Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so forth. Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more real the more consciously decisions are made and the more choices one allows oneself. Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects a massive block to notions of behavior as instinctive.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is not > reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness]. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent: > > I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came to > realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially > input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this > account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly > organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that > there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar > irreducibility. > > I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but > there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly > Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean. > > John > > On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be > helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No > such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their > ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other > animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a > goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms > have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my > body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a > woman would behave if her body were that of a man. > > And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed > blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms > and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic > forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). > Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with > their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also > to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to > enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical > bonds and subatomic forces are the product of semiosis, and not its > cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum > Semiotics > <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>. > > > While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis > and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In > its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean > miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) > looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and > it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve: > > I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail > Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would > > I'd rather be a hammer than a nail > Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would > > Away, I'd rather sail away > Like a swan that's here and gone > A man gets tied up to the ground > He gives the world its saddest sound > It's saddest sound > > I'd rather be a forest than a street > Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would > > I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet > Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would > > Regards > > > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM > To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman > Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature > > > > Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to > its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, > with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories. > > Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic > quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But > semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a > relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with > another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, > confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both > spontaneity [Firstness] and also, Mind or Thirdness. > > But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal > simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms > such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a > key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical > triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I] in a mode of > Secondness. But organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or > Thirdness. > > Edwina > > > > On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent: > > Hi Gary f, List, > > I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the > tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there > passages from Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to > nature, other than the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can > infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be subject to > semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like that? > > I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis in > the context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was helpful. > I read on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I > do like the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of > Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the > evidence gets. > > Thanks! > > Mike > > > > On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Mike, > > > > There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis > with Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being > general laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is CP > 5.105, EP 2:184): > > [[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to > which I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so > narrow and special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to > say that a general principle that is operative in the real world is of the > essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its modus > operandi is the same as that by which words produce physical effects. ]] > > > > Gary f. > > > > From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] > Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature > > > > Hi List, > > I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and > Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote: > > "One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is > human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there is > some reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic > products." (emphasis added) > > I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not > recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate nature other than > crystals. Does anyone on the list know of others? > > Thanks! > > Mike > > [1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge > Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, > 2010, pp. 89–100. > > > > > -- > John Collier > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban > Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier> > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
