Gary f, Jon S, list, I have to agree with Jon S that *every* sign has an immediate object. Here are a few examples (taken from the *Commens* Dictionary) to that effect. 1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s)
…*every* sign has *two* objects (emphasis added by GR). It has that object which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being. . .; and on the other hand there is the Real Object which has really determined the sign[,] which I usually call the Dynamical Object. . . 1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:407 … the *requaesitum* which we have been seeking is simply that which the sign “stands for,” or the idea of that which it is calculated to awaken. [—] This *requaesitum* I term the *Object* of the sign; - the *immediate* object, if it be the idea which the sign is built upon, the *real* object, if it be that real thing or circumstance upon which that idea is founded, as on bedrock. 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15 …all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: *the Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR). 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:24-5 The immediate object is the object as the sign represents it: the real object is that same object as it is, in its own mode of being, independent of the sign or any other representation. [—] *Every* sign must plainly have an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign [emphasis added by GR]. 1908-12 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.343 … it is necessary to distinguish the *Immediate Object*, or the Object as the Sign represents it, from the *Dynamical Object*, or really efficient but not immediately present Object. 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495 As to the Object, that may mean *the Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea*, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be. *The former I call the Immediate Object*, the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object that Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science) can investigate (Emphasis added by GR). 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:498 We must distinguish between *the Immediate Object, – i.e., the Object as represented in the sign*, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign *cannot* express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to find out by *collateral experience *(emphasis added by GR). 1910 | Letters to Paul Carus | ILS 284 Then there are 3 divisions that relate to the Object. One according to *the form under which the Sign presents its Object. This is of course **the object **as the sign represents it**, i.e. the Immediate Object *(emphasis added by GR). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 8:47 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, list, > > > > You say “Peirce very clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning > already in 1904 (CP 8.336)--that *every *Sign has an *Immediate *Object.” > I don’t think it’s that clear at all. CP 8.336, to take your example, does > not say anything about “every sign.” Moreover, in much of his late semiotic > Peirce refers to propositions as “complete” signs, while simpler sign types > are “partial” or “fragmentary”; and it looks to me as if many of his > references to “signs” in general at this time (and even earlier) are > references to such complete signs. > > > > In the Syllabus passage that refers to “primary” and “secondary” objects, > Peirce is clearly focused on Dicisigns, which are very much like > propositions, and what Bellucci actually says is that “There is a sense > in which only propositions and proposition-like signs have immediate > objects.” (His 2015 paper is a free download and is well worth reading, in > my opinion.) Reading this part of Peirce’s Speculative Grammar, around > EP2:276, is described by Peirce himself as “threading our way through a > maze of abstractions,” but it seems quite plausible to me that the > “Secondary Object,” being a part of the sign, fits reasonably well Peirce’s > later definitions of the Immediate Object. > > > > I think this will need some further looking into. Which I don’t have time > for right now, partly because I want to read your Additament piece first! > > > > Gary f > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 17:09 > *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture > 3.14) > > > > Jeff, List: > > > > CP 2.311 is from the 1903 Syllabus and discusses the Secondary Object, not > the Immediate Object. Peirce referred to the Immediate Object earlier in > the very same writing (CP 2.293)--a fact that is obscured by the editors' > unfortunate insertion of CP 2.295-308, which came from elsewhere, but is > evident from EP 2:274-277. That being the case, what is the warrant for > treating the two terms as designating the same thing? Perhaps Bellucci is > correct that only propositions have *Secondary *Objects, but Peirce very > clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning already in 1904 (CP > 8.336)--that *every *Sign has an *Immediate *Object. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:54 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > Gary R, Gary F, Jon S, > > One of the texts that was giving rise to my questions about the relations > between immediate objects, on the one hand, and their relations to signs > and interpretants, on the other, is the earlier discussion of primary and > secondary objects at CP 2.311-14. That discussion of the Dicisign is one of > the main passages that Bellucci cites in support of his interpretative > claim that only propositions have immediate objects. > > In order to make sense of Peirce's discussion, I am drawing on an analysis > of the phenomena at hand. As such, I'm focusing on our experience of making > assertions in propositions and of interpreting the propositions asserted by > others. In doing so, I am trying to be careful to avoid confusing matters > of phenomenology and matters of semiotics. > > Jon S suggests that there is only one place (that he knows of) where > Peirce characterizes the immediate object of a dicisign in terms of how > the interpretant represents the existential relation between an individual > dynamical object and an indexical sinsign. As such, we might consider > ignoring that one passage and, instead, focus on the places where he > characterizes the immediate object in terms of how the dynamical object is > represented in the sign. In fact, I believe there are many places where > Peirce characterizes the immediate object in terms of how it is represented > in both the sign and in the interpretant. One extended discussion is found > in the text cited above. Other passages are cited in Belluci's papers and > monographs on the speculative grammar. See, for instance, chapter 7 on the > Syllabus in his monograph. > > Gary F and Gary R suggest that I do seem to be confused about the way > Peirce is applying the modality of possibility within the contexts of both > Peirce's phenomenology and his semiotics. I, on the other hand, am > wondering about the sources of confusions--both mine and others--that might > lurk in both areas of inquiry. > > As such, I want to point out just how many places where Peirce talks about > the phenomena that can be observed using the following sorts of modifiers: > scientific phenomena, physical phenomena, mental phenomena, objective > phenomena, subjective phenomena, etc. I think that the term phenomena is > being used in the context of a philosophical theory of phenomenology in a > way that is entirely consonant with the way that scientists, like Peirce, > would describe the phenomena that can be observed in the special > science of, say, physics. For example, consider the debate that took place > between the American groups (under Peirce's direction) and the European > groups over whether one set of observations or another contained > observational errors. In order to sort out the sources of such error, the > two groups could observe the same gravitational phenomena at the same time > and at the same place--but with different pendulums and stands. Hence the > importance of thinking of the phenomena as public and reproducible. > > In saying that Peirce is using the term "phenomena" in phenomenology in a > manner that is consonant with the way the term is used in the special > sciences, I am pointing out that the main difference between the two is > that philosophy focuses on phenomena that can be observed without any > special equipment at any waking hour by any person. > > If we turn to semiotics and Peirce's discussion of the way possibility > applies to different kinds of signs and how those representations are > related to their objects and interpretants, this is the sort of passage > that I find particularly puzzling: > > "An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility involving a possibility, and > thus the possibility of its being represented as a possibility is the > possibility of the involved possibility." CP 2.311 > > Figuring out how the modal conception of possibility modifies each part of > that assertion is, I think, no easy task given the nested character of the > modal operators. If anyone thinks it is easy, feel free to have a go at it. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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