What’s so palpable about this ironic situation is that a claim is made by ones who claim Peirce, that the ‘self’ emerges by experience, while at the same time, denying *accident* in life. Does not tychism also belong to the river of pragmatism?
That is, what does it matter what woman is for man when the purpose is always the child? Predispositions? I forget predispositions! It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions. Should I not have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with me? Best, Jerry Rhee On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear list: > > > > “List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be > helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. “ > > > > “A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. > Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her > body were that of a man.” > > > > ______ > > > > "Such is the language of all fish," saidst thou; "what they do not fathom > is unfathomable.” > > > > “There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being > any real meaning or law in things. This scepticism is strongest in the > most masculine thinkers.” > > > > Hth, > > Jerry Rhee > > On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> > wrote: > >> >” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that >> matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the >> 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, >> learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate >> stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of >> which that single bird is merely one example?” >> >> My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for >> birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic >> resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I >> discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics >> <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>. >> The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous >> is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information >> determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA >> nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an >> alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what >> do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and >> experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that >> Changes Itself). >> >> >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed >> the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.” >> >> Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are >> these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once >> connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same >> *predispositions* in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel >> technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as >> they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is >> predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud >> huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they >> are isolated from one another. >> >> >”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the >> organism as to its behaviour.” >> >> The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when >> he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords: >> http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunk >> er-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html >> >> >”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not >> an analysis in my view.” >> >> What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident >> observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman >> Doidge), and a winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. >> Furthermore, in many species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their >> parents. That is, they learn to apply their winged predispositions, from >> their parents. So again, imitation plays an important role, despite the >> physiological predispositions. >> >> >”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems >> to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these >> Peircean categories within its framework.” >> >> Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was >> addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is >> best characterized in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it >> that *motivates* an organism to imitate (the associations that become >> habits)? That’s a question, in the first instance, of Firstness. >> >> >”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the >> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].” >> >> Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis – >> pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level >> of the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the >> recursion of behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s >> beyond the point that I wanted to emphasize. >> >> Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of >> thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout >> the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am >> outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not >> accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the >> entropy problem - Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the >> tendency to disorder. By contrast, the notion of instinct as stored >> information, as with the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent >> with the reality of entropy. It is the *persistence* of complexity >> across time, as evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth, >> that is the deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism. >> >> Regards sj >> >> >> >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca>] >> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM >> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; >> 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek >> *Subject:* Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature >> >> >> >> Stephen, list: >> >> >> I think that this is a vastly different perspective from one that >> includes Mind and Thirdness. >> >> You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. >> But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that >> matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which >> insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored >> knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which >> that single bird is merely one example? >> >> As for 'imitation' - this sounds similar to the old 'diffusion' >> explanation of human behaviour, where it was assumed that a new technology >> was invented once and then, diffused by imitation to other populations. But >> this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same >> technology or mode of behaviour/belief. >> >> You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that the FORM of >> matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its >> behaviour. So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but >> that's not an analysis in my view. >> >> Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to >> focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean >> categories within its framework. >> >> It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the >> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness]. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *On Sun 10/12/17 11:19 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au >> <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> sent:* >> >> Hi Edwina >> >> No, *knowing how to be* is not a synonym for instinct. It is an >> expression of pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the >> things that matter. It particularly relates to firstness and self. *Knowing >> how to be* incorporates the *self* into pragmatism. I suppose one might >> say, in this context, that a proper appreciation of firstness needs to >> factor in the role of self, and the self’s relationship to the world, in >> the context of its needs. By taking this approach, we attain a different >> and more compelling perspective on the role of *imitation*, particularly >> in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in *imitation*, we obtain a >> greater appreciation of the nuances that motivate a self to *imitation*… >> for example, fear. Fear motivates selves to imitate the current Bitcoin >> craze… the fear of missing out, versus the fear of loss when people begin >> to flee the market. The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown. >> >> Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body provides >> the “tools” that predispose us to how we define the things that matter… as >> per Mark Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man whose only tool is a hammer will >> perceive the world in terms of nails’. >> >> There are different layers to pragmatism, for example: >> >> 1) There are the mind-body predispositions; >> >> 2) There is imitation. >> >> >> >> Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for example, in >> the domestication of animals or in the feralization of humans (feral >> children, eg, the Wild Boy of Aveyron). >> >> Regards >> >> >> >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM >> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; >> 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek >> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature >> >> >> >> >> Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you haven't >> explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist? Where? How >> does it evolve? It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'! >> >> What is a 'mind-body' predisposition? >> >> Edwina >> >> >> *On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:* >> >> List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be >> helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No >> such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their >> ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other >> animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a >> goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms >> have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my >> body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a >> woman would behave if her body were that of a man. >> >> And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed >> blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms >> and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic >> forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). >> Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with >> their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also >> to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to >> enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical >> bonds and subatomic forces are the *product* of semiosis, and not its >> cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum >> Semiotics >> <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>. >> >> >> While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis >> and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In >> its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean >> miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) >> looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and >> it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve: >> >> I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail >> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would >> >> I'd rather be a hammer than a nail >> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would >> >> Away, I'd rather sail away >> Like a swan that's here and gone >> A man gets tied up to the ground >> He gives the world its saddest sound >> It's saddest sound >> >> I'd rather be a forest than a street >> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would >> >> I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet >> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would >> >> Regards >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM >> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman >> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature >> >> >> >> Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to >> its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, >> with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories. >> >> Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic >> quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But >> semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a >> relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with >> another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, >> confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both >> spontaneity [Firstness] and also, Mind or Thirdness. >> >> But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal >> simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms >> such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a >> key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical >> triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I] in a mode of >> Secondness. But organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or >> Thirdness. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> *On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:* >> >> Hi Gary f, List, >> >> I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the >> tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there >> passages from Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to >> nature, other than the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can >> infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be subject to >> semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like that? >> >> I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis >> in the context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was >> helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still >> vague. I do like the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of >> Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the >> evidence gets. >> >> Thanks! >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >> >> Mike, >> >> >> >> There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis >> with Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being >> *general* laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is >> CP 5.105, EP 2:184): >> >> [[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to >> which I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so >> narrow and special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to >> say that a general principle that is operative in the real world is of the >> essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its *modus >> operandi* is the same as that by which *words* produce physical effects. >> ]] >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] >> *Sent:* 9-Dec-17 17:25 >> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature >> >> >> >> Hi List, >> >> I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and >> Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote: >> >> "One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), >> is human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there is >> some reason to believe that even the *laws of nature* are semiotic >> products." (emphasis added) >> >> I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not >> recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate nature other than >> crystals. Does anyone on the list know of others? >> >> Thanks! >> >> Mike >> >> [1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge >> Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, >> 2010, pp. 89–100. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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