>”I doubt that the animal species had the brain capacity to develop language”
I don’t know about that. Communication between animals has been long well-established, so perhaps I need to know what you mean by “language”. I am almost embarrassed to have to admit that I just googled “do animals talk to one another,” curious to see what google brings up. Birds are capable of a rich repertoire of sounds, so it would come as a surprise to me if that richness was not employed somehow in some manner of linguistic expression. I’ve often observed magpies chortling in the early morning, and I cannot conclude anything other than that they were communicating somehow with one another. Perhaps there might be grounds for saying that magpie language does not have the semantic, structural complexity that human languages have… but how can we know for sure? From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 9:11 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; 'Helmut Raulien'; Stephen Jarosek Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Stephen - you wrote that that some animals have vestigial representations of vocal chords but chose not to use them, so their ability to speak atrophied. I don't see this; I don't see that the animal species CHOSE not to use those vocal chords. Speech is a cognitive system, made up not merely of sounds but of grammar; i.e., logical order of sounds. I doubt that the animal species had the brain capacity to develop language - again, understanding language as a symbolic system operating within a 'deep structural grammar'. Therefore - I wouldn't follow Sebeok's view of the ape/chimpanzee. I see biological [and physical] organisms as evolving complex Forms; the simple organisms have a lesser ability to change but as simple - are everywhere - various bacterium, simple insects, plants, etc...The more complex organisms are more adaptable but are more diverse and 'niche-constrained'. The most complex organism, our species, is highly adaptable, diverse and, interestingly, also 'niche-constrained'. That is, as material entities, we don't float above our material environment, indifferently. We live, are rooted, in a 'niche', in a neighbourhood...and develop local beliefs and behaviour...fascinating that we always, although the same species - created diversity. Edwina On Tue 24/10/17 1:57 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: >”You seem to confine Mind to individual actions rather than also collective >actions - which is strange, since I would think that quantum entanglement >involves a communal interaction.” You raise good points Edwina. I try to keep things simple and brief, in the interests of keeping things digestible. There is, of course, more to all of this. Different species of dog, for example, can have basically identical anatomical predispositions, you would think, given that they have almost identical “tools” (body as tool)… yet they can be predisposed to very different personalities, despite their apparent anatomical similarities. And I encountered a reference somewhere pointing out that some animals have vestigial representations of vocal chords but chose not to use them, so their ability to speak atrophied. And then there are parrots that can articulate human words perfectly, yet remain entirely birdlike in behavior. So there’s certainly more going on. But the late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 6:53 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; 'Helmut Raulien'; Stephen Jarosek Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Stephen - if I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that it is the FORM of the insect that is defining its actions within the world. I can certainly see that the Form definitely enables/constrains its actions, but you are, I think, removing the notion of Mind from the formation of that Form. You seem to confine Mind to individual actions rather than also collective actions - which is strange, since I would think that quantum entanglement involves a communal interaction. I don't think that your Mind and the Insect's Mind [and I acknowledge that Mind functions in both]..are similar. That is, I don't see that the fact that the Insect has no capacity for symbolic communication is due strictly to its Form - though I acknowledge that its Form [lack of a complex brain] doesn't enable symbolic communication. I'm suggesting that Mind cannot express itself in a similar capacity in all its biological Forms. That is Mind, understood as Reason/the Rational Will to Exist, operates in ALL biological forms but is it with the same capacity? I agree with your suspicion about 'information determinism' but I don't think that Thirdness/general habits are the same as mechanical determinism - because of the existence, also, of the other two modes. I'll try to take a look at your article on Quantum Semiotics. Edwina On Tue 24/10/17 12:22 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au <javascript:top.opencompose('sjaro...@iinet.net.au','','','')> sent: >”After all, a tiny butterfly knows how to live the instant it emerges; it >doesn't require a learning phase ” Good point, Edwina. But I conjecture that the butterfly’s body (or any other insect’s body) sufficiently accounts for the predispositions that enable it to make sensible choices from a reduced horizon of options. So yes, I would “ define this stored knowledge base of the butterfly as 'reduced horizon of options'”. In other words, if there is any semblance of information (genetic) determinism to be considered, then it would be confined to physiology (anatomy). The rest… the choice-making, the survival… is pure mind stuff. Insects are people too J An insect behaves as I would behave if I had an insect’s body. But there is another conjecture that I bring to bear on my reasoning, and it is DNA entanglement (nonlocality). The basis for my reasoning is outlined in my article, Quantum Semiotics <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> . DNA entanglement goes further in lifting us out of the notion of information determinism, to immerse us in an alternative narrative where knowing how to be (pragmatism “on steroids”) seems to be primary. This is the interpretation that first struck me when I stumbled across this link on DNA replication <http://www.sciencealert.com/dna-replication-has-been-filmed-for-the-first-time-and-it-s-stranger-than-we-thought> . From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 5:01 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; 'Helmut Raulien'; Stephen Jarosek Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: RE: RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Stephen - interesting; I haven't thought of it that way. Yes, all organisms learn how to live, but in most cases, the knowledge base is stable and incapable of much change [which contributes to the stability of the biological world]. I have put the knowledge base of most non-homo-sapiens as stored genetically/materially rather than socially/conceptually. After all, a tiny butterfly knows how to live the instant it emerges; it doesn't require a learning phase, whereas the human species requires a long learning phase - and- the development of a symbolic communication system to achieve that learning. Would you define this stored knowledge base of the butterfly as 'reduced horizon of options' ? But regardless of the terms, isn't the function of this difference in the nature of the knowledge base an important concept? The limited capacity to change a knowledge base, and its removal from any attempts to change it by storing it genetically rather than conceptually - means that the biological realm has a worldwide stable continuity of organization. Only the human realm can change - up to a point - both its biological and conceptual knowledge. Edwina On Tue 24/10/17 10:25 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: >”Our species, homo sapiens, has no genetic knowledge. The human individual has >to learn-how-to-live. This is certainly achieved by imitation. This enables >continuity and stability. The lack of genetic knowledge gives this species an >enormous capacity to change its lifestyle and technology. ” Indeed! This is the most important insight of all, and why Peirce is so important. However, I’d go one step further than that… my own suggestion is that what we are saying here applies to all life. All organisms have to learn how to be. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). Mind-body predispositions impact on the reach of that horizon. A reduced horizon makes for simple, almost reflexive choices that are tempting to write off as “instinct”. An expanded horizon, by contrast, such as we have in human cultures, creates the illusion that we are somehow different, unbounded by instinct. In principle, though, all living entities are bound by exactly the same basic axioms, and the differences become a question of degree. Many don’t see it that way, but my justification for this relates to neural plasticity, and the impact that a mind-body’s experiences have on how the brain is wired… all brains are neuroplastic. Cheers From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 2:41 PM To: 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; 'Helmut Raulien'; tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; Stephen Jarosek Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Stephen - thanks for your outline. My comments are [apart from my view that I don't agree that 'the Western world is unravelling'] - but, imitation is the first basic component of 'continuity'. The function of an organism/species - is reproduction-of-type. Mimesis, or imitation is the most basic method of enabling this continuity. It provides Stability - for one cannot have intricate networking of species in the biological world if each generation is vastly different from the previous generation. So, imitation is a key component of stable continuity. With regard to your outline of the emotions of Firstness, I see your point, but, I reduce the emotion to only the Will-to-Exist which would be similar, to Desire-to-Be. That is, there is no other emotion such as fear of the Other, in my analysis of Firstness With regard to your use of imitation within Secondness - hmm - I see the point of Secondness within its Need for Limits, the need for differentiation from Others. So, I don't see imitation in this mode. I accept your use of imitation in tool-use, i.e., in developing the knowledge of how-to-live, but I think this is more a function of Thirdness. With regard to your use of imitation in thirdness - I would see that generalizing a habit, such that similarity of Type becomes continuous - requires imitation.- as a general mode. Our species, homo sapiens, has no genetic knowledge. The human individual has to learn-how-to-live. This is certainly achieved by imitation. This enables continuity and stability. The lack of genetic knowledge gives this species an enormous capacity to change its lifestyle and technology. Rather then evolve wings, this species invents the airplane. I think we need all three modes - the Firstness of imitation, the Secondness of differentiation and deviation, the Thirdness of continuity. Edwina On Tue 24/10/17 4:52 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: While we are on the topic of categories… some time ago, we discussed the role of imitation with respect to pragmatism, and I recall that we arrived at a consensus that yes, imitation is important. But as we watch the western world unravel, I’ve been thinking more and more about the role imitation in this decent into chaos. Imitation is at the centre of it. If you are born into Christianity, or Islam, or conservatism, or liberalism, and if you choose to immerse yourself into one of these lifestyles, you will imitate its values. The spilling of blood or rule by governments is contingent, in the first instance, on imitation. So how do the categories apply to imitation? Allow me to suggest some possibilities: 1) Firstness: In my 2001 semiotica paper (The law of association of habits), I introduced the desire to be (analogous to Heidegger’s Dasein). The known and the unknown relate. Fear of the unknown provides a compelling motivation to imitate the known, in order to be. It applies, principally, to any living entity. Does it make sense to define this desire to be as the prime mover (or firstness)? It does, after all, account for other emotions, such as the fear of not being, or the fear of loss, or the fear of the unknown, or the desire for materialism, or the need to belong (conformity); 2) Secondness: A living entity imitates the things that matter that come together in the contexts that are relevant to its Umwelt (for humans, the Umwelt is culture). Birds, like crows, are terrific and intelligent imitators that will imitate their conspecifics in the use of tools, for example; 3) Thirdness: A living entity habituates and internalizes the things that matter and these become manifestations of the entity’s notion of self. Abduction, induction, etc, are relevant when it comes to how a mind-body negotiates its Umwelt of options. But I’m coming around to thinking that perhaps imitation should be elevated to a more central role, around which everything else revolves. An infant raised among wolves will become a feral child. An animal raised among humans will become domesticated. A human with thugs as role models will become a criminal. In other words, imitation, to some extent, overrides the mind-body predispositions. It might even be argued that abduction, induction, etc, are secondary to dumb imitation… just go along with what everyone else is doing. And we might extend the same line of thinking to matter and the physics of entanglement. Subatomic particles also need to make a choice between being and not being… hence the relevance of virtual particles, and their need to acquire the “right” behavior before they can become the atoms and molecules that persist across time. Here is an interesting article <https://digest.bps.org.uk/2017/10/03/the-psychology-of-sex-differences-5-revealing-insights-from-our-primate-cousins/> * on gender differences in humans and monkeys. Do boy and girl humans/monkeys somehow already sense that they are boys or girls, and ipso facto go on to imitate the respective male/female parent? The parents know, so surely, the infants pick up on their cues to know whether they are boy or girl, and therefore, which parent to imitate. Is this what it all comes down to? Imitation? Imitation is important because it is the interface between the known and the unknown. Imitation is integral to overcoming entropy. Imitation accounts for organism behavior far better than mainstream genetic determinism. In this regard, at least, Richard Dawkins’ memetic theory was a baby-step in the right direction. * Jarrett, Christian (2017, October 3). The Psychology of Sex Differences – 5 Revealing Insights From Our Primate Cousins. Research Digest. https://digest.bps.org.uk/2017/10/03/the-psychology-of-sex-differences-5-revealing-insights-from-our-primate-cousins/ Regards From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [ mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 4:40 AM To: Helmut Raulien; tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Edwina, Helmut, List, If you are interested in Peirce's account of genuine and degenerate relations among the elemental categories, then I recommend: Kruse, Felicia E. "Genuineness and Degeneracy in Peirce's Categories." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 27, no. 3 (1991): 267-298. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _____ From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> > Sent: Monday, October 23, 2017 12:21:40 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; Helmut Raulien Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories Helmut - my understanding of 'degenerate' is simply that the mode includes another mode. So, genuine Secondness refers to a mode of organization or composition that functions only within Secondness. Degenerate Secondness includes Firstness in that composition. One can 'theoretically, I suppose, refer to 2-1 as a 'submode' of 2-2, but I understand it as I've explained above. Yes, there are indeed 'more than one way' of something being a functioning part of something else. You wrote: 'The dynamical object is functionally a part of the sign (functional composition), but spatially not a part of it (external to it, spatial composition)." I I agree. That is in large part why Peirce referred to his theory as 'objective idealism'. Edwiina On Mon 23/10/17 3:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, thank you for acknowledging a different view! I have looked at Guess at the riddle, not having understood it, so I must look again, taking more time, being more focused and concentrated. Is it so, that "degenerate" mostly applies to classification, e.g. the sign classes? While, when it is about composition, it rather is submodes? About external and internal, regarding the example of the immediate object being internal, and the dynamical one being external to the sign, I yesterday have written something in my blog www.signs-in-time.de . There (quite at the end of it) I have come to the conclusion, that there are more than one ways of something being a part of something else: Three ways of composition. The dynamical object is functionally a part of the sign (functional composition), but spatially not a part of it (external to it, spatial composition). Best, Helmut 18. Oktober 2017 um 14:36 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote. Helmut - yes, Again, Peirce refers to external and internal frequently - see for example, all through A guess at the riddle. 1. 354- Yes, I can see the degenerate modes as submodes - except what is interesting about them is that they include the other modes, which thus makes them degenerate rather than genuine/pure. I hope I've explained why I describe 3-1 and 3-2 differently from you - though I acknowledge the validity of your points. Edwina On Tue 17/10/17 9:31 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Supplement: "External, internal" are a bit likely to lead to misunderstandings, I guess. I think, or rather guess, that, as secondness is actuality and firstness possibility, this also applies to the degenerate modes (I rather think of them as submodes). So, that (3.1.) is possibility rather, and (3.2.) actuality. Edwina, list, my concepts of (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.) I mostly have abducted from immediate object (2.1.), dynamic object (2.2.), immediate (3.1.), dynamic (3.2.), final (3.3.) interpretant, and also the parts of the consciousness: Sensation of altersense (2.1.), will of altersense (2.2.), abstraction of medisense (3.1.), suggestion of medisense (3.2.), association of medisense (3.3.). Looking at these, I think that I agree with your (2.1.) and (2.2.), but that I see (3.1.) and (3.2.) the other way around than you do, regarding their local ex- and internality. Are there btw. any more examples of degenerate modes by Peirce? Best, Helmut 17. Oktober 2017 um 21:59 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut - I can see how you are arriving at this outline of the categories - matter-form-interaction - and they DO fit into the three modal categories. My own view of the six modes possible within these three categories analyzes how they function within time and space. 1-1 [Pure Firstness]- is a mode of existence in Internal Local Space and Present time: As internal, which is to say, in the non-actualized or imaginary realm - - it provides a host of 'possible' experiences but its existentiality as not-actual is without definition and without form and thus, allows for a great deal of interpretation, via its open possibilities. A feeling. 2-2 [Pure Secondness] is a mode in External Local Space and Perfect time: As external, it provides a discrete actual instantiation 2-1 [Degenerate Secondness] is a borderline interface, in local space..and on the border between the external and the internal. It's an 'attractor'. I think it functions as a kind of initial condition [its Firstness] , able to link with other relations [its indexical Secondness]; It acts as a catalyst...with its properties of both internal feeling and external closure. So, it iconically and indexically 'interacts' with other sites and also, binds and links with them. 3-2 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an internal mode, and, as Thirdness, operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. As non-local, it provides communal continuity, but, as internal, it operates as a 'virtual information processor. It functions as an exploratory ongoing flexible connection of indexical links to both real and imaginary solutions; it 'browses' the entire informational community without making a discrete decision. It's a vital, highly important mode - because of its indexicality with its surroundings, and the fact that, as internal - its decisions remain possible rather than actual. This enables the organism to consider, without actualizing, multiple alternative solutions. It's a vital informational search engine. 3-1 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an external mode, and, as Thirdness, operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. It provides communal continuity, but, as EXTERNAL, i.e., as actual rather than imaginary or possible, it lacks the exploratory capacities of 3-2; it provides a symmetry-inducing model, a communal habit-form or abstract model, which guides and organizes the development of instantiations. Akin to the genes of a species. 3-3 [Pure Thirdness] is aspatial and atemporal - the universal rationality of Pure Mind. It cannot be described for description belongs to particularities. And now - I can imagine the reactions of shocked horror at my above outline. ..and the assertions that 'it's not Peirce'. Well- I think it is. Edwina On Tue 17/10/17 3:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, list, I completely agree with your outline of what a thing categorially is. My proposal about a thing is: Category 1 is matter/material, cat. 2 is form, and cat. 3 is interaction. 2.1. (firstness of secondness) is the form from the inside, the thing´s perspective, and 2.2. (secondness of secondness) is the form from the outside perspective. 3.1. is the interaction possibility, 3.2. the actual interactions, and 3.3. the interactional habits. Where exactly the border between existence and reality is, I don´t know. Maybe, depending on the depth of analysis, always between secondness and thirdness? so between 2 and 3, but also between 3.2. and 3.3., between 3.3.2. and 3.3.3.,...? Best, Helmut 17. Oktober 2017 um 01:19 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list Thanks for the quote. I've two, hopefully brief, comments. 1] I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential, but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits. 2] Thirdness, or generality or habits, has to be understood as distinct - spatially and temporally - from the modal categories of Firstness and Secondness. Firstness operates in the Open Here and Now - ...this undifferentiated 'instant'..and 'this space'..with no sense of past or future time and no sense of 'other space. It is that immediate sensation. Secondness operates in the Distinct Here and Now - this 'instant' as differentiated from the past or next instant and this space as differentiated from Other Space. It is that distinct, closed oppositional awareness of self-not self. Thirdness operates in Past/Future or Progressive Time and non-local space. That is, its properties, as generals, have no 'glue' confining them to 'hic et nunc' time; they are spread out; they are the same in the past and in the future; they are continuity. And - they are common to a lot of 'instances' over space. As such, these Generals are of course, real general possibilities. 3] BUT Thirdness or 'the real' , being composed of generals operating only in past/future time and non-local space, can only exist, within the temporal and spatial finiteness, the 'nowness' of matter operating in the mode of Firstness and/or Secondness. These two modal categories provide the 'hic and nunc' existentiality to Thirdness. Therefore - a General or an open general possibility, is 'real' but, being without current time and space, it remains an abstract open, vague continuous force. As a force, does Thirdness depend on being articulated within existential Firstness/Secondness? I think it does; its properties are general and open to change within the 'being made existential' - but - I don't see that Thirdness/ generals can continue-to-be-Real without that semiosic connection. That is, I don't see Thirdness/generals as functioning separated from Firstness/Secondness. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 5:12 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, list, I'm glad the quotation proved helpful to you. There does remain the question of the generality and reality of habits and habit formation towards the future, evolutionary tendencies, 'would-bes', etc. Since I've decided to rest my eyes for the rest of the day (I may in fact listen to that Mozart concerto), I'll just offer another quote and a brief comment to suggest what I have in mind for perhaps future discussion (I'd recommend that if we do take the discussion further that we do so in a separate thread). 1911 | A Sketch of Logical Critics | EP 2:457-458 (in Commens Dictionary) For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled. I would assume that we are in agreement as to Peirce's initial answer to the question he poses as to what it is for something to be Real. But the question of the reality of habits as "would bes" yet remains to be considered. Note that his description here of a habit--a "lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject would , under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real " concludes with the idea that "it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled." Now I recall Jon S also suggesting that something like this is the case not only for real generals (habits) but for real possibilities as well. It seems to me that Peirce's "extreme Scholastic realism" does argue that there are both real generals and real possibles, and that their reality is not dependent on whether the conditions bringing them into existence "actually do get fulfilled." Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> > wrote: Gary R - thanks; that's a great quotation. And yes, it does bring in his 'objective idealism' which is NOT equivalent to 'idealism'. Agreed - without the reality of generals, a theory is nominalistic - it can't be otherwise, for it is reduced to only two modal categories: Firstness and Secondness. That's a vital comment - that ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character Essentially, to me that means that reality doesn't depend upon what you or I may think of it but is itself, an operation of a general Mind. And most certainly, universals as generals do not, per se, in themselves, 'exist'. Instead, these generals 'exist'...within instantiations. "Matter is..mind hidebound with habits' 6.158 BUT - we can certainly have semiosic Signs [that triad] without generals. Just think of a rhematic indexical sinsign [a spontaneous cry] operative only in Secondness and Firstness. Edwiina On Mon 16/10/17 2:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Jon S, Edwina, list, This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP 5.503). Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and that it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting material from Lowell 2. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> > wrote: Edwina, List: Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now. That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist while having no generality whatsoever. And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> > wrote: Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to revisit it with you. I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but reality requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or generality and is not a thing. And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term 'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its end. There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's been done to exhaustion before. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, List: I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along now who were not on the List back then. Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> > wrote: Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> > wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument.. And I also agree with your other two points. I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. Edwina ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose('l...@list.iupui.edu','','','')> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose('peirce-L@list.iupui.edu','','','')> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose('l...@list.iupui.edu','','','')> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
