Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,
All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."
Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can determine other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other things. Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic theory (which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made in the context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the assertion? Is it drawn from common experience or our common sense understanding? Or, does the assertion rest on some kind of philosophical argument?
Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.
I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative theory) to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm starting to think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis of common experience--or something like that.
--Jeff
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2017 9:38 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.
Jon,
Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate trichotomies.”
In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate.
So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:
[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]
Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign determines the Interpretant.
All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs. To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or the Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is too simple to determine its Interpretant to be either an actuality or a law, and a sign is not complex enough to be a Legisign unless it determines its Object and Interpretant to also be laws.
To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its Object is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its Object are mere possibilities.
The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.
Either I’m missing something, or you are confusing Firstness with being First Correlate in a triadic relation, and the same with the other categories. Or something like that.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 15-Apr-17 10:46
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
Gary F., List:
CSP: The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2:235-236; 1903)
The usual rule for reducing the 27 possible combinations of three trichotomies to only ten is that the category of each can only be equal to or lower than the previous one, where "possibility" is the lowest (1ns) and "law" is the highest (3ns). Peirce said above that if the Third Correlate is a possibility, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be possibilities; just like if the Sign is a Qualisign, then it must also be an Icon and a Rheme. Peirce said above that if the First Correlate is a law, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be laws; just like if the Sign is an Argument, then it must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.
So in 1903, the order of the three correlate trichotomies for any triadic relation is Third, Second, First. For the triadic Sign relation, it becomes Interpretant, Object, Sign. However, in his 1903 classification of Signs, Peirce only included the last of these; the other two are not for the Object itself and the Interpretant itself, but for the dyadic Sign-Object relation and the Sign's determination of the Interpretant in respect to the Object. And Peirce evidently changed his mind about the order of the correlate trichotomies by 1908, when he wrote that the two Objects come first, followed by the Sign, and then the three Interpretants.
Regards,
Jon S.
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