Hello,
Just to be clear about my own views, my initial impression after reading Bellucci's claims about the immediate object in his essays was--"that can't be right." It is a view that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting the classification of signs based on the manner of presentation of the immediate object. Having said that, my own views are vague and confused in a number of respects. As such, I look to interpretations that are different from my own--especially by those who are engaged actively in the research and have given the matter considerable thought--as a source of challenge and possible light. Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the immediate object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for the simple reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical analysis of symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses and conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear to their objects and interpretants. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 3:12 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14) Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list, Gf: "I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that statement means." I'm not exactly sure what your meaning could be here. It seems that earlier you were arguing (and Jeff seemed to agree) that only propositions have immediate objects. If you are now "not challenging the statement that 'every sign has an immediate object'," then why would the "context," as you strongly suggest, make a significant difference except by in some way limiting the meaning of 'Sign' in some formal logical abstraction of the idea of 'Sign'? This, or something like it, seems to be the case as I reflect on the quotations you just gave and commented on. Quotation/commentary #1: [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of propositions and which must be true of them, since every proposition can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of concepts that are not propositional; and this argument is supported by the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906] This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” because it is a constituent of a proposition. As I read this quotation, it is not that "every sign has an immediate object” because it is a constituent of a proposition," but that "no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition" as these are employed in existential graphs. That is all that Peirce seems to be claiming. Quotation/commentary #2: [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, c.1908] A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects because they resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s another statement in the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a shorthand for “proposition”: Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "may have Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes) will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis) Quotation/commentary #3: [[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] CP 6.341,344, 1909] The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer to a generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, is a proposition or quasi-proposition or essential part of a proposition. The only way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for a given statement about “signs” is to read the context clues. Well, it still is sounding like you are arguing that only propositions have immediate objects. I continue to disagree. However, I will agree that in the fullness of "the composition of thought," that a "generic 'sign'," as you put it, or even a single actual sign, hasn't much to offer to that fullness which is "the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality." Still, this doesn't deny that there are what I've just termed "Incomplete Signs" which have immediate objects. And, of course, I fully agree that all signs are triadic. Yet even each "generic 'sign' " in the 10 fold classification of signs is given as triadic in that classification, so a fortiori, any actual sign had, has, and/or will have an "Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign)." Yet I principally understand semiosis as a consequence of my quotidian experience of it (naturally now deeply informed by Peirce's semeiotic science) or in thought experiments. This thought experiment (which I've made a number of times) I'll call, "The First Thing I See." I walk into a room I'm not familiar with, sit down, close my eyes, then turn my head to the right, open my eyes, and the first thing I see is an object of a peculiar shape (of course I haven't thought of it in these terms, but it isn't at all immediately clear to me what it is), then in a moment I recognize it as a 'vase' (a rheme, not a dicisign), albeit a peculiarly shaped one. In my later analysis I see that I have had at least two immediate objects set before my mind, a complex mix of qualisigns (shape, colors, etc.), so, at first not recognizable as "something," and a rhematic one, as I quickly identify this "something' to be a vase. And it seems clear enough to me that at that moment of recognition I did not think a proposition ("That is a vase"), but merely the rheme, 'vase'. Another thought experiment, this one based on one Peirce himself offers on how learning occurs, so which I'll call "The Child Learns a Lesson." Although the toddler has been told by mom to stay away from the stove's burners, that they're 'hot' and will 'burn' her so that she'll feel 'pain', yet when mom isn't looking, the child steps up to the stove, experiences the pain of the burn as she screams "Aie!!!" and immediately withdraws her hand. Well, while I'm certain some here will argue otherwise, to my way of thinking there isn't much in the nature of dicisignificance going on in this situation, especially given that the child has only a few words at her disposal at this point in her development. For me there can be little doubt that the child has 'experienced' (although that is hardly the correct word) at least one and probably several immediate objects. And while it is wholly unlikely that they all happened in an abstract 'instant', they certainly occurred in a fraction of a second, a 'moment' as Peirce analyzes the minimum of time. And, to boot, one can see in that moment several semiotic events: the qualisign which is the heat, the resultant pain (another qualisign), the immediate withdrawing of her hand (involving now 2ns), and the cry (perhaps involving 3ns as she's a French girl and has heard mom cry out "Aie!!!" when she herself was in pain or saw that her daughter was in pain). How complex even the simplest semiotic event appears to be! Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 2:02 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Jon, Gary R, The crucial question here is: What is the Real Object of the term “sign” in each of these definitions? In each case, we would have to gather what clues we can from the context of the definition (since, as we all know, the sign cannot express its object). And when we do, I think it would be wise to bear in mind some other general statements Peirce made about “signs,” such as this one: [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of propositions and which must be true of them, since every proposition can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of concepts that are not propositional; and this argument is supported by the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906] This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” because it is a constituent of a proposition. Or consider this statement: [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, c.1908] A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects because they resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s another statement in the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a shorthand for “proposition”: [[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] CP 6.341,344, 1909] The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer to a generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, is a proposition or quasi-proposition or essential part of a proposition. The only way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for a given statement about “signs” is to read the context clues. That’s what I intend to do when I come across such statements in the future. In short, I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that statement means. Our concept of “immediate object” depends on that. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 29-Jan-18 10:56 To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>; Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14) Garys, List: As Gary R. already reiterated, all of those definitions either explicitly state or clearly imply that every Sign has an Immediate Object, contrary to Bellucci's attribution to Peirce of the claim that only propositions do. In fact, if Bellucci were correct, then the mode of presentation of the Immediate Object would be limited to the third division (Copulants), since all propositions are Symbols; but Peirce emphatically affirmed that Signs can also be Descriptives or Designatives/Denominatives (EP 2:480,484-488). Since Gary F. asked for examples, Peirce classified a demonstrative pronoun or pointing finger as a Designative/Denominative (EP 2:484), and a statue of a common solider in a town square or a geometrical diagram as a Descriptive (CP 2:486-487). Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary f, Jon S, list, Yes, what I gave are not examples but definitions of "immediate object," something I recognized immediately after sending it, but it was too late to do anything about it because, despite the few seconds delay I have built into my email system, it had already been sent. I wonder why Peirce would consistently offer so many definitions which include the idea that all signs have an immediate object if he weren't convinced that that were so?This one, from 1907, even adds that without an immediate object "a sign would not be a sign." Pretty definitive language for him to use, I'd say. 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15 …all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: the Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR). As for your "stormy day" example, it's one which analyzes not any other kind of sign but a proposition. Yes, it would be excellent if Jon or I (or anyone) could find an example Peirce gives of an immediate object in a sign other than a proposition. But, as I have looked at the matter over the years, I would agree with Peirce in the definitions I offered that every sign (at least those employed in human semiosis) has an immediate object and that without one "a sign would not be a sign." So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that, according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects" Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:08 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Gary R, Jon et al., What you’ve listed here, Gary, are examples of definitions of “immediate object.” They are not examples of signs which have immediate objects, still less are they examples of immediate objects. I think we need to look at those, if we can find them, to clarify what an immediate object is. Here’s one example, from a 1909 letter to William James: [[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains. … I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment. The Immediate Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. ] EP2:498 ] I include that last sentence to further emphasize Peirce’s distinction between the character of a “notion” and the identity of it. This distinction is essential to the analysis of a Dicisign or a proposition, so it is clear that signs of that type must have immediate objects. The immediate object of such a sign is, as Peirce explains, the object of an Index which is necessarily a part of a Dicisign because it indicates what the sign represents itself to be about, Now, can you show us where Peirce gives an example of an immediate object of a rheme or icon, or any other sign which is not of a Dicent or propositional nature? If so, we can assure ourselves that we are not confusing the immediate object with the immediate interpretant by conflating the identity of an idea with its quality. 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