Jeff,
Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to organic compounds as "such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring to as "those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left." What would those be called by chemists today? Something like the DNA molecule? Of course its structure was not known until long after Peirce died, but I'm guessing some simpler organic molecules would have been known at the time to fit Peirce's description. I guess what I'm trying to grasp is the connection (in Peirce's mind) between three-dimensionality and Thirdness. Conceptualizing the elements of the phaneron takes a long time, as Peirce is about to say in Lowell 3 . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 12-Dec-17 22:11 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List, Gary F: "his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not very clear, at least to me" One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the chemical character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." As in the Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be drawing on a phenomenological account of the categories--both material and formal--as a basis for sorting out the phenomena that call out for explanation in philosophy. Peirce says: Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual, or inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward relations, or resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of resemblances and differences of bodies are classificatory, or chemical. We know little about them; but we may assert with some confidence that there are differences between substances - i.e., differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and a classification based on that, and there are differences in the structure of bodies, and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of bodies, depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences in the manner in which bodies are built up out of their smallest pieces. Here we have a distinction between that kind of structure which gives rise to forms without power of truth [true?] growth or inorganic structures, and the chemistry of protoplasms which develope [or] living organisms. (CP 1.512) Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual or inward." (1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or resemblances of bodies. (2) Laws of mind. The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature of the smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic elements), and the laws that are based (b) on the structural relations between the parts of bodies. The latter class is further divided into the laws of (i) inorganic chemistry, which are based on the shape and size of the atomicules, and the laws of organic chemistry, which give rise to (ii) forms that have the power of growth and life. The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm) are, I take it, examples of the chemistry of "active substances" because they are the kinds of things that are capable of growth and of developing into living organisms. As such, the laws of organic chemistry are on the border between the laws of fact and the principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern the growth of living things. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _____ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list, Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning of Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of Peirce's work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I don't know where that diagram started its career, except that it wasn't with Peirce. But then the three-spoke diagram of the "semiosic triad" (as Edwina calls it) didn't start with Peirce either. Edwina's given us a very free translation of what Peirce says in Lowell 3.4 (aka CP 1.347), and I'd like to direct attention back to what Peirce actually said (included below, diagrams and all). Peirce does give a little diagram of "a node connecting three lines of identity": . This is what he elsewhere calls a "point of teridentity," which is entirely different from a "spot with three tails" (it's not a spot at all). He uses both diagrams, in different ways, to prove (or rather "sketch a proof" of) the irreducibility of Thirdness, which he refers to here as "Meaning," which "is obviously a triadic relation." (At least, that should be obvious to any student of the logic of relations.) To establish the truth of his first premiss, "that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning," he asks us to take "any fact in physics of the triadic kind." It's clear enough that "Three things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference between right and left"; but his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not very clear, at least to me. Maybe some of the chemists on the list can comment on that. The relation of "giving," which he also uses elsewhere as an exemplary triadic relation, would be represented by a "spot with three tails," because "giving" is a triadic rheme, a predicate which requires three subjects. But it's the "other premiss of the argument" - "that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities" - that Peirce elects to illustrate with Existential Graphs, and in two different ways. First, you can't make a triadic rheme by joining the tails of two (or more) dyadic spots; that would just give you two dyadic rhemes (or a chain of them, which is still dyadic. Second, you do have a triadic relation if three lines of identity are joined at a spot of teridentity. This is what would occur in the transformations of a sequence of beta graphs that would diagram the series of events Peirce narrates, leading to the conclusion: "On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday. There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation." The key word that makes this a triadic relation is "consequently"; the whole sequence is an argument, or inference, which is unquestionably triadic. And of course an argument is a sign - a sign which cannot be fully represented by a single existential graph, but only by a sequence of them. Semiosis takes time. Then, as an "interesting" afterthought, Peirce adds that while no "complexus of dyadic relations" (as he put it in the Syllabus) can constitute a genuine triadic relation, a complexus of triadic relations can give you any higher -adicity - the point being, again, that Thirdness is an irreducible element but there is no irreducible Fourthness. This brings us back to Phenomenology, with perhaps a deeper understanding of its mathematical aspect. As for semiotics, there is no diagram here of the triad object-sign-interpretant. If someone can point to such a diagram anywhere in Peirce's writings (either triangular or three-spoked), I will thank them profusely, for refuting my claim that neither of those diagramming habits started with Peirce. Gary f. From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 12-Dec-17 07:01 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884 <https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lo well-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884> 27 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 464-465 (1903) - Lowell Lecture III - 3rd Draught) | FromThePage fromthepage.com 27 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 464-465 (1903) - Lowell Lecture III - 3rd Draught) - page overview. 46 of candor of which one is not oneself aware. You perceive, no doubt, that if there be an element of thought irreducible to any other, it... I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to those of Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all physical forces appear to subsist between pairs of particles. This was assumed by Helmholtz in his original paper on the Conservation of Forces. Take any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which can only be defined by simultaneous reference to three things, and you will find there is ample evidence that it never was produced by the action of forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, your right hand is that hand which is toward the east, when you face the north with your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference between right and left. Consequently chemists find that those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left can only be produced from such active substances. They are all of such complex constitution that they cannot have existed when the earth was very hot, and how the first one was produced is a puzzle. It cannot have been by the action of brute forces. For the second branch of the inquiry, you must train yourself to the analysis of relations, beginning with such as are very markedly triadic, gradually going on to others. In that way, you will convince yourself thoroughly that every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning. Take, for example, the relation of giving. A gives B to C. This does not consist in A's throwing B away and its accidentally hitting C, like the date-stone, which hit the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would not be a genuine triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another. There need be no motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer of the right of property. Now right is a matter of law, and law is a matter of thought and meaning. I there leave the matter to your own reflection, merely adding that, though I have inserted the word "genuine," yet I do not really think that necessary. I think even degenerate triadic relations involve something like thought. The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown. In Existential Graphs, a spot with one tail -X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -R- a dyadic relation. Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of identity is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C. 347. It is interesting to remark that while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher number of tails. And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond these three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to be found in the phenomenon. http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903
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