Edwina, List: You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing that. For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial. For my own clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally *normative*, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems *ought *to behave; or *descriptive*, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems *actually do* behave?
Thanks, Jon On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that > you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding > such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way > of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets > up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate: > No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is > 'judged' as 'unPeircean'. > > As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of > Peirce. Since, as you note: > > Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every > intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to > go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its > object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors > to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its business is > to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP > 2:375; 1906). > > Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn > from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a > 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to > consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No. > > That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics > certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider > that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and > certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of > thought - but - although the biological realm does not itself reflect on > or study the nature of logic and metaphysics - it nevertheless operates > within the rules of logic. Your view, as I understand it, that biosemiotics > is a 'free interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid. > > Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond > Peircean framework but is thoroughly grounded in his theories. > > Edwina > > On Mon 22/01/18 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less > legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental assertion > that expresses your personal opinion. If we were to forbid all such > statements from the List, then there would be very little discussion at all > going forward; it would thus "block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48; > 1898). Please also note that I have not applied these or any similar > descriptions to anything that you have (or anyone else has) said in the > current thread; nor have I argued here or elsewhere that "Peircean semiosis > is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics." I have simply > suggested that we be clear about whether we are talking about those > branches of philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in > the physical and biological sciences (as you usually are). > > That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that logic > and metaphysics apply exclusively "within the human conceptual domain." > "For normative science in general being the science of the laws of > conformity of things to ends, ... logic [considers] those things whose end > is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903). "Logic regarded > from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the > theory of deliberate thinking. To say that any thinking is deliberate is > to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a > purpose or ideal" (CP 1.573, EP 2:376; 1906). Hence the normative science > of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from > experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to go about pursuing truth as "the > conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). > Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of > Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its business is to study the most general > features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906). > > By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the special > sciences, rather than philosophy. "For those [special] sciences, > experience is that which their special means of observation directly bring > to light, and it is contrasted with the interpretations of those > observations which are effected by connecting these experiences with what > we otherwise know. But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in > order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, > experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes > interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538; > undated). Do we at least agree on that much? > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> - Jon - my final comment on this is that to declare that another view is >> 'unPeircean' or is 'more/less legitimate' is Gatekeeper terminology for it >> inserts a non-individual judgment. >> >> Yes, I read your full post - and don't agree that biosemiotics goes >> ''well beyond what Peirce explicitly stated'...After all, if it goes 'well >> beyond' the explicit, 'while still remaining within the scope of broadly >> Peircean views'...then, you have watered biosemiotics down to a peripheral >> and even diluted or 'free' Peircean semiosis. As you say - such a >> definition that you use implies a 'freedom' of interpretation. Those of us >> who refer to his many references to Mind as Matter disagree that Peircean >> semiosis is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics - both of >> which are within the human conceptual domain. Instead, we consider >> that biosemiotics is fully grounded in basic Peircean semiotics. Not 'well >> beyond' but fully grounded'. >> >> that's it. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 22/01/18 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and do; I >> have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as you. Did >> you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after the second >> sentence? Please note what I said in the last sentence, in particular. In >> the past, I have not adequately recognized the difference between talking >> about biosemiotics and talking about semeiotic within logic and >> metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon >> >> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by a >>> Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are more >>> legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who declares that >>> some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'! Legitimate >>> according to what non-individual authoritative scale? >>> >>> As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and >>> each as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our individual >>> interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's all. >>> >>> As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most >>> pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a >>> reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another. Again - >>> all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own view is >>> quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has the right to >>> declare that another view has a universal non-validity [i.e., is 'not >>> legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is 'not legitimate' >>> because that inserts an external authoritative criterion. All you can do is >>> say: I, personally, don't agree..... >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 22/01/18 9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or >>> some kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings. What I have argued >>> in the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of >>> Peirce (or any other author) are more legitimate than others. Instead, I >>> respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts >>> and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's >>> architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating. >>> There are at least three that seem to come up regularly. >>> >>> 1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic. >>> 2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism. >>> 3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics. >>> >>> This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's >>> scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his >>> lifetime. As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in >>> biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the >>> philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well >>> beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within >>> the scope of broadly Peircean views. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list >>>> [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as >>>> gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that >>>> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'. My >>>> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb >>>> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that >>>> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the >>>> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce. All one can say is: 'I >>>> disagree with your view'.....and outline your own view. That's it. >>>> >>>
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