Hi Gary F, List,
You have commented on remark I made a little while back. JD: On Peirce's account, the change of things over the course of time is itself a process that involves a general law--where that law has a monadic, dyadic and a triadic clause. GF: Well, not every change involves a general law according to Peirce; he does allow for spontaneous changes. I don’t know about your “clauses,” but I do think that wherever there is a continuous process there is Thirdness. Let me emphasize the key phrase in the assertion: "over the course of time." My aim was simply to summarize a few points Peirce makes about the ordering of things in time and the manner in which they are governed by a law of time. I was not trying to assert that every aspect of every sort of change is ordered in time, or that all changes are governed by the law of time. Rather, the assertion was only that changes that do take place in time are ordered by a law of time. Peirce articulates the law of time in terms of three clauses--monadic, dyadic and triadic. He follows the same pattern when articulating other sorts of laws (e.g., the law of quality, the fundamental law of logic, etc.) It would be nice to have a clearer grasp of the method he is using to articulate the three clauses in each case. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 10:03 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Determination and Creation in Sign-Action (was Laws of Nature as Signs) Jeff, Jon S, Sorry, I’m a bit late following up on this thread — but I only have a few comments to add anyway. JS: Peirce obviously endorsed analyzing the Sign-Object relation as dyadic by excluding the Interpretant. GF: Yes, in a way, but he did not exclude the Interpretant in his definition of the symbol, the third in that trichotomy. And that’s why the other two are relatively “degenerate,” according to Peirce, despite their necessary involvement in any informational symbol. JD: It is one thing to say that we should not think of “determination” as a dyadic action of sign upon interpretant (or upon mind) at all, and saying that we should not think of the process as solely a matter of such dyadic action. Are you advocating one of these options? Given all of the different classes of dyadic relations that Peirce considers, I tend to think that the latter way of putting the matter is closer to what Peirce is suggesting. GF: I think I agree with you … what I had in mind was something like this: [[ The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away a datestone which struck the eye of a Jinnee. This was purely mechanical, and there was no genuine triplicity. The throwing and the striking were independent of one another. But had he aimed at the Jinnee's eye, there would have been more than merely throwing away the stone. There would have been genuine triplicity, the stone being not merely thrown, but thrown at the eye. Here, intention, the mind's action, would have come in. Intellectual triplicity, or Mediation, is my third category. ]] — CP 2.86 (1902) JD: On Peirce's account, the change of things over the course of time is itself a process that involves a general law--where that law has a monadic, dyadic and a triadic clause. GF: Well, not every change involves a general law according to Peirce; he does allow for spontaneous changes. I don’t know about your “clauses,” but I do think that wherever there is a continuous process there is Thirdness. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 26-Apr-17 13:03 Jon S, Gary F, John S, List, Regarding #1, does Peirce ever identify a class of triadic relation that is similarly "productive or poietical"? Or is creation in this context an inherently dyadic relation as a matter of 2ns? Peirce talks about creation and procreation as well as production and reproduction in the context of the semiotic theory. For instance, we create abstractions such as diagrams by hypostatic abstraction (e.g., CP 2.341, 4.531). I take this to imply that some genuine triadic relations are creative in character. Regarding #2, Peirce obviously endorsed analyzing the Sign-Object relation as dyadic by excluding the Interpretant; thus it seems to me that the question is whether we can likewise fruitfully analyze the Sign-Interpretant relation as dyadic by excluding the Object. I used to think so, in accordance with the received view that the third 1903 trichotomy is based on this dyadic relation; but now I am not so sure, since I have recently come to view that trichotomy as based instead on the triadic Object-Sign-Interpretant relation. For my part, I put great weight on passages where he says that triadic action involves dyadic action. For example, see CP. 6.323-4, where he says: a) "But a triadic relationship is of an essentially higher nature than a dyadic relationship, in the sense that while it involves three dyadic relationships, it is not constituted by them." b) "The triadic fact takes place in thought. I do not say in anybody's thinking, but in pure abstract thought; while the dyadic fact is existential. With that comparison plainly before them, our minds perversely regard the dyadic fact as superior in reality to the "mere" relation of thought which is the triadic fact. We forget that thinking implies existential action, though it does not consist in that;..."(emphasis added) For my part, I would add "solely" to the last clause to make the point clearer: "though it does not consist solely in that;..." Regarding #4, on which specific page(s) of MS 611-615 at https://www.fromthepage.com/display/read_work?work_id=149 does Peirce discuss the relation "A determines B after ..."? MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) | FromThePage<https://www.fromthepage.com/display/read_work?work_id=149> www.fromthepage.com MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) - read work. MS 611-15 See the pages just before and after 49: https://www.fromthepage.com/display/display_page?page_id=7790 49 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 611-15) | FromThePage<https://www.fromthepage.com/display/display_page?page_id=7790> www.fromthepage.com<http://www.fromthepage.com> 49 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 611-15) - page overview. 1908 Nov 12 Logic 32 I have been so careful in defining 'Determination', for the reason that I have to use it in defining an even more... Yours, Jeff On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Gary F, John S, List, Here are a few quick observations about the points Gary F is making about the passage from the 1909 letter to James: 1. The last class of dyadic relation that Peirce considers in "The Logic of Mathematics;..." is that of the productive or poietical dyad (CP 1.468) . In this type of dyadic relation, the existence of the patient is dependent on the agent; e.g., mother produces son. As such, this type of relation involves a kind of creation of one thing by another. Do you think that this dyadic kind of productive relation is involved--in some way--in process in virtue of which something is created in the mind of the interpreter? More generally, do you think that genuinely triadic forms of creation involve such dyadic kinds of production of one thing by another? My hunch is that the answer is "yes" in both cases. If you disagree, I'd be interested in hearing the reasons why. 2. It is one thing to say that we should not think of “determination” as a dyadic action of sign upon interpretant (or upon mind) at all, and saying that we should not think of the process as solely a matter of such dyadic action. Are you advocating one of these options? Given all of the different classes of dyadic relations that Peirce considers, I tend to think that the latter way of putting the matter is closer to what Peirce is suggesting. 3. Gary F suggests that we should not think of the determination of sign by object as a fait accompli or event preceding the determination of interpretant by sign. What he goes on to say about events in a sequence would seem to apply to anything that takes places over the course of time. On Peirce's account, the change of things over the course of time is itself a process that involves a general law--where that law has a monadic, dyadic and a triadic clause. As such, any conception of an event as a discrete and separate part of time is an incomplete view on the matter--and this applies to processes that involve the interpretation of signs in minds as well as those that don't appear to have that character. 4. Providing a clearer definition of the relation "A determines B after..." is one of the tasks that Peirce says (in MS 612) that we need to take up in order to have a clearer understanding of determination. I wonder why this relation of determination of one being determined after another seemed to him to be so important. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:(928)%20523-8354>
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