotes the rest of [NDTR] to the division of sign relations, > i.e. the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies the three > trichotomies introduced above, one of which is according to the dyadic > relation between the first and second correlates, the Sign and its Object. > These are “constituted” by the triadic relation of which sign and object > are two correlates. Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is > “mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument > trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations. > > > So the first 1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) is for the Sign > considered monadically, and the second (Icon/Index/Symbol) is for the > dyadic Sign-Object relation that we can prescind from the triadic > Sign-Object-Interpretant relation. However, you seem to be saying that the > third trichotomy (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is *not *for the dyadic > Sign-Interpretant relation that we can likewise prescind. That would be > contrary to not only most (maybe all) of the secondary literature that I > have read on this topic, but also what Peirce himself wrote later in the > same 1904 letter to Lady Welby that you quoted. > > CSP: In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is > either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337) > > > Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is > somehow *not *dyadic like the Sign-Object relation? I am still inclined > to think that it *is *dyadic in much the same way--which, by the way, > strikes me as another reason to associate this particular trichotomy with > the relation of the Sign to the *Dynamic *Interpretant, rather than the *Final > *Interpretant; again, I recognize that this is a departure from Peirce. > Otherwise, what alternative relation is this trichotomy dividing? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 11:04 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon S, Gary R, list, >> >> >> >> Much as I admire the efforts of Jon S. to reconcile the Taborskian >> framework with the Peircean, and Jon A’s efforts to express it all >> algebraically, I would rather go straight to Peirce’s own text on the >> question Jon raised about the tenfold classification of signs. Since the >> topic of “Laws of nature as signs” has been left behind, I’ve devised a new >> subject line for this one. However, it is also a follow-up to Gary R's post >> which included some of our offlist discussion. >> >> >> >> In “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (EP2:290, CP >> 2.235-40), Peirce launches his systematic classification of triadic >> relations by distinguishing among the three correlates. Then he introduces >> a first tenfold classification according to the nature of each correlate >> considered monadically. Then we get a second tenfold classification based >> on the dyadic relations between any two of those correlates: >> >> >> >> [[ *There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations >> into ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute >> between either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or >> the Second and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws; >> and these ten classes will be subdivided in different ways.* ]] >> >> >> >> The syntax of this sentence implies that triadic relations “constitute” >> various dyadic relations; and these relations can themselves be “of the >> nature of possibilities, facts, or laws,” just as the correlates can. But >> when Peirce turns to the “*genuine Triadic Relation*,” where “*the First >> Correlate may be regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some >> respect,*” this “determination” is evidently not a dyadic relation, >> because the “respect” in which the Third Correlate gets determined is >> defined with reference to the Second Correlate. These “*triadic >> relations may be divided according as that determination of the Third >> Correlate is to having some quality, or to being in some existential >> relation to the Second Correlate, or to being in some relation of thought >> to the Second for something.*” >> >> >> >> Up to this point Peirce has been referring to triadic relations >> generally. Next he introduces the specific kind of triadic relation which >> has a “*Representamen*” as the First Correlate, “*the Second Correlate >> being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its >> Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is >> determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the >> same Object, and for some possible Interpretant*.” So the special >> characteristic of this triadic relation is that it reproduces itself by >> means of its determination of its Third Correlate. This is the “*power >> of reproduction*” which Peirce attributes to the Representamen in his >> “Speculative Grammar” (EP2:273). >> >> >> >> The sign relation is a special case of this kind of triadic relation: “*A >> Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a >> mind.*” This essentially repeats what Peirce had said earlier in the >> Syllabus, that “*A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant*” >> (EP2:273). Since “*Signs are the only representamens that have been much >> studied*,” Peirce devotes the rest of NDDR to the division of sign >> relations, i.e. the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies >> the three trichotomies introduced above, one of which is according to the >> dyadic relation between the first and second correlates, the Sign and its >> Object. These are “constituted” by the triadic relation of which sign and >> object are two correlates. Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is >> “mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument >> trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations. >> >> >> >> For a somewhat less systematic account of these triadic relations, and >> how they differ from dyadic relations, we can turn to Peirce's 1904 letter >> to Lady Welby (CP 8.330-31): >> >> >> >> [[ *I consider the idea of any dyadic relation not involving any third >> as an idea of Secondness ... * >> >> *Even in the most degenerate form of Thirdness, and thirdness has two >> grades of degeneracy, something may be detected which is not mere >> secondness. If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will always find >> a mental element in it. Brute action is secondness, any mentality involves >> thirdness. Analyze for instance the relation involved in ‘A gives B to C.’ >> Now what is giving? It does not consist [in] A's putting B away from him >> and C's subsequently taking B up. It is not necessary that any material >> transfer should take place. It consists in A's making C the possessor >> according to Law. There must be some kind of law before there can be any >> kind of giving,—be it but the law of the strongest. But now suppose that >> giving did consist merely in A's laying down the B which C subsequently >> picks up. That would be a degenerate form of Thirdness in which the >> thirdness is externally appended. In A's putting away B, there is no >> thirdness. In C's taking B, there is no thirdness. But if you say that >> these two acts constitute a single operation by virtue of the identity of >> the B, you transcend the mere brute fact, you introduce a mental element …. >> The criticism which I make on [my] algebra of dyadic relations, with which >> I am by no means in love, though I think it is a pretty thing, is that the >> very triadic relations which it does not recognize, it does itself employ. >> For every combination of relatives to make a new relative is a triadic >> relation irreducible to dyadic relations.* ]] >> >> >> >> Peirce had previously used the example of “giving” to make the same point >> in the Lowell lecture at CP 1.345. When he says that his algebra of dyadic >> relations employs triadic relations “to make a new relative,” it >> “introduces a mental element” (Thirdness) even though the relation which is >> the object of the diagrammatic sign may be dyadic. From another point of >> view, though, this “would be a degenerate form of Thirdness in which the >> thirdness is externally appended.” This in a way explains why the sign >> types defined strictly in terms of the dyadic sign-object relation (the >> index and the icon) can be regarded as “degenerate,” as Peirce says in “New >> Elements” (EP2:306). On that same page, he also says that “there is logical >> reaction in every real dyadic relation.” Since logic is semiotic, dyadic >> relations do have to be taken into account for the analysis of sign >> relations; and in the tenfold classification of NDDR, Peirce does this by >> prescinding the dyadic sign-object relation from the triadic sign relation. >> >> >> >> That’s all I have to say for today, and (due to interruptions from a >> grandchild) it’s taken me all morning to say it, so I hope it hasn’t been >> rendered redundant by other contributions to the list that I haven’t read >> yet. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> } Those who have an excessive faith in their ideas are not well fitted to >> make discoveries. [Claude Bernard] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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