Hello,
Just to be clear about my own views, my initial impression after reading
Bellucci's claims about the immediate object in his essays was--"that can't be
right." It is a view that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting the
classification of signs based on the manner of presentation of the immediate
object.
Having said that, my own views are vague and confused in a number of respects.
As such, I look to interpretations that are different from my own--especially
by those who are engaged actively in the research and have given the matter
considerable thought--as a source of challenge and possible light.
Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would hesitate
to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the immediate object and its
possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for the simple reason that the EG
are designed as a tool for the logical analysis of symbols expressed in
propositions that function as premisses and conclusions of arguments. As such,
the EG may not be the best tool for shedding light on the character of
qualisigns and the relations they bear to their objects and interpretants.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________
From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 3:12 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list,
Gf: "I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate
object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that statement
means."
I'm not exactly sure what your meaning could be here. It seems that earlier you
were arguing (and Jeff seemed to agree) that only propositions have immediate
objects. If you are now "not challenging the statement that 'every sign has an
immediate object'," then why would the "context," as you strongly suggest, make
a significant difference except by in some way limiting the meaning of 'Sign'
in some formal logical abstraction of the idea of 'Sign'?
This, or something like it, seems to be the case as I reflect on the quotations
you just gave and commented on.
Quotation/commentary #1:
[[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of
propositions and which must be true of them, since every proposition can be
analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of concepts
that are not propositional; and this argument is supported by the evident truth
that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts
belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a
proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional
signs can only exist as constituents of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906]
This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” because
it is a constituent of a proposition.
As I read this quotation, it is not that "every sign has an immediate object”
because it is a constituent of a proposition," but that "no sign of a thing or
kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except
in a proposition" as these are employed in existential graphs. That is all that
Peirce seems to be claiming.
Quotation/commentary #2:
[[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set
of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its
turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and
that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode
of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly
intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete
Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but
often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, c.1908]
A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have
Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be called
(Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects because they
resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s another statement in
the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a shorthand for “proposition”:
Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "may have Parts") and
which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a proposition, but any
Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every even, shall we say,
"Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes) will have an immediate
object (again, at least in human semiosis)
Quotation/commentary #3:
[[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the
nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living
intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of
the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a human being
can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself,
are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact,
which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] CP 6.341,344, 1909]
The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer to a
generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which
latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, is a
proposition or quasi-proposition or essential part of a proposition. The only
way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for a given statement about
“signs” is to read the context clues.
Well, it still is sounding like you are arguing that only propositions have
immediate objects. I continue to disagree.
However, I will agree that in the fullness of "the composition of thought,"
that a "generic 'sign'," as you put it, or even a single actual sign, hasn't
much to offer to that fullness which is "the living intelligence which is the
creator of all intelligible reality." Still, this doesn't deny that there are
what I've just termed "Incomplete Signs" which have immediate objects.
And, of course, I fully agree that all signs are triadic. Yet even each
"generic 'sign' " in the 10 fold classification of signs is given as triadic in
that classification, so a fortiori, any actual sign had, has, and/or will have
an "Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this
one, a sign would not be a sign)."
Yet I principally understand semiosis as a consequence of my quotidian
experience of it (naturally now deeply informed by Peirce's semeiotic science)
or in thought experiments. This thought experiment (which I've made a number of
times) I'll call, "The First Thing I See."
I walk into a room I'm not familiar with, sit down, close my eyes, then turn my
head to the right, open my eyes, and the first thing I see is an object of a
peculiar shape (of course I haven't thought of it in these terms, but it isn't
at all immediately clear to me what it is), then in a moment I recognize it as
a 'vase' (a rheme, not a dicisign), albeit a peculiarly shaped one. In my later
analysis I see that I have had at least two immediate objects set before my
mind, a complex mix of qualisigns (shape, colors, etc.), so, at first not
recognizable as "something," and a rhematic one, as I quickly identify this
"something' to be a vase. And it seems clear enough to me that at that moment
of recognition I did not think a proposition ("That is a vase"), but merely the
rheme, 'vase'.
Another thought experiment, this one based on one Peirce himself offers on how
learning occurs, so which I'll call "The Child Learns a Lesson."
Although the toddler has been told by mom to stay away from the stove's
burners, that they're 'hot' and will 'burn' her so that she'll feel 'pain', yet
when mom isn't looking, the child steps up to the stove, experiences the pain
of the burn as she screams "Aie!!!" and immediately withdraws her hand. Well,
while I'm certain some here will argue otherwise, to my way of thinking there
isn't much in the nature of dicisignificance going on in this situation,
especially given that the child has only a few words at her disposal at this
point in her development.
For me there can be little doubt that the child has 'experienced' (although
that is hardly the correct word) at least one and probably several immediate
objects. And while it is wholly unlikely that they all happened in an abstract
'instant', they certainly occurred in a fraction of a second, a 'moment' as
Peirce analyzes the minimum of time. And, to boot, one can see in that moment
several semiotic events: the qualisign which is the heat, the resultant pain
(another qualisign), the immediate withdrawing of her hand (involving now 2ns),
and the cry (perhaps involving 3ns as she's a French girl and has heard mom cry
out "Aie!!!" when she herself was in pain or saw that her daughter was in
pain). How complex even the simplest semiotic event appears to be!
Best,
Gary R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 2:02 PM,
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Jon, Gary R,
The crucial question here is: What is the Real Object of the term “sign” in
each of these definitions? In each case, we would have to gather what clues we
can from the context of the definition (since, as we all know, the sign cannot
express its object). And when we do, I think it would be wise to bear in mind
some other general statements Peirce made about “signs,” such as this one:
[[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of
propositions and which must be true of them, since every proposition can be
analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of concepts
that are not propositional; and this argument is supported by the evident truth
that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts
belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a
proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional
signs can only exist as constituents of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906]
This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” because
it is a constituent of a proposition.
Or consider this statement:
[[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set
of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its
turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and
that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode
of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly
intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete
Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but
often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, c.1908]
A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have
Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be called
(Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects because they
resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s another statement in
the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a shorthand for “proposition”:
[[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the
nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living
intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of
the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a human being
can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself,
are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact,
which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] CP 6.341,344, 1909]
The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer to a
generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which
latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, is a
proposition or quasi-proposition or essential part of a proposition. The only
way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for a given statement about
“signs” is to read the context clues. That’s what I intend to do when I come
across such statements in the future.
In short, I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate
object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that statement
means. Our concept of “immediate object” depends on that.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 29-Jan-18 10:56
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>;
Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Garys, List:
As Gary R. already reiterated, all of those definitions either explicitly state
or clearly imply that every Sign has an Immediate Object, contrary to
Bellucci's attribution to Peirce of the claim that only propositions do. In
fact, if Bellucci were correct, then the mode of presentation of the Immediate
Object would be limited to the third division (Copulants), since all
propositions are Symbols; but Peirce emphatically affirmed that Signs can also
be Descriptives or Designatives/Denominatives (EP 2:480,484-488). Since Gary
F. asked for examples, Peirce classified a demonstrative pronoun or pointing
finger as a Designative/Denominative (EP 2:484), and a statue of a common
solider in a town square or a geometrical diagram as a Descriptive (CP
2:486-487).
Regards,
Jon S.
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Gary f, Jon S, list,
Yes, what I gave are not examples but definitions of "immediate object,"
something I recognized immediately after sending it, but it was too late to do
anything about it because, despite the few seconds delay I have built into my
email system, it had already been sent.
I wonder why Peirce would consistently offer so many definitions which include
the idea that all signs have an immediate object if he weren't convinced that
that were so?This one, from 1907, even adds that without an immediate object "a
sign would not be a sign." Pretty definitive language for him to use, I'd say.
1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15
…all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: the Immediate object
or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign would not be
a sign); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is independent of any
particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR).
As for your "stormy day" example, it's one which analyzes not any other kind of
sign but a proposition. Yes, it would be excellent if Jon or I (or anyone)
could find an example Peirce gives of an immediate object in a sign other than
a proposition. But, as I have looked at the matter over the years, I would
agree with Peirce in the definitions I offered that every sign (at least those
employed in human semiosis) has an immediate object and that without one "a
sign would not be a sign."
So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that,
according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects"
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690>
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:08 AM,
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Gary R, Jon et al.,
What you’ve listed here, Gary, are examples of definitions of “immediate
object.” They are not examples of signs which have immediate objects, still
less are they examples of immediate objects. I think we need to look at those,
if we can find them, to clarify what an immediate object is.
Here’s one example, from a 1909 letter to William James:
[[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that
afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” This is a
sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose
Dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping
between the window-curtains. … I reply, let us suppose:
“It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion
of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the
character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical Object is the identity
of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment. The Immediate
Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what
there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. ] EP2:498 ]
I include that last sentence to further emphasize Peirce’s distinction between
the character of a “notion” and the identity of it. This distinction is
essential to the analysis of a Dicisign or a proposition, so it is clear that
signs of that type must have immediate objects. The immediate object of such a
sign is, as Peirce explains, the object of an Index which is necessarily a part
of a Dicisign because it indicates what the sign represents itself to be about,
Now, can you show us where Peirce gives an example of an immediate object of a
rheme or icon, or any other sign which is not of a Dicent or propositional
nature? If so, we can assure ourselves that we are not confusing the immediate
object with the immediate interpretant by conflating the identity of an idea
with its quality.
Gary f.
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
a message not to PEIRCE-L but to
l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
