Dear Stephen, list,
Your words are lovely. But pray tell, would you accept the following assertion as one that pragmaticists would boast themselves to be? *'the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer .. .'?* With best wishes, Jerry R On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics. > Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to > which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea > what happened. > > Here is a bit that may explain what I am about. > > Reality is all. > > All is the case. > > The world is a case. > > A case is a sign. > > + > > Facts are claims as well as true. > > Things are what they are. > > Ultimately, what is good is what is true. > > + > > Sometime is time to come. > > Future is here in > > The world is determined as we go. > > Things change and remain the same. > > + > > There is no end to all. > > Continuity and movement reign. > > Days are units of progress. > > + > > The case is what is true. > > The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth. > > Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the > disposition of choices. > > Our world is where we are in reality. > > + > > Logic tends toward good. > > The world tends toward good. > > + > > The world is not divided by any mental gyration. > > The world is what it is. > > + > > Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not > knowing. > > No one has a final answer. > > Most mystery we cannot fathom. > > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Edwina and Stephen, >> >> ET >> >>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and >>> a 'grammatical sentence'? >>> >> >> A sentence is just one move in a language game. >> >> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship >> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games, >> Natural and Artificial": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf >> >> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language >> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_. >> >> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'. >> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English >> 'game'. It would include noncompetitive play as well as games >> that involve competition. >> >> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as >> "pure play": http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement >> >> SCR >> >>> I claim logic is good. >>> >> >> Oh. Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of >> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth. >> >> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic >> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of >> philosophy. But logic is also one of the normative sciences. >> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two >> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics. >> >> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a >> historical observation: All versions of formal logic have >> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages. >> >> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems. >> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the >> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include >> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams. >> >> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic. That >> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules >> of inference, which preserve truth. >> >> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative. It puts >> constraints on what can be said. By itself, formal logic is >> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new. >> >> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction >> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction >> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight). >> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth. >> >> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction, >> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and >> further observation. But you can never be certain that the >> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth. >> >> John >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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