Helmut - my understanding of 'degenerate' is simply that the mode
includes another mode. So, genuine Secondness refers to a mode of
organization or composition that functions only within Secondness.
Degenerate Secondness includes Firstness in that composition.
One can 'theoretically, I suppose, refer to 2-1 as a 'submode' of
2-2, but I understand it as I've explained above.
Yes, there are indeed 'more than one way' of something being a
functioning part of something else.
You wrote: 'The dynamical object is functionally a part of the sign
(functional composition), but spatially not a part of it (external to
it, spatial composition)." I
I agree. That is in large part why Peirce referred to his theory as
'objective idealism'.
Edwiina
On Mon 23/10/17 3:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, thank you for acknowledging a different view! I have looked
at Guess at the riddle, not having understood it, so I must look
again, taking more time, being more focused and concentrated. Is it
so, that "degenerate" mostly applies to classification, e.g. the sign
classes? While, when it is about composition, it rather is submodes?
About external and internal, regarding the example of the immediate
object being internal, and the dynamical one being external to the
sign, I yesterday have written something in my blog
www.signs-in-time.de . There (quite at the end of it) I have come to
the conclusion, that there are more than one ways of something being
a part of something else: Three ways of composition. The dynamical
object is functionally a part of the sign (functional composition),
but spatially not a part of it (external to it, spatial composition).
Best, Helmut 18. Oktober 2017 um 14:36 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote.
Helmut - yes, Again, Peirce refers to external and internal
frequently - see for example, all through A guess at the riddle. 1.
354-
Yes, I can see the degenerate modes as submodes - except what is
interesting about them is that they include the other modes, which
thus makes them degenerate rather than genuine/pure.
I hope I've explained why I describe 3-1 and 3-2 differently from
you - though I acknowledge the validity of your points.
Edwina
On Tue 17/10/17 9:31 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: "External, internal" are a bit likely to lead to
misunderstandings, I guess. I think, or rather guess, that, as
secondness is actuality and firstness possibility, this also applies
to the degenerate modes (I rather think of them as submodes). So,
that (3.1.) is possibility rather, and (3.2.) actuality. Edwina,
list, my concepts of (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.) I mostly
have abducted from immediate object (2.1.), dynamic object (2.2.),
immediate (3.1.), dynamic (3.2.), final (3.3.) interpretant, and also
the parts of the consciousness: Sensation of altersense (2.1.), will
of altersense (2.2.), abstraction of medisense (3.1.), suggestion of
medisense (3.2.), association of medisense (3.3.). Looking at these,
I think that I agree with your (2.1.) and (2.2.), but that I see
(3.1.) and (3.2.) the other way around than you do, regarding their
local ex- and internality. Are there btw. any more examples of
degenerate modes by Peirce? Best, Helmut 17. Oktober 2017 um 21:59
Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Helmut - I can see how you are arriving at this outline of the
categories - matter-form-interaction - and they DO fit into the three
modal categories. My own view of the six modes possible within these
three categories analyzes how they function within time and space.
1-1 [Pure Firstness]- is a mode of existence in Internal Local Space
and Present time: As internal, which is to say, in the non-actualized
or imaginary realm - - it provides a host of 'possible' experiences
but its existentiality as not-actual is without definition and
without form and thus, allows for a great deal of interpretation, via
its open possibilities. A feeling.
2-2 [Pure Secondness] is a mode in External Local Space and Perfect
time: As external, it provides a discrete actual instantiation
2-1 [Degenerate Secondness] is a borderline interface, in local
space..and on the border between the external and the internal. It's
an 'attractor'. I think it functions as a kind of initial condition
[its Firstness] , able to link with other relations [its indexical
Secondness]; It acts as a catalyst...with its properties of both
internal feeling and external closure. So, it iconically and
indexically 'interacts' with other sites and also, binds and links
with them.
3-2 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an internal mode, and, as Thirdness,
operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. As
non-local, it provides communal continuity, but, as internal, it
operates as a 'virtual information processor. It functions as an
exploratory ongoing flexible connection of indexical links to both
real and imaginary solutions; it 'browses' the entire informational
community without making a discrete decision. It's a vital, highly
important mode - because of its indexicality with its surroundings,
and the fact that, as internal - its decisions remain possible rather
than actual. This enables the organism to consider, without
actualizing, multiple alternative solutions. It's a vital
informational search engine.
3-1 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an external mode, and, as Thirdness,
operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. It
provides communal continuity, but, as EXTERNAL, i.e., as actual
rather than imaginary or possible, it lacks the exploratory
capacities of 3-2; it provides a symmetry-inducing model, a communal
habit-form or abstract model, which guides and organizes the
development of instantiations. Akin to the genes of a species.
3-3 [Pure Thirdness] is aspatial and atemporal - the universal
rationality of Pure Mind. It cannot be described for description
belongs to particularities.
And now - I can imagine the reactions of shocked horror at my above
outline. ..and the assertions that 'it's not Peirce'. Well- I think
it is.
Edwina
On Tue 17/10/17 3:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, list, I completely agree with your outline of what a thing
categorially is. My proposal about a thing is: Category 1 is
matter/material, cat. 2 is form, and cat. 3 is interaction. 2.1.
(firstness of secondness) is the form from the inside, the thing´s
perspective, and 2.2. (secondness of secondness) is the form from the
outside perspective. 3.1. is the interaction possibility, 3.2. the
actual interactions, and 3.3. the interactional habits. Where exactly
the border between existence and reality is, I don´t know. Maybe,
depending on the depth of analysis, always between secondness and
thirdness? so between 2 and 3, but also between 3.2. and 3.3.,
between 3.3.2. and 3.3.3.,...? Best, Helmut 17. Oktober 2017 um
01:19 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
Gary R, list
Thanks for the quote. I've two, hopefully brief, comments.
1] I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is
existential, but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if
that modal nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes
generals or habits.
2] Thirdness, or generality or habits, has to be understood as
distinct - spatially and temporally - from the modal categories of
Firstness and Secondness.
Firstness operates in the Open Here and Now - ...this
undifferentiated 'instant'..and 'this space'..with no sense of past
or future time and no sense of 'other space. It is that immediate
sensation.
Secondness operates in the Distinct Here and Now - this 'instant' as
differentiated from the past or next instant and this space as
differentiated from Other Space. It is that distinct, closed
oppositional awareness of self-not self.
Thirdness operates in Past/Future or Progressive Time and non-local
space. That is, its properties, as generals, have no 'glue'
confining them to 'hic et nunc' time; they are spread out; they are
the same in the past and in the future; they are continuity. And -
they are common to a lot of 'instances' over space. As such, these
Generals are of course, real general possibilities.
3] BUT Thirdness or 'the real' , being composed of generals
operating only in past/future time and non-local space, can only
exist, within the temporal and spatial finiteness, the 'nowness' of
matter operating in the mode of Firstness and/or Secondness. These
two modal categories provide the 'hic and nunc' existentiality to
Thirdness.
Therefore - a General or an open general possibility, is 'real'
but, being without current time and space, it remains an abstract
open, vague continuous force. As a force, does Thirdness depend on
being articulated within existential Firstness/Secondness? I think it
does; its properties are general and open to change within the 'being
made existential' - but - I don't see that Thirdness/ generals can
continue-to-be-Real without that semiosic connection. That is, I
don't see Thirdness/generals as functioning separated from
Firstness/Secondness.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 5:12 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent: Edwina, list, I'm glad the quotation proved helpful to you.
There does remain the question of the generality and reality of habits
and habit formation towards the future, evolutionary tendencies,
'would-bes', etc. Since I've decided to rest my eyes for the rest
of the day (I may in fact listen to that Mozart concerto), I'll just
offer another quote and a brief comment to suggest what I have in
mind for perhaps future discussion (I'd recommend that if we do take
the discussion further that we do so in a separate thread). 1911
| A Sketch of Logical Critics | EP 2:457-458 (in Commens
Dictionary)
For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is
Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some
of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or
persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that
single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any
habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of
it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is
Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not;
and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions
never actually do get fulfilled.
I would assume that we are in agreement as to Peirce's initial
answer to the question he poses as to what it is for something to be
Real. But the question of the reality of habits as "would bes" yet
remains to be considered. Note that his description here of a
habit--a "lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject
would , under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real"
concludes with the idea that "it must be admitted to be a Real Habit,
even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled." Now I
recall Jon S also suggesting that something like this is the case not
only for real generals (habits) but for real possibilities as well. It
seems to me that Peirce's "extreme Scholastic realism" does argue that
there are both real generals and real possibles, and that their
reality is not dependent on whether the conditions bringing them
into existence "actually do get fulfilled." Best, Gary R
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication
Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky
wrote:
Gary R - thanks; that's a great quotation. And yes, it does bring
in his 'objective idealism' which is NOT equivalent to 'idealism'.
Agreed - without the reality of generals, a theory is nominalistic -
it can't be otherwise, for it is reduced to only two modal
categories: Firstness and Secondness.
That's a vital comment - that ". . . reality means a certain kind of
non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character
Essentially, to me that means that reality doesn't depend upon what
you or I may think of it but is itself, an operation of a general
Mind. And most certainly, universals as generals do not, per se, in
themselves, 'exist'. Instead, these generals 'exist'...within
instantiations. "Matter is..mind hidebound with habits' 6.158 BUT
- we can certainly have semiosic Signs [that triad] without generals.
Just think of a rhematic indexical sinsign [a spontaneous cry]
operative only in Secondness and Firstness. Edwiina
On Mon 16/10/17 2:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent: Jon S, Edwina, list, This remains a thorny issue,
apparently. I personally have found the quotation below useful in
thinking about the distinction Peirce makes between 'reality' and
'existence' and, by extension, the difference between realism and
nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did not
accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. In this
passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on
thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators
to suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective
idealism." ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence
upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character, while existence
means reaction with the environment, and so is a dynamic character;
and accordingly the two meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are
clearly not the same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost
incredible misunderstanding that all other men are individualists,
too -- even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that
"universals exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great
doctors of that time believed that generals exist? They certainly
did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of the evidences of
pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of
scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head
that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP
5.503). Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think
that it's probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this
thread, and that it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to
commence posting material from Lowell 2. Best, Gary R
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Edwina, List: Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly
have neither the time nor the inclination to revisit the argument
right now. That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how
you distinguish reality and existence, as well as your careful
limitation of "things" to the latter. I would simply question the
notion that anything can exist while having no generality whatsoever.
And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to
designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at
12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e.,
your saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate
before'. Well, tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and -
I'm not going to revisit it with you.
I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies
that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist
within only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in
it, but reality requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING'
can be real yet not exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality
is Thirdness, or generality and is not a thing.
And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term
'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551
to its end.
There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's
been done to exhaustion before.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent: Edwina, List: I know that we have been over this ground
before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions,
but there may be some following along now who were not on the List
back then. Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully
distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset
of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be
real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals
in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some
possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized.
Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.
If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are
generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27
AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.
But you know all of that anyway.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could
clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your
statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings
you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent
in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from
being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe,
Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50
AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary, list:
I presume you are being sarcastic.
I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted
frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce.
So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,
It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re:
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551
Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'. This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.
Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument..
And I also agree with your other two points.
I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
Edwina
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