Excellent - but only if one considers that 'mInd' operates in the
physic-chemical realm as well as the biological.

        Edwina
 On Sat 17/06/17 12:27 PM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
sent:
        Gary’s,
        Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. 
        What if we insert ‘mind’ instead of life? 
        Best,

         Auke
        Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
 Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2017 17:29
 Aan: Peirce-L 
 Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
        Gary F,
        Oh, I didn't take your expression "DNA chauvinism" all that
seriously, at least as an accusation. But thanks for your
thoughfulness in this message.
        You wrote: "Anyway, the point was to name a chemical  substance
which is a material component of life forms as we know them on Earth,
and not a material component of an AI."
        I suppose at this point I'd merely emphasize a point I made in
passing earllier: that although I can imagine life forming from some
other arising from "a chemical  substance which is a material
component of life forms as we know them on Earth." say, carbon, on
some other planet in the cosmos, that I cannot imagine life forming
from an AI on Earth so that that remains for me science fiction and
not science.
        Best,
        Gary R
        Gary Richmond

        Philosophy and Critical Thinking

        Communication Studies

        LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

        C 745

        718 482-5690
        On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 8:17 AM,  wrote:

        Gary R, 
        Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term
that Peirce would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he
wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the
point was to name a chemical  substance which is a material component
of life forms as we know them on Earth, and not a material component
of an AI. So I was reiterating the idea that the definition of a
“scientific intelligence” should be formal or functional and not
material, in order to preserve the generality of Peircean semiotics.
I didn’t mean to accuse you of anything.
        Gary f.
         From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]] 
 Sent: 16-Jun-17 18:35
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
        Gary F,
        You wrote: 
        Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of
generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and
taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable
of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and
lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there
to decide the question one way or the other. 
        I am certainly convinced "of the intimate connection between life
and semiosis." But as to the rest, especially whether electronic
systems can develop  "lives of their own," well I have my sincere and
serious doubts. So, let's at least agree that "the evidence is not yet
there to decide the question one way or the other." But "DNA
chauvinism"?--hm, I'm not even exactly sure what that means, but
apparently I've been accused of it. I guess I'm OK with that. 
        Best,
         Gary R
        Gary Richmond

        Philosophy and Critical Thinking 

        Communication Studies

        LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

         C 745

        718 482-5690 [4]
         On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 5:42 PM,  wrote:

         Gary,
        For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism,
which amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use
of signs. As he says in EP2:309, 

        “Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which
signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitution
of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question.”
        Biosemiotics has made us well aware of the intimate connection
between life and semiosis. I’m just trying to take the next step of
generalization by arguing against what I call DNA chauvinism, and
taking it to be an open question whether electronic systems capable
of learning can eventually develop intentions and arguments (and
lives) of their own. To my knowledge, the evidence is not yet there
to decide the question one way or the other. 
        Gary f.
        From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [6]] 
 Sent: 16-Jun-17 14:08

         Gary F, list,
        Very interesting and impressive list and discussion of what AI is
doing in combatting terrorism. Interestingly, after that discussion
the article continues:  

        Human Expertise

        AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism
and what does not isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are
not yet as good as people when it comes to understanding this kind of
context. A photo of an armed man waving an ISIS flag might be
propaganda or recruiting material, but could be an image in a news
story. Some of the most effective criticisms of brutal groups like
ISIS utilize the group’s own propaganda against it. To understand
more nuanced cases, we need human expertise. 

        The paragraph above suggests that "algorithms are not yet as good as
people" when ti comes to nuance and understanding context. Will they
ever be?  No doubt they'll improve considerably in time.
        In my opinion, AI is best seen as a human tool which like many tools
can be used for good or evil. But we're getting pretty far from
anything Peirce-related, so I'll leave it at that.
         Best,
        Gary R
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