Edwina, Gary’s, list,
I wasn’t so much thinking about the reasoning. I started thinking whether a difference between life and mind could be pointed down in the trichotomies of the Welby classification. For instance in the sympathetic, shocking and usual distinction. Emotional accompaniments, in Questions concerning, etc, are deemed to be contributions of the receptive sheet. The individual life is distinguished from the person by being the source of error. Best, Auke Van: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 20:43 Aan: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> Onderwerp: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI Gary R - I'd agree with you. First - I do agree [with Peirce] that Mind [and therefore semiosis] operates in the physic-chemical realm. BUT - this realm which provides the planet with enormous stability of matter [just imagine if a chemical kept 'evolving' and changing!!] - is NOT the same as the biological realm, which has internalized its laws within instantiations [Type-Token] and thus, a 'chance' deviation from the norm can take place in this one or few 'instantiations' and adapt into a different species - without impinging on the continuity of the former species. So, the biological realm can evolve and adapt - which provides matter with the diversity it needs to fend off entropy. But AI is not, as I understand it - similar to a biological organism. It seems similar to a physico-chemical element. It's a programmed machine with the programming outside of its individual control. I simply don't see how it can set itself up as a Type-Token, and enable productive and collective deviations from the norm. I can see that a machine/robot can be semiotically coupled with its external world. But - can it deviate from its norm, the rules we have put in and yes, the adaptations it has learned within these rules - can it deviate and set up a 'new species' so to speak? After all - in the biological realm that new species/Type can only appear if it is functional. Wouldn't the same principle hold for AI? Edwina On Sat 17/06/17 1:56 PM , Gary Richmond <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: Auke, Edwina, Gary F, list, Auke, quoting Gary F, wrote: "Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and semiosis." Then asked, "What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life?" Edwina commented: " Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the physic-chemical realm as well as the biological." Yet one should as well consider that the bio- in biosemiotics shows that it is primarily concerned with the semiosis that occurs in life forms. This is not to suggest that mlnd and semiosis don't operate in other realms than the living, including the physio-chemical. What I've been saying is that while I can see that AI systems (like the Gobot Gary F cited) can learn "inductively," I push back against the notion that they could develop certain intelligences as we find only in life forms. In my opinion the 'mind' or 'intelligence' we see in machines is what's been put in them. As Gary F wrote: I also think that “machine intelligence” is a contradiction in terms. To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems. I fully concur with that statement. But what I can't agree with is his comment immediately following this, namely, "I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence " Computers and robots can already perform certain functions very much better than humans. But autonomy? That's another matter. Gary F finds machine autonomy (in the sense in which he described it just above) "plausible" while I find it highly implausible, Philip K. Dick not withstanding. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 12:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> > wrote: Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the physic-chemical realm as well as the biological. Edwina On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl <javascript:top.opencompose('a.bree...@chello.nl','','','')> sent: Gary’s, Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and semiosis. What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? Best, Auke Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose('gary.richm...@gmail.com','','','')> ] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29 Aan: Peirce-L Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI Gary F, Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that seriously, at least as an accusation. But thanks for your thoughfulness in this message. You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material component of an AI." I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in passing earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some other arising from " a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot imagine life forming from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science fiction and not science. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 <tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM, < <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Gary R, Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material component of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a “scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not material, in order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics. I didn’t mean to accuse you of anything. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI Gary F, You wrote: Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other. I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life and semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic systems can develop "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and serious doubts. So, let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other." But "DNA chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure what that means, but apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with that. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 <tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote: Gary, For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs. As he says in EP2:309, “Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question.” Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there to decide the question one way or the other. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08 Gary F, list, Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is doing in combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion the article continues: Human Expertise AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what does not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good as people when it comes to understanding this kind of context. A photo of an armed man waving an ISIS flag might be propaganda or recruiting material, but could be an image in a news story. Some of the most effective criticisms of brutal groups like ISIS utilize the group’s own propaganda against it. To understand more nuanced cases, we need human expertise. The paragraph above suggests that "algorithms are not yet as good as people" when ti comes to nuance and understanding context. Will they ever be? No doubt they'll improve considerably in time. In my opinion, AI is best seen as a human tool which like many tools can be used for good or evil. But we're getting pretty far from anything Peirce-related, so I'll leave it at that. Best, Gary R ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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